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    ummid pe dunya khayam hai
The world stands on hope
(A Hindi-Urdu Adage)
2 / 272
Mauro Vaiani - Disintegration as Hope - Index
(PhD public defense on 12 July 2013)
Index
Table of Contents
Index.......................................................................................................................................................3
Abstract...................................................................................................................................................5
Introduction.............................................................................................................................................8
1. Integrations and their limits..............................................................................................................16
1.1 The Original Oppression.................................................................................................17
1.2 The Original Globalization..............................................................................................23
1.3 The Triggering of the State..............................................................................................30
1.4 States and the Empire......................................................................................................38
1.5 Empires and the Barbarians.............................................................................................46
1.6 European Expansionism..................................................................................................52
1.7 Western Revolutions.......................................................................................................64
1.8 Industrial Colonialism.....................................................................................................74
1.9 The Totalitarian Outcome................................................................................................87
2. The Turn and a Conjecture.............................................................................................................109
2.1 Nationalism and Its Deceits...........................................................................................110
2.2 Decolonization and Its Bias...........................................................................................115
2.3 Integration Self-Exhaustion...........................................................................................128
2.4 Liberation Movements..................................................................................................137
2.5 Big Brother's Self-Restraint..........................................................................................144
2.6 Leviathan's Overstretch.................................................................................................154
2.7 Disintegration and Peace...............................................................................................164
2.8 The Permissive State of Disintegration.........................................................................174
3. After the Break of Sameness..........................................................................................................187
3.1 Beyond the Cycle..........................................................................................................188
3.2 The Princely Citizenry..................................................................................................192
3.3 Anarchy Resized...........................................................................................................202
3.4 The Coming Caretakers.................................................................................................214
Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................220
Bibliography.......................................................................................................................................230
Books and Chapters............................................................................................................231
Journal Articles and Other Papers.......................................................................................253
Websites and Other Multimedial Sources............................................................................264
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................................267
About the author.................................................................................................................271
Annotations.........................................................................................................................272
3 / 272
Mauro Vaiani - Disintegration as Hope - Index
(PhD candidate in Geopolitics – University of Pisa)
4 / 272
Mauro Vaiani - Disintegration as Hope - Abstract
(PhD public defense on 12 July 2013)
Abstract
This  research  theorizes  an  ongoing,  global,  grand  trend  of  geopolitical 
disintegration, in the Post-Cold War, and increasingly in post-1989 time. The proposed 
paradigm may be useful to analyze redistribution of internal power within every state, 
from developed old Western powers, to new developed powers as China and India, well 
beyond the dissolved former real-socialist countries and the so-called failing states. The 
focus  is  on  not  empirical  description  of  each  local  request  of  more  autonomy, 
self-government, or even independence, but on the reached limits of the centuries-long 
and planet-wide integration process, from which the modern states and contemporary 
world have arisen, and that has now left room to a time of disintegration.
This  insight  draws  on  a  wide  range  of  positions  and  contributions  from 
International Relations theorists,  along with other  political  scientists and scholars of 
geopolitics,  anthropologists  and  sociologists,  political  geographers  and  economists, 
historians of colonialism and nationalism, experts of secession, critics of globalization 
and postmodern intellectuals, federalists and anarchists.
*
The first of the three parts of this study, is dedicated to an historical insight about 
the  geopolitical  integration  process  that  had  westernized  and  globalized  the  entire 
world. War, the state and expansionism, were not an inevitable destiny. Instead, a very 
small group of modern states, in competition and imitation amongst themselves, started 
a particularly steady conquering march on the planet. Their power expanded in intensity 
and  extension  for  centuries  and,  with  and  because  of  the  Industrial  Revolution, 
culminated in totalitarian states and in total wars.
* *
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The second part treats the social and national movements that have led to the end, 
in 1989, of the bipolar  paramountcy of the two industrial superpowers, United States 
and Soviet Union. Along with the dissolution of blocs and states, a steady decreasing of 
states wars, crimes and violences, is registered and explained in the study.
A slippery use of the word and concept of nationalism, particularly in post-1989 
geopolitical crises, is frontally attacked in this part, drawing from early works of Ernest 
Gellner and Tom Nairn. Under the umbrella term of nationalism, integrationist projects 
and their victims, colonizers and colonized, oppressors and resistants,  are likely to  be 
confused.
An early intuition of Karl Deutsch about the social awareness and mobilization 
of people in post-totalitarian, post-industrial and post-colonial societies, is here crossed 
with the work about coercion, capital, inclusion and consent of Charles Tilly.  Masses, 
once enslaved in industrialized obedience, have evolved in networks of active citizens – 
and netizens – able, in a less violent international system, to claim for more personal 
liberties but also, as communities, for social, economical, and geopolitical change.
A theoretical conjecture is  also  presented in this second part:  in the  Post-Cold 
War, no old or new powers will be able to keep enough concentration of power, in order 
to compete for world domination. We have entered a permissive state of disintegration. 
Redistribution  of  power  from center  to  peripheries,  empowerment  of  federal  units, 
multiplication of small states,  may  occur,  from now on,  because there is nobody and 
nothing capable of preventing it. From this geopolitical point of view, the 1989 is at the 
very beginning.  While sharing certain premises of a well-known thoughtful article by 
Alexander  Wendt,  on the  inevitability  of  a  world  state  (2003),  this  work  reaches  a 
different conclusion.
* * *
In the third and last part, the scope and the nature of the break in the sameness of 
international life is explored, with normative purposes. History is not repeating, and 
integration  prejudices  along  with  integrationist  projects  should  be  overcome.  Every 
state may substantially devolve powers to its internal authorities, or even breakup, and 
many new smaller states, or self-governing units within states, might come out.
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In this increasing number of polities, an overwhelming number of citizens may 
go  well  beyond  electoral  democracy  and  have  direct  access  to  power.  They  may 
coalesce  around  what  Brian  Ferguson  defined  an  «identerest»  complex:  constructed 
identities  and  tangible  interests,  inextricably  intertwined.  Citizens  and  netizens 
demanding power on their own territories and disintegration of their states, are required 
to take care of citizenry's duties, not only citizenship's rights.  A model of responsible, 
moderate, pragmatic, «princely citizenry», echoing Machiavelli and Gramsci, is here 
proposed.
-|-
Acquisitions of this study are bluntly offered as a contribution to political action 
in a time of geopolitical change, in which it would be important to rely on expertise, but 
also on compassion, and on a real interest in the historical and geographical, spiritual 
and  material  pathways  that  each  local,  concrete  human  community  is  pursuing. 
Western-led state-building hubris, for instance, should be put aside in Afghanistan and 
many other corners of the world, it is recommend by this study. In favor of bottom-up 
cantonization,  for  example,  an  ancient  Swiss  wisdom  which  would  deserve  more 
consideration in a changing world.
While  burdened by the contradictions of modernity and  menaced by  recurrent 
economical and ecological  crises,  local princely citizenries,  demanding sovereignty in 
their place of dwelling, are probably the main and the best possible challengers to the 
status  quo.  Concentrating  on  their  territory  and  population,  they  may  change  their 
everyday reality,  overcoming  political corruption,  bureaucratic impotence, economical 
inequality, ecological destruction.
It  may reveal  be easier to scale down, rather than tear down, the pyramids of 
oppression.  Leopold Kohr, Ivan Illich and don Lorenzo Milani's prophecies  of justice 
and  peace  in  geopolitical  smallness,  may  become  inspiring  visions,  in  a  time  of 
disintegration.
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Introduction
In a time of strong faith in one-direction progress of human civilization, history 
has  been  told  as  a  “spectacle  of  the  grouping”  of  humans  in  “knit  units”  of  ever 
increasing size, able to live in internal peace, and notwithstanding
“all temporary revolutions and the shattering of larger units for the time 
being, the progress in the direction of recognition of common interests 
in larger groups, and consequent political federation has been so regular 
and so marked that we must needs conclude that the tendencies which 
have swayed this development in the past will govern our history in the 
future” (Boas, 1932, p. 101).
This apparently inexorable historical trend was, by the way, early questioned. 
Still in the midst of Cold War, while the complexity of the human world seemed to be 
reduced to one globe divided in only two halves, each of them under the paramountcy 
of  one  of  the  two  major  superpowers,  Karl  Deutsch,  in  his  pioneering  work  of 
international political theorizing, was already questioning if it was indeed realistic such 
a grand trend of geopolitical unification, which would be turning the human world into 
one politically unified world (Deutsch, 1960).
He conceived the possibility and positivity of integration of countries into strong 
and cohesive, friendly and lasting international security communities, but he did never 
take  for  granted  that  the  nation-state  was  being  superseded  by  the  rise  of 
continent-wide, ocean-wide, or planet-wide unions. Data and facts never allowed him to 
believe  that  there  was  a  clear-cut  process  making  the  world  more  hierarchically 
integrated, in any meaningful political sense. The great facts and the main subjects of 
his  studies,  the  building  of  security  community  joined by Western  and westernized 
major democratic countries, and the possibility of peaceful coexistence and cooperation 
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between the North Atlantic community and the bloc of real-socialist countries, were 
wrested  by  conscious  effort  of  statesmanship,  from  a  welter  of  underlying 
contradictions (Deutsch, 1960, p. 46).
Many other political thinkers spent their life studying integration processes, some 
of them embedded in international organizations. As often it is in political studies, it 
was not only a matter of scientific observation. The unification of continents, of the 
world, seemed to some of them, not only a likely historical trend, powerful and lasting, 
but also a good, right, suitable destiny for mankind, to close with a past of wars and 
fears, to escape the gloomy reality of Cold War. They were wrong, as we will argue in 
this  study,  but  they  notwithstanding  contributed,  in  many  admirable  ways,  to  the 
multiplication of institutions of peace and justice.
The  present  study  is  contributing  to  a  further  deepening  of  Karl  Deutsch's 
skepticism  about  concentrations  of  power.  It  theorizes  a  global,  grand  trend  of 
geopolitical  disintegration,  as  a  paradigm  useful  to  analyzing  many  different, 
disintegration  processes,  and  to  explain  their  apparent  contradictions.  It  suggests  a 
positive  insight  on  our  time  of  geopolitical  disintegration,  which  is  as  risky  as 
surprising. It proposes a normative discourse about the opportunities, the powers, the 
duties  that  citizens  –  and  netizens  –  are  having  in  this  new situation,  not  only  as 
individuals, as protesters, as networks of active citizenship, but as politically aware and 
geopolitical  responsible  institutionalized  citizenries,  that,  in  this  study,  echoing 
Machiavelli and Gramsci – but also as a warning not to forget the tragedy of the Indian 
partition - are defined and named «princely citizenries».
There is a,  perhaps unexpected,  counter-intuitive analogy, behind such different 
processes as the endless war in Afghanistan, and Pakistan's desperate need of federal 
reform;  the  disintegration  of  Somalia,  and  the  Tuareg  recurrent  revolt  in  Mali  and 
beyond; the bloodiest clashes in Nigeria, and the fragile independence of South Sudan; 
the  suicides  of  nuns  and  monks  in  Tibet,  and  the  struggle  for  democratic 
self-government in Hong Kong; the rivalry between state and provinces in Bolivia, and 
Brazilian Autumn's revolts; the European Union's crisis, and the aspiration of Scotland, 
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Flanders and Catalonia to independence; Occupy Wall Street, the Tea Party Movement, 
and the Mouvement souverainiste du Québec.
While sharing some premises of a well-known, thoughtful article by Alexander 
Wendt, on the inevitability of a world state (2003), this work reaches a rather different 
conclusion.  We  do  not  focus  on  empirical  description  of  each  separatist  and  local 
revolts, or social and economic struggles, but we concentrate on what these crises have 
in  common.  It  is  more  than  it  is  commonly  imagined,  and  it  may  be  better 
comprehended, this work argues, within the theorization of the proposed geopolitical 
disintegration paradigm.
All serious questions,  Deutsch reminded, are particular and any more general 
theory might be neither warranted nor wanted. But while studying the forty years of 
violence war in Afghanistan, from the fall of the monarchy in 1973 till the – hopefully 
irreversible, this time - end of foreign intervention, scheduled in 2013-2014, the weight 
of political imbroglio, military impotence, academic blindness, became unbearable and 
encouraged the present profound afterthought. Turning again to  Deutsch's lesson: any 
retreat into the empiric, localized case-study risks to be based upon a fallacy, if one 
lacks a previous correct theorization. We cannot successfully investigate a particular 
problem without having made a correct assumption about the general context in which 
it occurs (Deutsch, 1960, p. 34).
Karl  Deutsch  had  early  intuitions  about  Social  Mobilization  and  Political  
Development (1961),  and  a  possible  relation  among  popular  awareness,  integration 
failures and increasing necessity of decentralization in the modern world (Deutsch and 
Kochen, 1980). Intuitions we have crossed with the seminal reflection of Charles Tilly 
(1990) about coercion and capital, inclusion and consent, within the development of 
European  states,  and  developed,  in  order  to  uncover  certain  repeated  failings  and 
eventual limits of the integration process from which the modern world has arisen.
Failings and limits that,  since the 1960s, have been globally manifesting as a 
continuous series of social and national liberation movements, which  went on in the 
1970s and 1980s, and eventually culminated in the 1989, the year which did become a 
reality the long expected rise of the powerful voice of powerless citizen (Havel, 1985). 
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A sociological tipping point,  the 1989, which was also an historical and political turn. 
Its  dramatic  geopolitical  consequences,  this  study  argues,  have  been  largely 
undervalued and are all but concluded.
The  Post-Cold  War is  not  only  a  time  of  expanded  electoral  democracy and 
«Washington Consensus», in the light of the XIX century returning temptation – old 
liberal, then neoliberal, and eventually even neoconservative - of assuming or searching 
harmony among states, while maintaining the actual hierarchy of power and relations of 
dependency, not rarely coupled with the belief in individual rights, while maintaining as 
irredeemable  social  structural  inequalities  (cf  Waltz,  1954,  p. 103).  In  addition,  the 
Post-Cold War is in fact very far from feared coming anarchy (Kaplan, 2001), descent 
into chaos (Rashid, 2008), or other dreadful outcomes.
Rather,  geopolitical  disintegrations  are  mostly  peaceful,  and  states'  violence, 
crimes and wars, have been steady declining. Nationalist state-building projects – as in 
Somalia - and neocolonialist designs – as the Serbian one in former Yugoslav – have 
been defeated.
Cold  War-inherited  barbarizations  are  steady  declining,  along  with  states' 
violence, crimes and wars, as we have learned from The State, Identity and Violence :  
Political  Disintegration  in  the  Post-Cold  War  World  (Ferguson  editor,  2003).  This 
positive  insight  on  disintegration  owes  much  to  this  book,  whose  collection  of 
international  contributions  is,  at  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  the  first  conscious  and 
public  discussion  of  the  Post-Cold  War  as  the  dawn  of  a  time  of  geopolitical 
disintegration. A crucial, fertile encounter, which had come to complete this author's 
own reflection  on disintegration,  started in  the 1980s,  as  personal  experience  much 
before than scholarly work.
Geopolitical disintegration, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, has not been only an 
issue in  collapsed real-socialist  regimes,  nor just  in  failing states.  Rather,  it  derives 
directly from successful social advancements of ordinary people, and from a successful 
management  of  diversities  and minorities,  achieved by certain states.  Disintegrating 
states could be defined the most socially and politically successful modern states, as we 
have seen in the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet block and in many other federal 
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reformations and power devolution in the rest of the world. It is not a paradox, but an 
invitation to an inversion of perspective. From this point of view, furthermore, with the 
progress of the global and technological change, we will understand that geopolitical 
disintegration is at its very beginning, as a process, all over the world.
In this  study much of what the mainstream treats under the umbrella term of 
nationalism is openly put in discussion, drawing much from early – and in our opinion 
still fundamental - intuitions contained in Ernest Gellner's Thought and Change (1964), 
and Tom Nairn's The Modern Janus (1975). In particular, we explicitly refuse to use the 
word and the concept of nationalism, while describing the coming out of a multitude of 
local polities, which are demanding for self-determination.
Stateless  peoples,  substate  communities,  federal  units  are  developing  their 
“identerest” (Ferguson,  2003i, p. 28) – a  complex of identity and interest, which may 
certainly evolve in an advocacy for separation, partition, independence. This demand of 
sovereignty, however, does not mean necessarily, or mostly, violence and war. Rather - 
driven by a princely citizenry - the local polity may evolve as inclusive and nonviolent, 
as  it  is  possible  in  our  time  of  gentle  revolutions,  and  allowed  by  their  concrete 
geopolitical  position.  And always within the framework however,  of increasing,  and 
increasingly overlapping, international security communities.
In the 2010s,  many successful  princely citizenries have yet  come out as new 
international actors – Scotland, for instance, is among the most known and the nearest 
to its historical achievements, with the coming 2014 referendum. Interestingly, debates 
about its institutional future has ranged from the so-called «light independence» to the 
so-called  «maximum  devolution»  (aka  devo-max).  This  language  tells  us  of  an 
intellectual difficulty. It is well clear that, in our contemporary world, an autonomous 
province as Hong Kong in China has much more self-determination than – for instance 
– Grenada, the little independent state that was normalized by United States far in 1983. 
No state  is  totally  independent  and,  in this  sense,  it  is  hard to  find any substantial  
difference among the two formulas of light independence and devo-max.
In both cases, regaining full control of their own resources, Scotland may thrive 
and take off, but it is not going to the Moon or Mars. It will remain certainly integrated 
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in the contemporary post-1989 world and its security communities, namely, in its case, 
the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, along with others. More importantly, it 
would be necessary not  to  use ambiguous expressions  to  obscure  the really  crucial 
question: will the Scottish princely citizenry be sovereign on its circumscribed territory, 
or it  will  not? If  their  informed, long matured,  final decision will  be respected,  the 
answer  will  a  clear  “Yes”,  regardless  the  fact  that  they  will  maintain  their 
representatives  at  Westminster,  or  they  would  prefer  the  total  repatriation  of  their 
political powers, the homecoming of their constitution.
The lack of intellectual elasticity – and moral clarity – when we come to discuss 
of  any  form  of  state  power  redistribution,  is  largely  due  to  anti-disintegration 
prejudices, which have laminated rather recently, in late modern history and particularly 
in  the  Cold  War  glaciation,  and  that  are  frontally  attacked  in  this  study:  (1) 
balkanization  as  a  geopolitical  taboo;  (2)  the  presumed  economic  or  political 
impracticality of small states and statelets; (3) the disconcerting blindness to the paucity 
of results and total lack of accountability of international organizations, agencies and 
bureaucracies; (4) the fixity of untouchable borders, and a general horror of secession; 
(5) the inevitability of territorial augmentation, of concentration of power in big states, 
and of continental integration, and the consequent fear of remaining dwarfs in a world 
of giants; (6) the connected conviction that those who resist the attraction by the center, 
are dangerous and backward; (7) the inevitable waning of the states in the face of an 
improperly  reified  globalization,  which  would  lead  to  some kind of  world  political 
unification.
Such «seven deadly» prejudices have been blocking the understanding of other 
and possibly diverse political evolutions, eventually contributing to the worsening of 
already tragic situations, as happened in Afghanistan and Somalia, two most tragically 
misunderstood crises, and in many  places. With a  recent exception, the South Sudan 
secession, that may be a sign, albeit late, of rethinking, and of acknowledging that not 
breakup, but  obsessive big state-building, have primarily meant ethnic cleansing  and 
ecocide.
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Remaining  stranded  in  integration  prejudices,  may  lead  to  serious  scientific 
misunderstanding and, consequently, dramatic political consequences. It is time, this 
author argues, that disintegration studies may be deepened, for they are needed. They 
are important for the coming time, as regional and functional integration studies were at 
the time of the rebuilding of the world from the ruins of the  XX century totalitarian 
wars,  when  they  effectively  inspired  and  led  the  decision-makers  of  international 
integration.
We have long learned from our mentors, and from a long experience of civic and 
civil  service,  that  there are no scientific  solutions  to political  troubles.  A change of 
paradigm,  however,  from  integration  and  integrationism,  to  understanding 
disintegration,  will  help,  if  not  prevent,  at  least  to correct  many errors.  This author 
would like to think, as a scientist and as a committed intellectual, this time we arrive in 
time, before the disaster of new global wars, and not after, thanks to the entering onto 
the world stage, of an incredible number of people who are largely peacefully refusing 
obedience to their state, in the name of love for life and for their motherland.
The study is divided into three part: first, an historical insight on the triggering of 
human wars,  states,  empires,  Western  expansionism,  industrial  colonialism,  and the 
totalitarian outcome of modernity, contesting these facts may be treated as a «natural» 
evolution in any possible sense this ambiguous word may assume in the westernized 
political  discourse;  second,  a  treatment  of  the  powerful  -  even if  contradictory  and 
deceptive - social and national liberation movements that has brought the bipolar world 
to its end, and our reflections – with a theoretical conjecture – about the 1989, seen as a 
major  geopolitical  turn;  third,  some  final  assessments  –  some  of  them  deliberately 
provocative  – along with a few proposals for a normative debate about how human 
polities should deal in a time of disintegration.
Remembering a great lesson of Isaiah Berlin (1954), we try to keep away from 
believing in  any possible  kind  of  historical  inevitability,  or  resting  on  any kind of 
historicist fallacy, less even on any Promethean constructivism. Not to be confused, this 
last,  as we will see at the beginning of the study,  with the constructivist approach in 
International  Relations,  of  which  we  consider  debtor,  and  that  should  be  named, 
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according to many less ambiguously, constructionism (Raskin, 2000). The renounce to 
any positivist hubris brings with itself a positive dividend, for scientists:
“They will know more precisely the limits of their knowledge. While 
the  tracing  of  robust  processes  may  appear  less  glorious  than  the 
scientific  norms  of  social  physics,  perhaps  it  will  make  political 
surprises somewhat less surprising and social science more useful as a 
guide to policy-making in a complex world” (Cederman, 1997, p. 231).
This  work  was  completed  in  the  five-hundredth  anniversary  of  Machiavelli's 
seminal essay on power, the 1513 Prince. A lucky coincidence we hope, while we mark 
the transition from the early modern Prince, to the Party as modern prince reigning over 
obedient masses, up to a self-governing princely citizenship,  where every human may 
be prince, and no more subject, or submitted.
These thoughts about geopolitical disintegration as hope, a chance for justice and 
peace, an opportunity of freedom for the individual and liberty for the people, have 
been  constantly  inspired  by,  and  are  humbly  dedicated  to,  Karl  Deutsch  and  his 
remarkable  Voyage of the mind (Deutsch, 1980j).  He  feared concentration of power, 
welcomed  self-government,  encouraged  the  renewal  of  the  ancient  wisdom  of 
federalism. Following his capacity of going beyond integration prejudices, we strongly 
believe, would help the coming  princely citizenries to avoid many tragic  geopolitical 
mistakes, and further decades of farther wars, from Aceh to Zanzibar.
15 / 272
Mauro Vaiani - Disintegration as Hope - 1. Integrations and their limits
(PhD candidate in Geopolitics – University of Pisa)
1. Integrations and their limits
16 / 272
Mauro Vaiani - Disintegration as Hope - 1. Integrations and their limits
(PhD public defense on 12 July 2013)
1.1 The Original Oppression
Human  sociality  and  its  political  consequences  are  rooted  in  human  nature. 
Berger  and Luckmann in their  fundamental  work about  The Social  Construction of  
Reality  (1966),  recount  the  impossibility  for  humans  to  produce  an  environment  in 
isolation and explain the anthropological necessity for the building of a society and, 
within that society, of a hierarchy.
Solitary human existence at a primordial animal level has been widely imagined, 
with a long list  of archetypal  feral  children – from the ancient  Mesopotamian hero 
Enkidu, to the modern jungle hero Tarzan. These stories contain a powerful message, a 
mixture of hope and nostalgia, a deep faith in a divined good nature, where food and 
freedom are providentially and abundantly available. But nature has another face, where 
the human, if  isolated,  is only a fragile naked creature,  who can be prey from wild 
beasts and be a victim of natural elements, in all their fury. The human being, as an 
individual, lacks the biological equipment to survive in loneliness.  For what we know 
of human condition, humans must socialize to provide a stable existence for themselves.
Humans co-operate  not  only to survive,  but also to  externalize themselves  in 
socially recognized activities - a lonely quiescence is seldom enough, for most of them. 
Human actions can be repeated till they become patterns, which can be reproduced with 
an economy of effort by experienced and specialized individuals. In any specialized 
repetition there is an implicit psychological gain, which is the basic motivation of every 
institutionalization  process.  Any  rite,  tradition,  way  of  life,  routine  or  corvée,  may 
narrow the possible choices, but they also free individuals from the burden of too many 
decisions. This relief is biologically grounded in human undirected instinctual structure. 
It is not a reduction or a deprivation of human possibilities, because by providing a 
stable framework in which human activity can proceed along consolidated procedures, 
with a minimum of decision-making, every institutionalization process also frees energy 
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for more challenging decisions, as they may become necessary on certain occasions (cf 
Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 51-61). It is still a very common experience for the 
contemporary  person:  driving  a  car,  for  instance,  with  a  minimum  of  conditioned 
vigilance, it corresponds in the meantime to a state while the driver feels free to think, 
imagine, create. The institutionalization of activities opens new possibilities.
Human communities consist basically of this elementary institutionalization: in a 
group, every individual is bound to a specialized role, circumscribed space, or regulated 
time.  Thanks to those who specialize and concentrate on the most pragmatic roles, a 
few others  may become inventors,  artists  or  leaders.  Even in the  queer  and sacred 
family  of  Jesus  in  Bethany,  a  shrine  of  innocence,  there  was however  this  kind  of 
tension among Martha and Maria (Luke, 10:39-41).  It could be said that there is no 
socialization, without institutionalization, and this last only may free energies, resources 
for a wider range of cultural innovations and spiritual achievements.
To say that humans  institutionalize their activity  and socialize,  means also that 
they have accepted a control,  an original  hierarchy. Once it has been constructed,  the 
institutionalized hierarchical society  confronts the individual as an undeniable fact. It 
may exist before any individual birth and it may last after any individual death. It is out 
there, external to the individual, persistent and resilient, whether the individual likes it 
or not. It may resist any attempt to change, avoid or evade it. It has coercive power over 
the members of the social  group, by the sheer force of its existence (cf Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, pp. 51-61).  It cannot be otherwise:  the very structures that require 
conformation,  are  the necessary ones which allow human creativity,  innovation and 
eventually rebellion.
Not  only  institutionalization,  socialization,  hierarchy, and  innovation,  are  an 
inextricable tangle, but they have a history from which they are the products and they 
contribute to shape. It is trivial and paradoxical at the same time: humans produce the 
world they need and they consequently become subject to this very humanized world, 
after it has been externalized and transformed into a social reality. The individual and 
the social world  incessantly  interact with each other,  in time.  The product – society - 
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acts back upon the producer – the individual - and there is no easy way to reconstruct 
any chain of causes and effects (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 51-61).
Therefore, theorizing that social order stems from biological and anthropological 
necessity,  does not make it any less socially constructed.  The state of nature has been 
widely theoretically imagined and discussed, from Aristotle to Rousseau, but certainly a 
time before the society, populated by uneducated and unconditioned human beings, if it 
ever existed, is empirically unavailable.
None  of  the  structures  of  the  human  world  can  be  understood  as  something 
deterministically given. No social order exists – if ever existed - in nature, though every 
local  natural  environment  certainly  requires  and  determines  the  economic  or 
technological features of a particular local, temporary social order. The objectivity of 
the human world, however natural or divine, factual or scientific it may appear to the 
individual, is a humanly locally produced, locally constructed temporary objectivity. If 
there are superior laws - from nature,  from divinity,  or from any kind of intelligent 
design  -  they  can  only be  understood through an  ever  local,  provisional,  imperfect 
socially  constructed  human investigation.  In  Berger  and  Luckmann's  words:  social 
order exists as a product of human activity; no other ontological status may be ascribed 
to it without hopelessly obfuscating its empirical manifestations (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, pp. 51-61).
While reexamining the few things we know about the  spreading oh humans  all 
over the planet, we will have to remember that wherever they went, they invariantly, in 
the different corners of the world, settled and formed communities, thus reproducing 
their original  institutionalization, socialization, hierarchy and innovation. Not always, 
however, and by no mean necessarily, as we will see,  this original oppression meant 
war, inequality and destruction of the environment.
The entire creation of the human world is a social construction, the Promethean 
myth of innovation brought by the individual hero included. Therefore, everything we 
know and certainly all we can scientifically know about humanity, is conditioned by our 
sociality.  Despite many theoretical differences, most of those who believe in this,  call 
themselves social constructionists, rather than constructivists,  reflecting their  aversion 
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to the notion of the isolated learner, that would risky lead to a fallacious vision a human 
being imprisoned in one's own individualistic experience (Raskin, 2002). 
A merely subjective constructivism would end up to be ahistorical, asocial, and 
blind to institutions (Eberle, 1992). To avoid, since the beginning, a risk of confusion, 
this  author  precises  to  be  among those  who,  while  welcoming the  social  theory  of 
international  politics  (Wendt,  1999)  as  an  incarnation  of  a  mature  social 
constructionism,  which  is  at  the  very  basis  of  social  theorizing  (Hayek,  1943), 
nevertheless  would  prefer  to  name  this  approach  constructionism,  instead  of 
constructivism, also in the International Relations, following the clarification made by 
many other constructionists in their fields (Raskin, 2002).
Social  facts and institutions can be comprehended adequately only  within the 
society, the geography, the history in which  they  are  produced. This does not lead to 
thinking that social  science is just a kind of clash between different opinions, in an 
outcome of scientific irrelevancy and moral relativism,  because, since they have been 
constructed, institutions and societies exist in external reality and the individual cannot 
understand them solely by introspection. It is therefore possible to know the reality, 
albeit imperfectly, through the narrow limits of a socially conditioned and then partial, 
fallible human perception. A limited realism is therefore possible, along with a limited, 
inherent  relativity: the reality  may be  viewed as dependent on how diverse groups of 
people collectively and differently elaborate their own ideas. Thus, there are a variety of 
socially  constructed  realities,  but  these  realities,  precisely  because  they  are  socially 
negotiated, can be studied, criticized and also put into discussion.
When  the  awareness  of  the  social  construction  emerges,  a  more  prudent 
perspective follows and a  less dogmatic  approach to  the social  reality  is  generated. 
People are moved toward interpersonal discussion, public debate, social critics and the 
beneficial re-examination of their culture, society and politics (cf Raskin, 2000).
In front of  this ever surprising and profoundly human contradiction  among the 
necessity of a limited realism, along with a limited relativity, it is worth remembering a 
brilliant page written by Karl Deutsch,  where we are remembered that there are more 
cells in the brain of every single human person than there are people in the world. An 
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individual has vastly greater speed, range of recall from memory, power of reflection, 
recombination and innovation, than any social group, organization, or polity, no matter 
how big and powerful that collective may be. Any collective body is absolutely inferior 
to the less gifted individual human mind. The collective is much slower, less receptive 
and creative,  embarrassingly  uncritical  and,  even worse,  almost  totally incapable  of 
self-criticism,  let  alone  any irony or  self-irony.  Every  group,  even the  best,  is  also 
highly  likely  to  be  much  more  oppressive  and  scarcely  farsighted  than  the  worst 
individual (Deutsch, 1953-1966, pp. 171-172).
This co-operation between the two different types of mind - the smart individual 
one  and the brute  collective one,  “between the thought  of  individuals  in  the  vastly 
complex, sensitive, and accurate inner communication channels of their nerves, brains, 
and  bodies,  and  the  slower,  far  more  primitive  channels  of  society”  (Deutsch, 
1953-1966, p. 172), is never an easy one. It has costs, negative feedbacks, uncertain 
results and an inescapable sense of uncertainty about the future.
It could seem that this lead us to a certain frustration: the individual is superior, 
but the individual alone is also impotent; the collective is strong, but brute and brutal. 
Individual comprehension of reality is in need to come to terms with that of others. If 
the individual welcomes a limited relativity of her intuitions, and the group welcomes a 
limited collective realism, their joint efforts  may gather,  Deutsch wrote,  resources and 
knowledge, well beyond the lifetime of individuals, achieving what no single person - 
no matter how exceptional - can accomplish, and even bringing the living and the dead 
together, in a collaboration beyond generations (Deutsch, 1953-1966, pp. 171-172).
A social scientist like Gellner deeply opposed both excesses of positivism and 
relativism: the first  considering one only social  and intellectual  order,  as  absolutely 
valid;  the latter  denying the very possibility  of  objective knowledge.  The European 
originated Enlightenment rationality, he argued, had enabled unprecedented mastery of 
the world, for good and bad,  and it ought not be considered a  cognitive style among 
others. But Gellner was also deeply aware of social and cultural differences and of the 
fact  that  our  rationality  was the product  of  our particular  social  order  -  that  of the 
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Western  modernity  (cf  Breuilly,  2006,  p.  XV).  A limited  relativity  could  temper 
positivism. A limited realism could temper relativism.
Scientist  positivism  and  moral  relativism,  eventually  became  Western 
instruments of  environmental destruction,  social  cruelty,  and political  cynicism.  From 
Comte to Marx, from Darwin to Malthus, from Mackinder to Pareto, from Quételet to 
Lombroso, a set of rigid, simplistic, one-sided ideas, narrowly conceived to justify the 
domination of the Europeran and wealthy male, were improperly reified in inexorable 
social  forces,  and  treated  by  those  in  power  as  inescapable  natural  laws.  Global 
domination by the European states became «natural», as well as their wars, as we will 
see below.
“Society is produced by our wants”. Rephrasing this famous  incipit of Thomas 
Paine's Common Sense (1776), one may say that to live within a society is a necessary 
blessing and to be controlled by its institutions is an unavoidable price, or, as Paine 
would say, a necessary and minor price we have to pay. But nothing suggests that there 
was something unavoidable in the course of history. The original oppression was not the 
original sin.
We are authorized, and required, to look more critically at political development 
of  human  history,  since  the  formation  of  states  and  empires,  and  at  the  spread  of 
civilizations,  and mostly  of  our  own,  and its  supposedly  manifest  destiny  of  world 
domination.
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1.2 The Original Globalization
Within the many possible scientific conjectures and reconstructions about human 
origin,  there  is  a  minimum  consensus  about  the  fact  that  a  population  of  modern 
humans evolved in an African cradle from archaic Homo sapiens, between 200,000 and 
150,000  years  ago.  They  are  known  as  Homo  sapiens  sapiens and  defined 
«anatomically modern humans».
About 100,000 years after, between 100,000 and 50,000 years ago, in Africa and 
in  the  Near  East,  there  are  evidences  of  a  further  dramatic  change.  Their  physical 
appearance and structure were the same, but their mind was different. Some of those 
humans  became  able  to  join  their  forces  in  a  much  more  efficient  hunting.  They 
revealed themselves to be much smarter gatherers of edible fruits and vegetables. Their 
stone and bone artifacts were produced and reproduced following regular patterns. They 
started fishing, swimming and building watercraft. They engrave stone walls and use 
colors to paint them. They show signs of cultural variation and, last but not least, they 
express  the  most  human  of  the  abilities:  innovation.  Diamond  (1989)  reports  the 
speculation that this  turn consisted of improved neural connections,  so that humans 
could start creating languages to communicate more completely. Having no evidence of 
further genetic evolution, those humans are defined «behaviorally modern humans».
This innovative people were able to live better and longer, and to multiply and 
expand, in a way analogous to that their  Homo sapiens predecessors had been able 
before  them,  but  astonishingly  much faster,  farther,  and with  greater  success.  After 
having  expanded  in  Africa,  Eurasia,  Australasia,  Oceania,  they  reached  America. 
Finally they expanded towards the Arctic region and the depth of the Amazonia forest. 
This expansion all over the world is a surprising performance: it has been called the 
«great leap forward» by Diamond (1998).
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This  late  smart  branch  of  Homo  sapiens  sapiens,  spreading,  produced  an 
extraordinary cultural diversity all over the planet, but it also gradually replaced all the 
preceding  older  and  diverse  human  populations.  We  don't  need  to  imagine  the 
predecessors as inferior: their evolutionary trajectories went independently for hundreds 
of  thousands  of  years,  then  they  possibly  evolved  their  neurological  and  cognitive 
capacities  in  a  way  that  could  have  simply  been  significantly  different  from  ours 
(Mellars, 2006).
Among  those  who  disappeared,  one  has  to  remember  the  Neanderthals,  that 
flourished in Europe, till their fatal encounter with the  Homo sapiens sapiens. Their 
remnants reveal us creatures that left at least three unequivocal signs of their humanity: 
first, they were the earliest to regularly light fires; second, Neanderthals were also the 
first people who ordinarily buried their dead; third, they possibly took care of their sick 
and aged ones (Diamond, 1989).
A social  construction  of  our  human  history  as  an  irredeemable,  inevitable 
manifestation of human cruelty, of the stronger’s abuse of the weaker, may induce the 
idea that even this very first globalization had its victims. The expansion of our human 
population may be thought, in Darwinist terms of survivor of the fittest, as happened at 
the expense of every other older and diverse humans. Diamond suggests that their fate 
was similar to events that occurred repeatedly in human history, “whenever a numerous 
people with more advanced technology invades  the lands  of  a  much less numerous 
people with less advanced technology” (Diamond, 1989, pp. 21-22).
It not necessary, however, to imagine a carnage, in modern terms, of which, by 
the way, we would have no evidences: some may have been killed by the contagion of 
newcomers' diseases; some may have been displaced by the demographic success of the 
colonizers;  others  may  have  succeeded  to  live  peacefully  alongside,  taking  some 
advantage from relationship and cooperation with the incoming smarter hunters and 
gatherers, and even interbreeding. We cannot ignore, however, the mere fact that while 
the newcomers were spreading, the Neanderthal and any other former human creature, 
slowly declined till extinction.
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We probably ate better, lived longer, created and innovated much more, and in 
the course of a long historical process, that took many thousands of years - too long and 
too gradual to be in any sense comparable with ours modern violence - we have come to 
substitute the others.
It is not certainly here the place to state discussions and studies in progress about 
the possibility that some of today's humans may bring along, upon interbreeding, some 
genetic traces of the ancient Neanderthals or other older, diverse human populations. It 
is  important  to  remind,  instead,  for  the  correct  comprehension  of  the  following 
reconstruction, a founding evidence: all the now living human beings are descendants 
from a common genetic trunk of speaking-able and socializing-oriented humans, no 
matter if unique or, eventually, a progressively unified branch. 
A global human family exists  since the origin,  this  is  a scientific fact till  it’s 
unlikely  falsification,  and a  very  important  one,  that  need  to  be  made explicit  and 
reiterated  tirelessly,  especially  after  the  militarization  and  industrialization  of  our 
civilization,  and  the  consequent  invention  of  modern  racism,  conceived  to  justify 
permanent submission and irredeemable inequality among human creatures. The human 
diversity  is  only  a  cultural  development,  because  humans  are  99.9%  genetically 
identical and no things like human sub-species exist or ever existed. The treatment of a 
few merely exterior  diverse appearances,  as skin color,  nose shape,  head size,  as a 
scientific  explanation  and justification  for  oppression,  exploitation,  submission,  is  a 
very modern, political invention.
We can only speculate about the motivation of human demographic expansion 
out of Africa, throughout the world. Curiosity, a spontaneous desire of exploring, cannot 
be excluded. A fast increasing of a successful population is conceivable, resulting in the 
necessity of wider spaces of gathering and hunting. Dramatic, rapid climatic changes 
have always occurred and in Africa, our originating continent, tougher dry conditions 
were registered precisely at the time when the archaeological evidence indicates that 
human improvements leading to our first globalization (Mellars, 2006).
While keeping their original nomadic lifestyle, humans could conserve only what 
they could carry on their shoulders, but they may have also had an original sense of 
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territory, along with shelters, huts, camps, where they may probably have spent longer 
periods or have returned periodically. In defined places, frequently but not necessarily 
connected with burial and worship, our ancestors created works of art. All these may 
have  been  key  elements  in  the  process  of  passing  from a  nomadic  to  a  sedentary 
lifestyle.
We imagine early human groups as little more than an enlarged family, composed 
by keens, but also acquired partners and other adopted, included members. They could 
not increase indefinitely, so in case of demographic success, they were destined to split. 
Carneiro (1970, p. 735) suggests the example of human expansion in the rain forest of 
Amazonia. In such a wide space, new areas could easily be found and occupied, without 
trespassing on the territory of other groups. What Carneiro suggests for the equatorial 
jungle, can be reasonably extended to human expansion in other open spaces, even the 
least hospitable, like the savannah and deserts, steppes and the arctic expanse, where 
human expansion may have met little success, but rarely limitation by other humans.
The vastness of the territory might have not prevented exchanges, interbreeding, 
along with rivalries and fights, but these sparse human groups, even those derived by 
common ancestors and still living nearby, may be imagined as independent one from 
the other.
In a demanding environment, the human presence was rare and fragile and, with 
such a low level of cooperation and conflict, the pace of innovation was probably slow. 
Notwithstanding,  they  perfected  local,  specific,  sustainable practices  of  hunting  and 
gathering, along with elementary forms of breeding and farming, that were absolutely 
enough to provide plenty of food.
We feel authorized to suppose that these ancient humans may have developed 
such a sophisticated knowledge of their local environment, to result as in a crystallized 
one. And, at least, in such a kind of timeless equilibrium, the European explorers met 
many very archaic human communities, in remote places, from Arctic to Patagonia, 
from Australia to Africa.
Our reconstruction of Pre-Neolithic life is  forged upon what we have learned 
about  peoples  like  the  Bushmen  of  the  Kalahari  desert,  that  greatly  surprised  the 
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modern  anthropologists  that  «discovered»  them.  The  natives  were  all  but  primitive 
starving and backward survivors. On the contrary, they enjoyed an enviable social and 
spiritual equilibrium. They sustained themselves with a surprisingly varied diet. They 
were  working  for  their  subsistence  much  less  than  the  members  of  any  other 
agricultural  and  industrial  societies  we  know,  saving  time  for  learning  from  their 
environment, receiving and visiting friends, telling stories, producing objects and tools, 
in order to align a virtuous circle of mutual help and free exchange of gifts (Sahlins, 
1972).
The complexity that we may find in ancient languages and the immense depth of 
spiritual and naturalistic knowledge that the anthropologists have found in many native 
populations, are only some of the most notable achievements of such humans. We may 
imagine that these individuals had much more time to listen to each other, mainly their 
elders  and  their  sages,  in  this  way  ending  to  learn  by  heart  a  quantity  of  words, 
concepts,  data,  genealogies,  details,  that are  unbelievable to a contemporary person, 
even the most gifted of memory and patience.
Something  very  different  happened,  instead, in  the  two  areas  of  Eurasian 
hemisphere,  that  have  been  identified  with  certainty  as  the  place  of  original 
domestication of plants and animals: the Fertile Crescent and China. In a suggestive 
reconstruction,  Diamond  (1998)  sustains  that  these  two  territories  were  certainly 
blessed  by  abundance  of  water,  productive  land,  animals  and  vegetables  to  be 
domesticated,  all  this  encouraging  the  agriculture  intensification  and  resulting  in 
demographic expansion. And, in addition to this, the two cradles, Levant and East Asia, 
despite distances in-between, certainly experienced a continuous exchange.
The Eurasian hemisphere, from the Fertile Crescent, to Iran and India, to China 
and Indochina, is an enormous stretch of lands, with impressive quantity and quality of 
goods and ideas to exchange. This geographical continuity has a horizontal orientation, 
therefore it is blessed by limited and gradual climate variations, ideal for the exchange 
of plants, animals, along with diseases, that operated - since then - as a cruel selector of 
people who were gifted of antibodies. The surviving people could, along this horizontal 
axis, fully express their immense human potentiality as walkers, runners, swimmers, 
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rowers,  as  creatures  able  to  explore,  communicate  and  socialize.  Further  later 
innovations as pottery, metallurgy, wheel, writing, bronze, iron, spread like fire on the 
prairie, among  these  Eurasian societies divided, or better united  - especially after the 
domestication of the horse - only by steppes and plateaus that could be easily crossed 
(cf Diamond, 1998).
The  agricultural  revolution,  in  Eurasian  Neolithic,  something  around  13,000 
years ago,  was a  continent-wide one.  The same thing was never  possible along the 
vertical  axes,  with fast  and dramatic  variation of climates,  that  exist  from North to 
South Africa, or, even longer, between the two Americas. The earliest colonizers of the 
American  hemisphere,  coming  from  Asia,  were  probably  already  aware  of  the 
potentiality of domestication of animals and plants. They also succeeded, indeed, in 
creating  a  local  agriculture,  at  least  in  two  separate  independent  sites,  in  the 
Mesoamerica and in the Andean area. But these two areas were unfortunately unable, 
because  of  climate  diversities,  to  exchange  plants  and  animals,  along  with  other 
innovations, towards North, or South, or even between them.
To be born in the middle of the Eurasian Neolithic revolution, or in the Kalahari 
or Amazon eternal Paleolithic, was not obviously the same thing. Geography matters, in 
human destiny,  and this original globalization had its unfair  starting points. What is 
important in Diamond's synthesis, however, in our opinion, it  is  not underscoring the 
burden of geography upon history, but rather its  contribution to the narration of the 
extraordinary human ability to change and innovate, to take on risk and to learn from 
mistakes, on their own, and under the stimulation of others.
We close  this  paragraph with  a  reflection  borrowed from the  anthropological 
self-awareness,  in  continuity  with  our  preceding  caveats  against  sciences  used  as 
instruments of power. We must be aware of the risk that any possible reconstruction of 
prehistoric  individual  and  grouped  lives,  is  not  only  a  conjoining  of  sets  of 
archaeological  artifacts  and  presumed  subsistence  systems.  There  are,  inevitably, 
different reconstructions of prehistoric and historic facts, because scientific research is 
conducted in a political and  ideological context. That does not mean we renounce to 
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truth,  but  we have to  accept  a  certain  relativity  of  our  convictions  (Domańska and 
Jacobs, 1998).
Science has both value implications and value origins, and lies close to the roots 
of many forms of power: power to create and destroy, to heal or harm, to feed or let 
hunger, to enlighten or obscure. Regardless of any presumptions to objectivity, we have 
the political responsibility to prevent the abuse of our studies (Proctor, 1991).
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1.3 The Triggering of the State
What we have learned from ancient and native cultures, that we have met during 
the European expansion, authorizes us to believe that, all along the 50,000 years of their 
first globalization, humans lived within self-sufficient and self-governing communities.
Within  those  groups  there  was  probably  an  egalitarian  life  style,  a  short 
hierarchy, a respected position not only for dominant male warriors, but also for elders, 
women, youngsters, adopted strangers. Along with different grades of psychological or 
physical  submission,  and  violence,  there  were  also  love,  affection,  spontaneous 
fellowship. There should have been, in such a basic social nucleon, a certain possibility 
of elevating one's own status in the group, along with the possibility of leaving the 
group itself, in extreme cases of serious division and lasting dissatisfaction.
The power within the primitive community is very often an intimate connection 
between the consent of the governed ones and the generosity of those who govern. In 
the Amerindian history, the chiefs' authority is not only about reconciliation of internal 
struggles, moderation in external ones. They are a force of material, not only spiritual, 
redistribution. They literally spoil of their own abundance and riches, in favor of their 
people (Clastres, 1974, pp. pp. 32-40).
So, it is not easy to escape the fact that the  Homo sapiens sapiens have been 
genetically  and behaviorally  forged by living  in  such small,  dispersed,  independent 
communities, where the family was open and the food shared; where authority could 
not  wipe  out  equality,  and  specialization  in  production  did  not  mean  necessary 
unevenness in distribution; where any possible conflict was resolvable through internal 
confrontation, or in the worst case, escapable through separation.
May sound unconventional, but if there is something «natural» that may make a 
sense in a social and political discourse, it is certainly that it  appears more natural for 
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human beings to live in an anarchical world of independent small communities, than in 
any kind of hierarchical bigger polity.
Surprising as it could be, we have very poor evidence of warfare among those 
original  independent  human  communities.  One  could  expect,  from  anthropological 
research, a sopravalutation of violence occurrence, for it is simply reasonable to think 
that, in a pre-literate and pre-urban environment, a day of war may leave many more 
remnants than a generation of peace. On the contrary, global records contradict the idea 
that war was always within humanity, like worship or exchange were. Evidence of war 
is an exception, not a rule, all along the Paleolithic (Ferguson, 2003w).
External  warfare  appears  irrelevant,  if  only  because  at  such  a  low  level  of 
interdependence between self-help groups, there is virtually no occasion to quarrel.
Things may change when  many clans agree to live together,  because  a second 
level of hierarchy arises, the leadership of the  enlarged  community and its territory, 
which adds to the basic authority existing within each family clan.
Further complications may arise when and if more than two communities come 
to be united in a wider territorial entity.  At this point a third level of hierarchy arises, 
because someone or something is required to be in charge of this more complex social 
formation. When this third level of authority is established, we already mean a state has 
born. Then, we  use  the word  and a concept of state  in a very broad sense,  and not 
posing  any  clear-cut  dividing  line  among  early  simpler  states  and  those  who  have 
developed a unifying culture, a spiritual legitimization, and information processing to 
keep united generations and territories (cf Cohen, 1978i, p. 2-4).
We follow Carneiro (1978, p. 205) in his emphasis on this passage: after that for 
millions of years human societies existed exclusively as autonomous communities and 
political  organization did not advance beyond the level of independent  communities 
with their own territory, the birth of a territorial political unit, transcending the relative 
self-sufficiency and autonomy of each village, is a crucial historical turn, the origin of 
the territorial power, the triggering of the state.
When and why did humans renounce,  however, to  a  good deal  of  individual 
freedom and local autonomy, to become part of, and subordinate to, more complex and 
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alienating social machines, eventually becoming subjects of despots? Let apart the few 
who are destined to stay at the top, but what about those who have to accept the lower 
position in higher and heavier pyramids? If our ancestors were living in an original 
stateless  and  warless  anarchy,  when,  why,  and  how  did  anarchical  and  isolationist 
human  groups  of  the  Paleolithic  turn  into  the  more  hierachical  and  more  violent 
societies of the following millennia?
Something may have changed  since the domestication of the first animals and 
plants, when it should have been found ever more useful to live in a closer relationship 
with  a  given  territory.  The original  nomadic  or  semi-nomadic  humans  settled  and 
became breeders and farmers, with an increasing interest in local lands' fruits and with 
the necessity of building stores for the crops. People probably learnt to live in more 
numerous  communities,  where  one  could  find  more  people  willing  to  go  beyond 
hunting  and gathering,  and to  specialize  in  the  new activities,  as  herding,  farming, 
articrafting.  The community may  have evolved in a  borough -  an ancient  and very 
important Western word, borough, by which we mean a community with a sense of 
identity,  the  possession  of  a  circumscribed  territory,  and  a  capacity  of  self-defense 
(Vaiani, 1998).
At this point, when we still do not have any evidence of the existence of any real 
political organization, we start finding remnants of war. Bitterly and ironically enough, 
the  ancient  Fertile  Crescent,  in  what  are  now Israel,  the  West  Bank,  Gaza,  Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, it provides some of the best evidence for the emergence of war 
from a warless background. While in sites of ancient hunters and gatherers, the analysis 
of hundreds of skeletons show rare signs of trauma and none of them suggesting a 
military action, in early farming sites things have dramatically changed. In a site dated 
around 8000 BCE, Qermez Dere in  North Iraq,  maces  and arrowheads were found, 
associated  with  skeletons,  along  with  fortifications  and  defensive  walls.  Enough  to 
identify it as a  place of invention of war, the site where a true “mother of all battles” 
was fought (Ferguson, 2003w). War, then, seems to have been a social construction of 
settlers, decided to defend their territories from troubles. Which kind of troubles?
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A first kind of troubles for the settlers may have come from the not yet settled. A 
time  of  uneven development,  perhaps,  made war, and later the state, possible.  At the 
very  moment  that  a  human  farming  community is  founded,  while  others  remain 
nomadic  all  around,  a  social  attraction,  along  with  an  economical  envy,  may  arise 
between different populations. The settler and the nomad may cooperate or may fight, 
they may merge or may slaughter each other (cf Salzman, 1978).
A second source of troubles may be found in the neighbors. Settled communities 
were probably able to grow demographically and socially only up to a certain critical 
point. They could become bigger than nomadic clans, but they were probably destined 
to split in the same way, in case of demographic success, because of land and resource 
shortages, or in order to solve generational, succession, and status conflicts, among their 
members. This growing and splitting of communities may have occurred repeatedly, so 
that in time one ancestral village could give rise to dozens of descendants (cf Cohen, 
1978i, p. 4; Carneiro, 1978, p. 206). Vast geographical spaces were open to Neolithic 
early farming populations who knew demographic success, so they expanded on large 
continental  scale,  diffusing  their  culture  along  impressive  distances  (Bellwood  and 
Oxenham, 2008). Things may have become considerably more complicated, however, 
when people arrived to fill of villages a valuable, fruitful, but limited space.
A reconstruction of farming communities’ expansion in a narrow valleys of the 
Peruvian  coast  is  proposed  by  Carneiro  (1970).  Each  of  these  Peruvian  valleys  is 
sharply circumscribed, backed by the mountains, fronted by the sea, and flanked on 
either side by inhospitable deserts.  As long as free land was still  available,  villages 
probably continued to split  and spread.  Once that all  readily arable land was being 
farmed,  two main  changes  are  registered:  the  tilling  of  already cultivated  land was 
intensified; and new, previously unused land was colonized by means of terracing and 
irrigation. This social works were probably realized by people coming from different 
villages of the valley, thus generating cooperation, but also competition and conflict. 
When the land shortage became acute, with increasing pressure of human population, 
frequency and intensity of war may have increased. 
33 / 272
Mauro Vaiani - Disintegration as Hope - 1.3 The Triggering of the State
(PhD candidate in Geopolitics – University of Pisa)
Losing the war in such a circumscribed Peruvian valley produced consequences 
very  different  from those  faced by a  defeated  village  in  wider  and underpopulated 
spaces. The mountains, the desert and the sea, not to mention the existence of other 
villages, reduced dramatically any possibility of escape or emigration. Carneiro thinks 
that, instead of extermination and expulsion, the winner and the loser reached a deal in 
which the latter accepted submission to the former.  The recurrence of warfare,  with 
capitulation of loser villages to the winner ones, lead to the integration of the entire 
valley into an unified domination (Carneiro, 1970, pp. 734-735).
Finally,  beyond nomadic newcomers and neighboring settlers,  a  third kind of 
troubles may have also been originated from within. And this may have been, we argue, 
the decisive one. Unequal division of land, work and food may have been originated by 
the very  productive specialization,  along with  personal  and family different  origins, 
characteristic and  fortunes,  but  also,  o  perhaps  mainly,  by  emerging  religious  or 
political  authorities'  decisions.  Conflicts  may  then  have  arisen  among  different 
members of a same society, because they were enjoying differentiated access to basic 
life resources (Fried, 1978).
These three speculations have the only purpose to help to imagine the origin of 
political  violence,  and  war:  difference  of  interest  among  settlers  and  newcomers; 
difference of power between neighboring communities; difference of status within each 
community. But violence and war certainly added to these three a new, and more bitter 
social  difference,  that  among  winners  and  losers  of  the  early  social  and  territorial 
conflicts. To manage with, to maintain, if not to extend, all these inequalities, an ever 
increasing political hierarchy was needed, along with the establishment of specialized 
military  corps.  Internal  unevenness,  then,  made  the  state,  and  the  state  generated 
violence,  war and increased inequality, since its inception (cf Ferguson, 2003w, and 
Fried, 1978).
Blind obedience to a political hierarchy, the state, and killing or being killed in 
violences and  wars commanded by those in power, then, are no inescapable part  of 
human existence. External warfare and internal inequality are not a genetic fate, but a 
social construction originated in a few original settler states.
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A few but not all of them. It is worth citing some known exceptions. The early 
Neolithic Anatolian culture of Çatalhöyük appears largely egalitarian and peaceful; for 
more than one millennium, from approximately 7000 to 6000 BCE, a community of 
thousands people was never looted or attacked; it shows no self-evident signs or spaces 
of religious, military or political hierarchy (Brosius, 2012; Hodder and Cessford, 2004). 
The oldest walls of Jericho, built before 7,000 BCE, once taken as evidence of war, are 
now understood to have been built for flood control, not defense (Ferguson 2003w). 
Research about state origin between 4,000 and 3,000 BCE in southwestern Iran, didn't 
find any sign of expansionism and no fortified towns and military remains, nothing who 
suggest the forming of a dominant caste of politicians and warriors (Wright, 1978).
Internal inequality and external warfare cannot be considered inevitable, fatal, or 
natural in any possible sense, because we have important evidences of polities that do 
not necessarily conquer neighbors, and do not always enslave their enemies, creating a 
repressive state in the process (Service, 1978, p. 31).
One  may  believe,  with  Carneiro  (1970),  that  war  may  intensify,  due  to 
overpopulation in a  narrow  habitat, but also cooperation does. The human history, in 
condition  of  environmental  and  social  circumscription  do  not  produce  only  unified 
valleys under avid warlords,  but also free communes and city-states, where internal 
inequality  and violence,  and external aggressiveness were relatively less relevant than 
what  is  imagined  in  certain  modern  reconstructions.  Local,  tiny  states,  then,  may 
originate also from voluntary cooperation and subordination, not only from inequalities 
and conflicts (cf Cohen, 1978i, p. 5).
They can be conceived by those who are in power in their own advantage, but 
power can also voluntarily be given in the hands of those who are able to perform 
benefiting functions, as, for instance, redistribution in local markets, promoting public 
works, celebrating a unifying spirituality, organizing a machinery for settling disputes, 
assuring protection of borders (cf Service, 1978, pp. 27-31).
Nothing of what we know about this ancient past, implies the inevitability of war, 
and of the state either, even if,  at the same time, it is easy to understand that a certain 
measure of internal inequality, and external envies,  may be frequent.  Cooperation and 
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success are inextricably linked with conflict and failing, in the human world. Stability 
and  instability,  consensus  and  dissent,  conservation  and  change,  represent  the 
Janus-headed intrinsic quality of every form of human and social life.
We are then led to a more synthetic position in which state origin is viewed as a 
process.  The  initial  impetus  could  well  be  negative  as  well  as  positive,  but  while 
evaluating centralization of power, rising of internal inequalities, building of an external 
security, as causes of state forming, all these cannot be treated as if we could know the 
facts or as concepts which could have the same meaning of today, within their different 
original  societies.  Does  irrigation,  for  instance,  enhance  centralized  governmental 
institutions, or, on the contrary, does an existent central government promote irrigation? 
Do  long-distance  traders  foster  state  expansion  to  receive  protection,  or  do  rulers 
promote such international commerce as part of their love of luxury, desire of riches, or 
because of their constructed duties as explorers, conquerors, and unifiers? Hypothesized 
causes may reveal to be consequences instead. This fact  may  disappoint anyone who 
emphasizes one causal nexus over another, but there are multiple roads to statehood, 
that have  produced similar results,  and then  clouded  any possible reconstruction of a 
chain of causality (Cohen, 1978i, p. 7-8).
It has been argued that historical early territorial states evolved from a wide web 
of  former  petty  states,  but,  again,  this  is  a  process  that  we  deduce  only  from  its 
aftermaths. A semi-nomadic clan or a rural village-state left, it is understandable, very 
few archaeological records. Most of their inter-relations, were they peer or hierarchical, 
remained in the obscurity of the prehistory or they are only vaguely recorded in late oral 
tradition.  The emergence of  the early state  remains  an intrinsically  obscure subject, 
because original states formed before any kind of writings, and literacy, when emerged, 
was itself a product of the new societies and powers that had emerged (Gat, 2003).
The formation of early states happened in at least six, unconnected or very lightly 
connected  regions:  Mesopotamia,  Egypt,  the  Indus  basin,  the  Yellow  River  valley, 
Mesoamerica  and  the  Andes,  with  possible  others  in  Africa,  Europe,  and  North 
America. Those original states developed sui generis, in a real sense, from indigenous 
process, with no previous models present. They are called the «pristine states» (Fried, 
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1978). All of them exhibit a similar concentration of power, because once centralized, 
permanent authority structures evolve, the new political power becomes the determinant 
agent of change. “After the tendency to centralize has been triggered, the hierarchical 
structure itself becomes a selective determinant that feeds back to all the sociocultural 
features to make them fit more closely into its overall pattern” (Cohen, 1978i, p. 8). 
Again,  one  must  not  believe  that  similarities  could  lead  to  any  kind  of  improper 
generalization  about  the  little  we know about  the  original  states.  We may  imagine 
pristine states only through the features of those that are called «secondary states», that 
are their successors (Fried, 1978, p. 37). 
The most striking human ideas, we have reminded above, have been surprisingly 
contagious: the fire,  domestication, breeding, agriculture,  the wheel,  metallurgy. The 
political transformation driven by concentration of food, people, and power, made no 
exception.  All  over  the  world,  states  spread  and  multiplied,  adopting,  emulating, 
improving the experiences of the pristine states.
Up  to  certain  dimensions,  the advantages  of  specialization  in  labor  and  of 
territorial  cooperation were certainly more valuable than the disadvantages of social 
stratification  and military subordination.  The state certainly deserved imitation, much 
more  than  it  searched  for  expansion.  The  state,  however,  arrived  literally  to  move 
mountains  and redirect  rivers,  “and it  has  on occasion  sent  untold  thousands,  even 
millions, to their deaths” (Cohen, 1978i, p. 1).  Why did the state, however, grow so 
further, arriving to allow such great iniquities?
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1.4 States and the Empire
By the  beginning of  IV millennium BCE,  in  the  pulsing  heart  of  the  Fertile 
Crescent, between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, in the region Greeks and Romans 
much later called Mesopotamia, the modern Iraq, the millenarian Ubaid period, marked 
by increasing social stratification, gave way to the emergence of urban life, the Uruk 
period,  during  which,  the  most  ancient  of  the  known pristine  states,  the  Sumerian 
city-states, were formed.
The rise of the city-state probably started from the fortune of a place of exchange 
of goods and knowledge, blessed by presence of fresh water, healthy air, a favorable 
position, and of attractive symbols, like the burial of an ancient hero, or an altar of 
worship. Gradually, power over many settlements and a surrounding territory may have 
been concentrated in  such a  center,  along with food, and people.  For centuries this 
pristine political  center  may have been ruled by the charismatic  power of  a clergy, 
supported by a tribute-paying hinterland (Tilly, 1990, p. 2). 
Labor of hundreds, or even thousands, over many years, may have been required 
at  this  center,  to  build  temples,  food  stores,  housing  and  laboratories.  Within  this 
embryonic political organization, the earliest writing was conceived as a pragmatic tool 
to deal with problems of record keeping in stores and constructions, but it soon became 
a powerful mean of communication, and control, over space and time.
These early urban centers were vibrant and within them riches were increasingly 
accumulating,  along with inequality.  They soon developed the need of professional, 
organized protection. Protection from whom? From internal enemies, from neighboring 
rivals, and from invaders, three categories of troubles we have already introduced in the 
preceding paragraph and that deserve further discussion. As a consequence of the rising 
of violence and of its importance as a political tool to keep people submitted, by 2500 
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BCE many cities of Mesopotamia were ruled by kings that were also military leaders 
(Tilly, 1990, pp. 1-2).
The kings and their soldiers needed weapons and this led metallurgy to assume a 
political meaning in Mesopotamia, that it did not have in other places of Eurasia, along 
the  great  west-east  axis  of  the  Neolithic  revolution.  On  one  side,  in  the  Iberian 
peninsula, metallurgy remained limited to producing mainly and merely ornaments, for 
another  millennium.  On  the  opposite  side,  in  Thailand,  metallurgy  focused  on  the 
production  of  utilitarian  artifacts,  while  local  communities  did  not  evolve  toward  a 
centralization of power (Amzallag, 2009, p. 497).
Ancient  Mesopotamia  must  have  been  magnetic  for  people  coming  from 
everywhere, bringing with them their ideas and goods. A beautiful metal nugget, the 
cassiterite,  was  probably  brought  in  as  a  precious  good for  gift  or  exchange,  from 
voyagers coming from far ore fields, situated in remote territories, like Afghanistan or 
Turkey. The beautiful stone revealed to be rich of tin and a bright metalsmith had the 
curiosity to try to combine tin with copper, inventing the fusion of bronze. This new 
alloy was much easier  to  cast  in  molds  than copper,  and much harder,  and it  soon 
revealed its full political meaning: the early Sumerian states coined the original bronze 
shekel, the first coin; bronze jewels were required by important people, as a sign of 
distinction; the wealthy wanted to be entombed with bronze amulets; for workers better 
axes, hammers and sickles could be forged, not less importantly, better weapons, for an 
increasing number of professional warriors.
The city-states of Mesopotamia could afford the importation of tin from far East 
or far West, along with the long-distance trade of other prestige goods, because they 
were rich and strong enough, in material and human resources. Thanks to importation of 
such precious rough materials, and their transformation, they became even richer and 
stronger,  their  rulers became more powerful,  and their  subjects  were required to  be 
more obedient. Political-religious centralism, concentration of food and labor, writing, 
better weaponry, coins and long-distance trade - are the defining characteristics of those 
successful pristine Sumerian city-states.
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Along  with  the  first  historical  record  of  kings'  names  and  gestures,  we  find 
immediately the narration of their wars. The first war recorded was that between Lagash 
and Umma, around 2500 BCE. From the famous Stele of Vultures, we know that the 
city of Lagash went to war on the city of Umma, over a disputed agricultural  land 
located between the two states. The conflict ended in a battle in which the leader of 
Lagash, described as the beloved of the gods, triumphed over Umma. After the defeat, 
the leader of Umma swore that he would no more trespass into the territory of Lagash, 
fearing further divine punishment.
It is easy to believe in the frequency of such border clashes, disputes over lands 
division,  channels  maintenance  and  water  shares,  in  the  fragile  and  overpopulated 
Mesopotamian environment, but there is certainly more: following Ferguson (2008), we 
can figure out that war was already, at this early point, an instrument in favor of the 
continuity of power for the military leaders.  War among neighboring city-states had 
nothing  of  the  inevitable,  it  was  instead  a  political  instrument  of  maintaining  and 
legitimizing the military dictatorship. The Sumerian leaders were more creators, than 
victims, of their security troubles with their neighbors.
They were shaping a history of violence, to justify their power that they proposed 
as  the  only  possible  solution  to  the  problems  of  the  dangerous  environment  they 
themselves had created. Personal ambition, elites' expansionism, suspicion about their 
neighbors' intention, all these motivations were relatively much less important than the 
naked fact that, just to make their power a legitimate and enduring reality, they needed 
war.
In  time,  stronger  cities  came  to  control  weaker  ones,  forming  territorial 
kingdoms, thus justifying the existence of more hierarchy and bureaucracy, but even at 
this stage war of all against all, was not considered either desirable or inevitable. It was 
soon conceived the idea of a possible security community including all Sumer cities.
In a late epigraphy, that can be the copy of an earlier  inscription,  the Sumer 
sovereign Lugal-Anne-Mundu, possibly one of the early military kings of the Sumerian 
city-state of Adab in 2500 BCE, is already called King of the Four Quarters (Kramer, 
1963, pp. 51-52), meaning that he was supposed to have a political supremacy over the 
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entire Sumerian word. The creation of a unified inter-state space was early considered 
the  most  reasonable  solution  to  security  problems,  at  least  in  the  eyes  of  the  most 
powerful of the military leaders of the region, the one whose manifest destiny was to 
become the undisputed universal leader. A higher level of hierarchy was conceived and 
gradually established, a new kind of political authority over the authorities of each local 
states, giving origin to a super-state formed by local states. Levels of hierarchy became 
at least four, for the new universal political level was added to existing territorial, local 
and familiar authorities (Wright 1977).
Sumer was certainly attractive not only for individual mavericks and little groups 
of migrants, that could easily be absorbed, but also for bigger, organized populations. 
Semitic  peoples  of  Northern  Mesopotamia,  the  first  among  others,  absorbed  many 
aspects of the southern Sumerian civilization and, not far from modern Baghdad, one of 
them established its own city-state, called Akkad. Were these alien peoples a potential 
external enemy, in addition to internal riots and rivalries among neighboring states? 
Certainly they were, but, again, they were not a natural fatality, but a precise political 
invention of the Sumerian ruling elites.
After the 2300 BCE, the king of Akkad, Sargon, was, interestingly enough, at the 
service of the king of Kush, at that time one of the most prestigious Sumerian courts. 
The Akkadian, after having learned at the service of the Sumerian, decided to act in his 
own  name,  sizing  the  power  in  Kush  and,  from  this  political  center,  eventually 
submitting all the Sumerian city-states. That political universe came to be ruled by a 
homogeneous aristocracy of his Akkadian warriors. It had a core territory, formed by 
the  city  of  Akkad  and  the  entire  Sumer,  but  it  also  dominated  over  a  conquered 
periphery and a sphere of indirect influence. The leadership was hereditary and, notably, 
one  of  Sargon's  successors,  his  grandson  Naram-Sin,  after  having  extended  his 
influence from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea, he declared himself a god, 
something that no former Sumerian ruler had done before. All these are the ingredients 
of an empire and because of them the Akkadian one deserved to be known as the first  
empire in history.
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From Sargon on, the emperors of Sumer and Akkad developed an increasingly 
sophisticated ideological  justification of  the necessity  of  their  universal  power over 
every other state. Later Mesopotamians considered this original unification a high point 
of their history and an achievement to be imitated, and that was believed not only by 
them.  A few  centuries  later,  Hammurabi,  born  after  1800  BCE,  ruler  of  Babylon, 
succeeded in  becoming a renewed unifier  of  all  the  region.  He made all  the  cities 
subject  to Marduk, his  own city's  god, and he felt  as his  imperial  duty to  establish 
universal laws for all the submitted peoples. Wrapped in this sense of spiritual mission, 
Hammurabi thwarted his opponents, thus utilizing religion as an instrument of power. 
Razing  neighbor  cities,  annihilating  allies,  vilifying  victims,  he  claimed  to  be  an 
instrument of divine justice (cf Tilly, 1990, p. 1).
Mesopotamian early states leaders and early empires builders were part of a vast 
continental  network  linked  by  technology,  trade,  marriage,  and  ideology,  and  this 
system was itself part of a larger interaction sphere centering on the Middle East and 
stretching from Mediterranean to South Asia and beyond (Ferguson 2006b; Amzallag, 
2009).
By the end of  the Bronze  Age,  around 1500 BCE,  their  political  ideas,  their 
conceptions  of  state,  and  of  war  among  states,  were  already  become patterns  of  a 
universal political cult all over the eastern hemisphere (cf Ferguson, 2003w). Also the 
imperial  idea,  originated  in  Mesopotamia  as  a  political  and  military  answer  to  the 
problem of security among states, diffused. In space, it clashed, but also intertwined 
with similar concepts of a general order among the states, arisen in Egypt, Iran, Europe, 
India,  Africa,  and  China.  In  time,  it  passed  from  a  dynasty  to  another,  from  one 
conqueror to another: from Babylon to Cyrus, Alexander, the Caesars, Byzantium, the 
European Emperors, the Russian Czars.
Ancient  empires  developed  without  showing  any  sign  of  coherent,  enduring, 
inevitable integration. When compared, ancient imperial systems show shared historical 
patterns of alternation among centralization and subsequent decentralization processes 
(Marcus,  1998).  The  ancient  empire  is  not  a  political  organism,  which  rises  and 
declines,  rather  it  is  more  similar  to  a  geopolitical  system,  coinciding  with  a 
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civilizational  space.  Many different  political  centers,  dynasties,  invaders,  institutions 
may be in power, rising and demising, one following the other, while the rest of the 
system endures independently from any political turmoil in its center.
The submitted states, also, endured within the imperial system, resulting often 
more resilient than the central  powers they were depending on. Local economy and 
politics were poorly influenced by the political cycle of forces and actors that were in 
charge  at  the  center.  The  local  states,  under  the  paramountcy  of  ancient  empires, 
resembled much more to relatively independent states than to departments or provinces 
of contemporary centralized states. To be conquered by a dynasty or another, or to be in 
the sphere of influence of an empire or of one of its rivals, either to remain a neutral 
buffer petty state among neighboring giants, all these variations made little difference 
for the ordinary people, for the local elites, little more than a change of the remote 
address where tribute and reverence were due to be sent.
Because of our modern statist and imperialist conceptions, ancient empires are 
often depicted as much more hierarchical and oppressive than they really were, while 
they  were  mostly  loose  organizations,  where  effective  subordination  of  local 
communities  to  the  imperial  center  was  an  exception,  not  a  rule.  Their  task  was 
containment of internal bandits, external pirates, potential invaders, providing a security 
framework  for  the  autonomous  development  of  their  member  states.  If  there  were 
occasionally centralization efforts, and relative tension with the peripherals, they much 
more frequently allowed locals to bolster their independence and rail against central 
interference in local affairs (cf Tilly, 1990, p. 2).
The history of ancient empires, along the Eurasian horizontal axis, contains this 
ambiguity: it may be told as a history of expansion, but it was also a quest for peace,  
and not a temporary, local peace, but a general, universal one. Every ancient empire 
implied  forced  subordination,  but  it  was  also,  relatively  and  compatibly  with 
circumstances, a desired security solution. There was the imposition of new universal 
obedience, but also a universal authority able to grant political and religious freedom to 
the persecuted and a shelter to the exiled. The imperial authority could be an agent of 
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oppression and exploitation, but also a higher instance to invoke in case of crisis and 
corruption of the local authorities (Fabbrini, 1983).
When the Spanish conquered the western hemisphere,  they met a plurality of 
territorial polities, urban or rural, militarized or peaceful, large systems or isolated petty 
states, whose political development had gone separately and independently from the 
Eurasian one, for at least 15,000 years. Risking anachronism and dystopia, the New 
World polities were understood and described, since the very beginning of the European 
conquest, with a language invented in the Old World, for its states and empires.
In Mesoamerica, the Spanish invaders allied with an ancient but declining state, 
Tlaxcala, in order to defeat the emerging Aztec power. The local ally was probably a 
kind  of  confederal  oligarchical  republic.  The  enemy,  the  Aztec  state,  had  been 
originated by the alliance among three city-states, Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and Tlacopan, 
and it  was defined as an empire,  in the sense that it  was a regional  system with a 
political center exercising a political hegemony and providing some kind of inter-state 
regional security.
In  Peru,  the  Spanish  clashed  with  an  outstanding  centralized  religious  and 
political organization. It was called the Inca empire, but it could also be defined an 
absolute centralized papacy as well, for its religious meaning was as important as the 
political one. The Inca authority was widely recognized and had practically no rivals in 
a long Pacific coast area, ranging from today's Colombia to southern Chile, governed 
without horses and wheels, thanks to a network of running messengers, the Chasquis. 
The invaders found the Inca empire-papacy already weakened, shacked by smallpox 
and by succession intrigues, but its centralization was one the main reason of its easy 
conquest by the Spanish. The system was so centralized, that it resulted to be easily 
controllable after having grasped the control of its vertex (cf Diamond, 1998).
In its  prevalent  Quechua language,  the Inca system was called  Tawantinsuyu, 
which can be translated as  The Four United Regions - something that curiously and 
interestingly resounds the Mesopotamian title of King of the Four Corners. In absence 
of  evidences  of  exchange  among  the  two  far  civilizations,  may  this  resonance  be 
considered indicative of something more profound?
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Our Western comprehension of pre-Colombian states and statelets, their political 
and religious concepts, their  «flowers wars», is forcibly limited, but the presence in 
America  of  complex  inter-state  regulatory  systems,  of  supra-national  authorities, 
apparently not so different from our Eurasian empires, it inspires a suggestion. An idea 
of  lasting  peace  among  independent  human  groups  may  be  older  and  much  more 
important than the same pristine states, and their wars. It may be something that humans 
had already conceived and brought with them, much before their spreading along the 
different ways of their original globalization. It may be something that humans ever 
wanted,  and  committed to  ever  rebuild,  after  every  failing,  even  after  the  social 
construction of states, founded on internal inequalities and violence, and external wars.
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1.5 Empires and the Barbarians
Any assumption about an inherent,  inescapable human need and greed of the 
state,  expansion,  and  war,  it  would  overlook  the  Janus-headed  quality  of  the  most 
historically relevant political expansion, those of empires, that grew up gradually, along 
with the reach of the civilization they were the expression of, in the Mediterranean and 
Europe,  from  Mesopotamia  to  Iran,  in  India  and  China,  in  the  Americas,  in  the 
Polynesian islands.
They remained open and fluid, and those which remained less centralized and 
militarized, they demonstrated to be the most elastic and resilient, as political systems. 
Peaks of political  violence are registered during their  formation,  but events like the 
destruction of Carthage by Rome are exception, not an historical rule. There were long 
moments of bloody rivalry among powers that were part of a same geopolitical space, 
like between the Byzantine and the Sassanid empires,  but  also centuries of relative 
peace. Never an empire tried the invasion of other empires, beyond the borders of its 
civilization space. Persia never feared an invasion from China, yet there was economic 
interdependence enough, between the two, to let arouse envy and ambition. India never 
planned an invasion of Zanzibar and of the East African Swahili coast, notwithstanding 
the intense maritime trade and relations.
From Sargon's time till  the dawn of the modern European state-system, every 
imperial parabola can be interpreted more as a succession of random events than as a 
planned expansion, and the search of internal power and external security, however, it 
soon arrived to meet, or to create, its borders, its limes.
This  Latin  word,  limes,  indicated  military  border  fortification  capable  of 
separating the civilized known world from the hostile and unknown one. They could be 
important physical obstacles, like a great river or a mountain chain. They could be a 
myth, like the Pillars of Hercules, with the spiritual value of being a warning against 
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human  hubris.  They could  be  human artifacts,  like  the  Chinese  Great  Wall,  or  the 
Hadrian  Wall,  that  were  more  a  symbol  of  imperial  self-restraint  than  having  an 
effective defensive meaning.  Limes were always conceived, carefully maintained and 
rarely trespassed, because crisis and collapse were the only possible outcome for any 
imperial military, administrative overreach.
Stability of civilizational limes, not its further expansion, was the measure of the 
imperial political success. Peace, not war, was what an empire was required to provide 
to its submitted states, to last as a respected political authority.
The word  limes  is  somehow connected  with the  homo-phonic  limen,  another 
Latin word meaning threshold, entrance, gate granting access.  Limes and  limen may 
both indicate a same limit, but in an opposite though complementary sense: every end is 
also a beginning, every border means containment but also attraction of those who are 
living beyond.
Non-state peoples living beyond the imperial  limes, were certainly attracted by 
the imperial limen. Were they really a danger, because of their innate cruelty? Or was, 
then like later in history, the barbarian danger a political construction, a propaganda 
argument to justify military expenses and military controls of larger territories?
There was not any kind of natural fierceness in non-state people, but certainly, 
thanks to imperial money, they were a source of cheap and gullible, maneuverable and 
expandable men power. Foreign legions and alien mercenaries are common in practical 
every imperial history.
From the Romans we learned another important fact, in further confirmation that 
expansion  is  all  but  a  natural,  inevitable  event:  after  having  established  their 
Mediterranean empire, they convinced, forced or bribed many peoples who were drawn 
along their borders, to form client tribes and satellite kingdoms (Mattingly, 1992). The 
promotion of these border buffer polities, under imperial paramountcy, was a regular 
and successful  Roman politics.  But  when barbarian peoples  constituted most  of  the 
recruited, and became arbiter of the internal imperial fights for power, they demanded 
their voice in Roman history. In the V century CE, the Western empire was ended by 
Odoacer, one of its non-Roman immigrated general, and the Eastern empire survived 
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longer only at the price of bloody purges in its army and fighting long wars against 
Germans, Huns, Slavs.
The  patterning  of  states  upon  non-state  societies  was  always  striking  (Price, 
1978).  The  encounter  between  a  disorganized  population  with  the  economical  and 
political power of the empire, was certainly uneven, and a source of resentment and 
violence, but also of unexpected capacities of imitation and adaptation. Clans gather in 
chieftains,  and around a prestigious  chieftain a  major  force,  a  tribe,  was eventually 
formed. Tribalization has been called this process of gathering of non-state peoples in a 
military larger and politically more centralized body (Fried, 1967 and 1975).
The tribe was then a kind of lean, temporary state, formed to acquire a military 
and  political  dimension,  big  enough  to  be  comparable  with  the  dimension  and  the 
strength of  an imperial  border  legion.  The tribe,  and its  wars,either  were not,  then, 
something natural - exactly as the state and the empire were not. Rather it is the answer 
of  formerly  dispersed  populations,  challenged  by the  contact  with  concentration  of 
political power, social stratification, economic exploitation.  Tribalization is a concept 
useful beyond the end of ancient history,  after  the  beginning of Western expansion. 
Iroquois  military  and commercial  fortunes  in  North  America,  developed  in  face  of 
French, English and American rivalries and taking advantages by becoming agents of 
European expansionism (cf Abler, 1992). Native peoples, like the Yanomami, did not 
become fierce tribes,  because of something  like agressivity being impressed in their 
genes. Many so called tribal wars seemed to have been fought over access to steel tools 
and other goods, distributed by Westerners, missionaries and anthropologists included 
(Ferguson, 1985, 2003w).
In the ancient world, when military unevenness could be easily overcome by a 
good combination  of horses, chariots, better weapons, tactic innovations, men power, 
the  tribal  answer  to  the  civilized  influence  often  resulted  in  a  rather  efficient  one. 
Chronicles  of barbarian invasions can be found since the very beginning of written 
history. It happened, for instance, to the Akkadians something worse than what they had 
previously done to its  Sumerian mentors.  Their  empire was invaded by a  tribe,  the 
Gutians,  originating  from the  neighboring  Zagros  mountains.  They were  previously 
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listed  among  the  nations  submitted,  but  eventually,  the  weak,  the  unorganized,  the 
backward, became the successful invader.
The Gutians were only the first of a long series of barbarian, relatively backward, 
peripheral  peoples  that,  after  their  contact  with  densely  farmed  countryside, 
sophisticated urban centers, huge concentrations of riches, decided for penetration and 
confrontation. The Hyksos entered Egypt, Persia annexed Babylon and Egypt, Macedon 
seized the power in Greece and Asia,  and Rome conquered its  Etruscan fathers,  its 
Greek mentors, and all its Mediterranean and Hellenistic neighbors. Many successful 
and powerful imperial societies were more often invaded than organizing invasion. The 
pretended imperial conquerors were often conquered.
Violent  expansions  of  peripheral  populations  in  already  existing  geopolitical 
spaces are among the most impressive events of our ancient history. The Arabian tribes 
gave  origin  to  Muslim  states  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Chinese  Sea,  and  it  is  not 
surprising  that  the  turbulent  relations  between  marginal-desert  and  central-urban 
societies was early theorized, as one of the main drives of political change in ancient 
history,  by the Arabian author of  The Muqaddimah : An Introduction to History,  in 
1377, Ibn Khaldun (Service, 1978). The Vikings raided, explored and settled in wide 
areas of Europe and beyond, from the Mediterranean, to the North Atlantic islands, 
being at the origin of the Russian and of the American colonial epic. Several composite 
coalition of Mongol, Turkic warring tribes, under the leadership of charismatic figures 
as Genghis Khan, Timur, Babur were, reshaped repeatedly the geopolitics of Eurasia. 
But all these invasions, however, are not easily classifiable under a ahistorical category 
of inevitable expansionism.
These raiders and invaders were interested in different things: from plundering 
and just leaving after, to finding a new homeland, to replacing local elites establishing 
themselves as new aristocracies or dynasties. And eventually, many invaders, after their 
initial expansion, they become the new peace-keeper of the entire civilizational space 
they have come to control. Such invasions did fast result in establishing a new imperial 
peace, with new dynasties at  the center, which could last  only if  they did fit in the  
imperial  ideal:  exacting  reasonable  tributes,  preventing  internecine  warfare,  limiting 
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military  excess,  including  their  own.  And,  again,  in  most  of  the  local  kingdoms, 
city-states,  petty states,  nothing was really changing in the everyday life,  if  not the 
address to which honors and tributes should be sent (cf Tilly, 1990, pp. 71-72).
Carneiro  wrote  that  once  village  autonomy  was  transcended  and  state  was 
conceived “only two or three millennia were required for the rise of great empires” 
(Carneiro, 1970, p. 736), but this statement implies that each early territorial state was 
not  only  an  embryonic  state,  but  also  an  embryonic  expansionist  state,  and  that  a 
political expansionism was the natural prosecution of a natural, original competition 
over land. Thus, states were destined to conquer, or be conquered, “and in many areas 
of the ancient world the result of this competition was the emergence of the still larger, 
stronger, and more complex political units that we generally call empires” (Carneiro, 
1978, p. 208). Carneiro also made a parallel between the state augmentation through 
successful  political  and  military  expansionism as  part  of  the  struggle  for  existence 
carried on by all forms of life: concurrent groups, exploiting the same portion of the 
habitat, cannot coexist indefinitely; sooner or later one of them will eliminate the others 
(Carneiro,  1978,  p.  209).  History,  according  to  a  theorist  of  conflict,  would  be  a 
competition in mutual destruction or submission, and those who empirically would not 
be competing, they are merely the unsuccessful (Price, 1978, p. 179).
Within open and fluid ancient imperial geopolitical spaces, however, we cannot 
see at work any kind of such Darwinian competition among land-hungry, warmongers’ 
powers. Such narrowly deterministic statements may also lead to misunderstand more 
facts  than  the  few  they  pretend  to  explain.  How  could  human  civilization  have 
developed, in a constant warfare, and, even worse, in an increasing necessity to unite, 
obey, fight and die? If the “tamest are the strongest”, as phrased by Walter Bagehot in 
an early and  soon  paradigmatic social  Darwinist  sentence (Dawson, 1999, p. 99), if 
such a selection was really at work, a very strange evolution would have resulted: from 
multiplicity to singularity, from innovation to conformism, from freedom to obedience.
Such arguments are indeed of poor help in the understanding most part of human 
history.  From the Sumerian experience onward,  the most fruitful civilization cradles 
were  also  places  where  a  crowd  of  independent  petty  states  was  thriving,  from 
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Phoenicia to Etruria, and from the Levant to the American Thirteen Colonies. All these 
bundles  of  statelets  produced  much  more  riches  and  masterpieces,  than  death  and 
destruction.  Their  competition  was  more  economical  and  cultural,  than  political  or 
military.  And  the  imperial  paramountcy  was  conceived  as  an  umbrella  for  their 
independence  and  diversity.  The  expansionist  argument  cannot  simply  explain  why 
empires  decided to  maintain within their  civilization limits,  why barbarians  became 
peace-keepers, why petty states were protected and not destroyed in ancient empires, 
why so many prophecies of ruin changed in histories of cooperation.
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1.6 European Expansionism
At  the  end  of  the  first  Christian  millennium,  systems  of  loosely-articulated 
fragmented  local  polities  were  prevailing  all  over  the  known  Euro-Mediterranean 
World.  Humans  were  mostly  living  in  petty  states,  under  the  paramountcy  of  the 
imperial  systems present in that civilizational  space.  Conquest and battles,  raids for 
booty and captives occurred, but long wars and mass armies were rare events (cf Tilly,  
1990, p. 162).
Europe,  after  centuries  of  invasion  from Eastern  Asian,  Southern  Arabic  and 
Northern  Viking  tribes,  was  particularly  diversified  and  fragmented.  Cities  and 
communes,  landlords  and  fiefdoms,  bishoprics  and  cloisters,  Christian  orders  and 
Muslim sheiks, Jewish and Gypsy communities, merchant and pirates leagues, all these 
different powers were local, expressing themselves in the control or in the competition 
for the control of petty states. These latter ones enjoyed a reasonable local stability, 
while  remaining  part  of  an  open,  cosmopolitan,  vibrant,  competitive  social  and 
economical Euro-Mediterranean milieu.
Two main central imperial authorities existed in Europe, the German Emperor 
and  the  Roman  Pope,  and  they  competed  and  fought  each  other.  The  best  known 
conflict  among  them,  the  Investiture  Controversy,  remained  mainly  an  economical, 
ideological,  and  political  one.  They  both  contributed  to  a  measure  of  international 
security, at least containing warfare within the European geopolitical system.
The  local  authorities,  in  the  meantime,  favored  the  revival  of  agriculture, 
technological  innovations,  the  rise  of  open  markets,  the  foundation  of  reformed 
monasteries,  and the  opening of  universities.  Members  of  dominant  elites,  but  also 
individual mavericks and rebels, conformist missionaries but also spiritual innovators, 
were able to move through this wide, pluralistic, geopolitical space. Wandering students 
and scholars could move throughout this nascent Europe, being protected by a clerical 
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status. Men of genius, intellectuals and artists, innovators and inventors, when they felt 
not understood or protected enough, could easily move from one polity to another. In 
this wide and fluid environment, governments that decided to be less welcoming and 
tolerant, were going to lose many golden eggs along with their potential geese (Vries, 
2002).
The first three centuries of the second millennium in Europe have been called the 
age of feudalism, a classic concept that might have become ambiguous to many late 
readers. In an age of bigger, stronger centralized states, the concept has been vulgarized 
to suggest the idea of a vertical society, with a strong chain of subordination: first, at the 
top, the emperor; at an inferior level, the kings and other main imperial vassals; at lower 
ranks the vassals of the vassals, the minor vavasors. This abstract reconstruction may 
still  help  to  understand  a  chain  of  formal  political  dependence  among  legitimate 
authorities, but it must not lead to overshadow the condition of strong local economical, 
religious, political and military autonomy that hundreds of polities enjoyed under the 
paramountcy either of the Empire, or that of the Papacy, or both. In the cooperation, 
overlapping, and competition among so many different  powers,  are  the roots of the 
early ideas of freedom in the Medieval Europe.
Libertas was a word written in ancient local community statutes, meaning a very 
concrete  condition of franchise,  a pragmatic territorial  immunity from the power of 
other, neighboring or higher authorities. Many city-states, from Tuscany to Flanders, 
were relatively free,  independent  republics,  and rural and mountain communes,  like 
those of Graubünden, started their political experience (cf Barber, 1974, p. 101). In this 
sense, following Lord Acton and many others, in comparison with the exclusivity and 
absoluteness of state power that will be a feature of the modernity, this feudal Europe 
deserves to be defined as an age of local liberties.
Medieval  Christendom  was  certainly  populated  by  passionate  and  ferocious 
people, as Huizinga (1924, p. 103) wrote, and, to put it with the words of Karl Deutsch, 
it was also a place of 
“recurring outbreaks of local or private warfare among barons, dukes, 
cities, and other local powers; and the efforts of the Church to insure a 
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'peace  of  God'  had  only  limited  success.  Nevertheless,  while  the 
ever-present danger of domestic violence was irksome, it was not fatal 
to the development of the community. Enough peace was enforced in 
the  markets,  and a  sufficient  measure  of  security  was found on the 
roads,  to  permit  an  ever-increasing  volume  of  travel,  trade,  and 
pilgrimage.  The  rates  of  social  change  were  slow,  but  they  were 
cumulative in  their  effects,  as  well  as  faster,  than  they  had been in 
antiquity” (Deutsch, 1954, p. 16).
These  thriving  societies  and  their  peoples  put  in  act  their  expansion.  An 
expansion  that  turned  out  to  be  much  more  aggressive,  of  greater  scope  than  past 
enlargement  of  civilizational  spaces  we  have  already  discussed  above.  In  such  a 
pluralistic  environment,  this  expansion  was  enhanced  by  a  powerful  mixture  of 
cooperation and competition in prestige and power among the many political players. 
Both the Emperor and the Pope, along with kings, city-states, petty feudal nobility, they 
all  shared a lust for the enlargement of this late medieval European world, whether 
taking  part  in  the  Spanish  Reconquista,  the  German  Ostsiedlung,  the  Norman 
colonizations,  or  the  Crusades.  This  expansion became,  since  then,  a  longue  durée 
feature of European history (Alphandery and Dupront, 1959; Braudel, 1958).
The expansion of the European multiplicity had nothing of inevitable, historically 
speaking. Within the wider Eurasian world, the Arabic conquests and later the Mongol 
expansion  had  reinforced  safe  and  reliable  trade  links  from  Europe  to  Indochina, 
allowing many other  successful  societies  to  thrive.  Throughout  Europe,  Byzantium, 
Rum,  Baghdad,  Iran,  India,  Khmer,  China,  Korea  and  Japan,  local  kingdoms  and 
empires knew important material and cultural achievements, thanks to the empowered 
Eurasian economic and social integration. It may be usefully remembered that Eastern 
states were, at this point and long they remained, in many senses, much more rich and 
developed than Europe (Abu-Lughod, 1989).
The entire Eurasian horizontal axis was such an open and interconnected system 
that it was equally devastated by the Black Death, the great 1348 plague, where millions 
died in a few years. In the aftermath of such a profound crisis, the desire for redemption 
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and  rebirth  of  European  powers,  in  competition  among  them,  became  even  more 
evident.
We can usefully state here a well-known and highly symbolic comparison that 
helps to understand the different destinies of other civilizations that were absolutely 
superior  to  the  European  one,  but  that  were  simply  too  politically  centralized  to 
compete  with  the  European  multiplicity.  While,  after  the  Black  Death,  the  Asian 
prosperity was endangered by the decline of the overland routes, in the most advanced 
and powerful empire of the world, China, one single centralized decision was taken 
about navigation and control of the seas and it was, at the best of our limited possibility  
of understanding, the wrong one.
At  the  beginning of  1400,  under  the  leadership  of  an  astonishing figure  like 
Zheng He, a eunuch at the service of the early Ming emperors, Chinese ships were sent 
across the Pacific and Indian oceans, as far as the east coast of Africa. Unfortunately, 
after a power struggle between a group of eunuchs and their opponents, at the Chinese 
court, as a result of it, in hate of the defeated eunuchs, the winners suspended these 
missions. The entire Chinese ocean-going maritime technology was rapidly forgotten 
thanks to this centralized imperial resolution (Diamond, 1998, p. 412).
On  the  contrary  in  Europe,  the  decline  of  terrestrial  continental  trade  was 
compensated  by  technological  improvements  that  made  possible  the  deep  sea 
navigation.  Hanseatic  and  Mediterranean  sea  powers  were  outweighed  by  Atlantic 
powers.  A visionary,  self-taught  traveler  and geographer,  Christopher  Columbus,  an 
émigré from the maritime Republic of Genoa, succeeded, not without having to try and 
retry, in convincing the royal couple, Isabella of Castilla and Ferdinand of Aragon, to 
finance his western oceanic exploration, after having tried and failed with the king of 
Portugal and other minor nobles. So the immense spaces of the two Americas were 
conquered by European microbes and arms, not Chinese ones. Once Spain had thus 
launched its colonization of America, other European states, after having seen the gold 
and  silver  flowing  into  that  state,  joined  the  Spanish  kingdom  in  the  enterprise 
(Diamond, 1998, p. 413).
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This  history  of  emulation  was  repeated  many  times  in  Europe's  history  of 
innovations, whether cannon, printing, electric lighting, and many others. Each was at 
first neglected, or even opposed, in some parts of Europe, but once adopted by one local 
power, it became widespread, through imitation and competition, in the rest of Europe. 
In the meantime, the Chinese court decided to halt, besides long-distance navigation, an 
elaborate  water-driven  spinning  machine,  thus  stepping  back  from  a  potential 
industrialization in the XIV century. It also virtually abolished mechanical clocks, along 
with  an  emblematic  cultural  retreat  from  technology  in  general  after  the  late  XV 
century.  On  the  contrary  Europe's  fragmentation  ever  resulted  in  hundreds  of 
independent,  competing  statelets  that  were  also  centers  of  innovation  (cf  Diamond, 
1998, pp. 413-416).
In addition to this, we must register another important point of strength, through 
which Europe set itself apart from the rest of the world. Some of the most successful 
European powers became able to combine, in an original way, coercion and capital, thus 
conceiving and realizing a further development of their internal power, not only of their 
expansion capabilities. The state expanded not only geographically, but it expanded its 
ability of extraction of resources, both in the long dominated core and in the recently 
conquered peripheries (cf Tilly, 1990, p. 5).
An immense literature has scrutinized the rise of European modern states. In this 
study we have modestly followed those who have understood the unheard concentration 
of  political  power  in  a  few  hands,  in  a  few  centers,  that  is  the  feature  of  their 
geopolitical  success.  Their  internal  power  expansion deserves  to  be  defined,  for  its 
self-awareness and its ideological coherence, the integration process par excellence.
Since the XIV century, a little group of integration powers started to exhibit their 
enhanced capabilities, and to use them, provoking a crisis of legitimacy of both the 
Emperor and the Pope, and promoting a new wave of wars. The decline of the European 
universal  powers is  given forceful  expression in the writings of the Florentine poet 
Dante Alighieri,  who set his masterpiece, the  Divine Comedy, in the Jubilee year of 
1300, while his Monarchia was written some time after 1314. He strongly believed in 
an empire conceived as a «just bonding» among geopolitical secular powers, under the 
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legitimate leadership of the Holy Roman Emperor. He welcomed the election of Henry 
VII, who he named his alto Arrigo, the long waited right candidate for the position of 
Roman German emperor, as a bringer of international peace and justice. Dante bitterly 
criticized  Pope  Boniface  VIII  and  other  popes,  for  the  greed  that  drove  them  to 
appropriate unjustly temporal powers that negated their spiritual calling.
But  when  passing  from heaven  to  earth,  and  from poetry  to  prose,  the  real 
protagonist of the ideological and political moment is not the corrupt Pope, neither the 
righteous Emperor, but a cynical, ambitious local king, Philip IV - ironically enough 
known in  English  as  «the  Fair»,  Philippe  le  Bel in  French  -  sovereign  of  the  still 
small-to-medium kingdom of France. In 1303 he humiliated and arrested the Roman 
Pope, Boniface VIII, in the famous  Outrage of Anagni, and he made the succeeding 
popes,  all  of  them Frenchmen,  move Peter's  seat  from Rome to the  French city  of 
Avignon, where the papacy resided for almost a century. In 1308 he tried to bribe the 
princes and the bishops, who were electors of the Holy Roman German Emperor, in 
order to have his brother, Charles of Valois, elected as a French puppet on the highest 
throne of Europe - instead of Henry VII, the one praised by Dante. He persecuted the 
Jews and disbanded the Knights Templar, in order to confiscate their assets. Philip IV of 
France, in a few years, managed to enhance his powers on his subjects, to enlarge his 
domains, to cancel his debts, and to confiscate riches illegally.
Philip IV le Bel was also one of the monarchs who posed the conditions of the 
Hundred  Years'  War  (1337-1453),  a  conflict  that,  although  being  a  low-intensity, 
low-budget  dynastic  conflict,  it  also  gave  strength  to  much  more  modern  ideas: 
competition  among  territorial  states,  and  the  appearance  of  a  certain  territorial 
patriotism,  Paris  vs  London,  before  the  birth  of  the  modern  nations  of  France  and 
England.
The  rising  French  state  inaugurated  a  fundamental  feature  of  the  coming 
modernity: through imposing its political will as an ethos, not only a law, the sovereign 
power  started  deciding  what  was  evil,  or  good,  dividing  the  right  subject  from the 
wrong one, triggering the decomposition of any moral restraint to its power. The state 
imposed, since this beginning of the XIV century, not only its abuse of power, which is 
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– this  yes,  it  is – an inevitable feature in all  ages,  but its proclamation as a higher 
morality. From this moment on, France - and England, and other rising powers - started 
fully legal persecution and expulsion of Jews, imprisonment and execution of gays and 
witches,  lepers  and  heretics,  and,  overall,  confiscation  of  properties,  among  those 
belonging to potentially anybody who could be cursed as an enemy of the monarch 
(Boswell, 1980).
From the XIV century, states and their wars gained the centrality that would last 
till the end of the XX century. In a crescendo of ruthlessness, and even more ruthless 
self-justification  of  the  sovereign  increasing  power,  states  demanded not  only  more 
taxes,  but  also  much  more  submission,  and  a  certain  degree  of  fanatical  devotion, 
uprooting any traditional political or moral restraint, at expenses of every traditional 
statuses of personal freedom and local liberty. This process was fueled by a mixture of 
religious  fanaticism,  political  cynicism,  and  a  technology  friendly  but  spiritually 
dogmatic attitude (Shennan, 1974; Ertman, 1997). This rise of state powers, in many 
ways,  we  believe  to  have  lasted  till  1989,  thus  allowing  the  definition  of  an 
uninterrupted age of integration seven centuries long (Vaiani, 1994 and 1998).
Notwithstanding  the  Black  Death,  the  European  powers  brought  forward  the 
Hundred Years' War (1337-1453). Along a century of decline and violence, the state 
ruling  elites,  especially  in  France,  experienced  the  continuous  increase  of  their 
extractive capacity and geopolitical powers. In 1400, they set a fertile spiritual ground 
for welcoming technological innovations, that had roots in the Middle East, India and 
China,  but that  only in Europe became appreciated and were developed as tools of 
power.  The  first  printing  presses  helped  the  spread  of  the  will  of  those  in  charge. 
European firearms-empowered ships and armies crossed the ocean – as we have said - 
starting with the exploitation of American silver and gold, but soon posing the bases of 
the future international trade of slaves and goods. Gunpowder became a key feature in 
domestic oppression and European warfare.
Florence was, for a while, the world capital of the Renaissance, but it was the 
French king that imposed a change of scale to warfare with his cannons, thus being able 
to invade Italy, practically unopposed, in 1494. From this moment on, every European 
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power,  from the  least  of  the  German  princes,  or  of  Italian  city-states,  to  the  most 
powerful  monarchs,  the French,  the English -  the German Emperor and the Roman 
Pope included - struggled to have increasing exclusive control of a territorial base in 
Europe, for taxation and, if and when possible, colonies for exploitation. The European 
competition changed dramatically in its nature. From then on, the survival of those who 
could not raise enough money to pay for cannons and for the building of the new kinds 
of fortresses that cannon could not easily shattered, would not be as easy as it used to be 
(cf Tilly, 1990, p. 76).
States had to become more extractive, stronger than Asian empires that are often, 
and  unjustly,  described  as  despotic  and  avid.  Asian  powers  were  more  civilized, 
populated, and astonishingly richer, but were also basically much weaker as political 
organizations, than the Europeans states. They were less predatory with their subjects 
and less aggressive with their neighbors. In China, for instance, the Confucian ideas that 
taxes  ought  to  be  low and that  government  should spend only what  it  earned,  was 
largely prevalent,  along with the practical absence of any expansionist  mood. Great 
Britain, the Dutch Republic, and other European states, arrived, instead, to exceptional 
taxation. The rising of the European state meant, like it or not, the rising of taxes (Vries, 
2002).
The great religious Reform launched by Martin Luther with the publication of its 
Ninety-five  Theses  in  1517,  in  the  new political  environment,  went  far  beyond  its 
religious motivations and cultural meaning. It became a political opportunity, to many 
local rulers, to challenge successfully both the Pope and the Emperor. Having the Bible 
translated in their local vernacular and establishing their own national church, not only 
many princes could emancipate from any foreign political  and religious control,  but 
they could also appropriate immense ecclesiastical properties.
In 1576 Jean Bodin was already able to write, in Les Six livres de la République, 
that the king of France had absolute sovereignty. The sovereign could make any general 
law for his subjects, and also give any kind of particular order to each of them. He was 
the emperor in his domination: rex in regno suo imperator est. And he was also the pope 
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of his  people,  with the  power of  choosing the religion,  the liturgy,  the  culture,  the 
language, for everybody: cuius regio, eius religio.
At this author's best knowledge, the Tuscan moralist Enrico Chiavacci has been 
among the firsts to understand that modern states would have also provoked the death 
of an authentic moral debate among ecclesiastics, theologians and scholars, along with 
the increasing submission of people to the state, by means of state-imposed bigotry. The 
complexity, the creativity, and the pluralism, of the Christian heritage were forgotten 
(Chiavacci, 1980, pp. 63-64). Thomas of Aquino (1225 – 1274) was sanctified but his 
genial Christian relativism was misused.  The millenarian tradition of natural law was 
reduced to a caricature in the interest of the new absolutist sovereigns, paving the way 
to  long  -  and  ultimately  totalitarian  -  fabrication  of  the  political  myth  of  the  state 
(Cassirer, 1950) and to the state-worship - statolatry (Lottieri, 2011).
The European state apparatus emerged, able to cope with both the domestic and 
the  international  front.  The  dimensions  of  the  military  and  bureaucratic  machine 
depended on the population that could support it, and on the extent to which the state 
could call its power-holder members to cooperate in case of wartime mobilization. The 
ruling and the taxation of wider territories required the creation of the modern state 
machinery. Internal oppression and external conquest and settlement inevitably called 
forth durable armies, navies, and bureaucracy, calling into being “a world-wide web of 
officialdom” (Tilly, 1990, p. 94).
Early modern Europe was then a reign of integration powers: states expanding 
their  structures  and powers  at  the  expenses  of  their  own subjects,  of  other  internal 
powers, and of local communities, in the first instance, and if and when possible, of less 
powerful neighbors. Between monarchies that were also rival papacies, and that were 
free, or trying to free themselves, of any imperial restraint, wars became more frequent 
and more international, like the wars in Italy, in the Low Countries, or the Thirty Years 
War (1618-1648).
Wars  became more  frequent  and  more  dangerous  than  any plague  and  other 
natural disasters, in the European everyday life, but a few caveats may be useful, at this 
point. In 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia put a first substantial conclusion to a long 
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season of war, hundreds of states still maintained sovereignty on their territory. There 
was no such thing like a steady, inexhaustible, European greed where any major powers 
would devour every weaker neighbor. The European powers engaged much more their 
peoples, than they did each other, with the only important exception of England that we 
will discuss below. At this point of integration history, for the rest of XVII and all the 
XVIII century, most wars were successions or dynastic conflicts, which led to minor 
adjustments and small conquests.
Conquests that, it must be remembered, were still, mostly, very similar in nature 
to the old imperial style we have defined above. They limited to a change of hegemonic 
elite, or dynasty, while the local power structures remained unchanged, as in the Duchy 
of Milan in its passing from local rulers to France and then to Spain. In addition, some 
European powers were dispersed over many, too heterogeneous, fragmented territories, 
like the Habsburg domination. Other states were too small, like most of the Italian and 
German states, to gather enough money to take part in ambitious political and military 
adventures. And even among the greater ones, at least before the age of absolutism and 
of  enlightened  monarchs,  the  integration  advancement  must  not  be  over-evaluated. 
Spain was slowly unifying Castilla, Aragon and other territories, but without Portugal. 
France was imposing on its southern provinces the abandonment of the  òc  language 
(Occitan) in favor of the  oïl  one (French), but its expansionism was meeting strong 
local resistance along the Rhine, in the Alps, and in Italy.
All the rising European states, furthermore, were occasionally obliged to suspend 
their  internal  rivalries  and  cooperate  in  the  containment  of  the  expansion  of  the 
neighboring Ottoman political  system.  A few years  after  the  death of  Suleiman the 
Magnificent,  in 1571, a coalition of southern European maritime states defeated the 
Ottoman fleet in the Battle of Lepanto, but only in 1683, at the Battle of Vienna, the  
European armies led by the Polish king John III Sobieski, defeated the Ottoman land 
army, thus preventing the eastern power from advancing further in Europe and in the 
Mediterranean. Not surprising, renouncing this competing with the Europeans, led the 
Ottoman empire to remain peaceful, stable, and relatively prosperous. It became also, 
and it is worth remembering, a sanctuary for hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees, 
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expelled from Spain and from other intolerant European states. Cities like Sarajevo and 
Salonika flourished thanks to the Sephardi immigration, along with the ancestral Jewry 
of Jerusalem and Safed.
Many  explanations  of  the  rise  of  modern  states  through  some  forms  of 
competitive  efficiency  may  contain  the  fallacy  of  a  bias  toward  linear,  one  sense 
evolution, depicting larger modern states somehow naturally destined to displace older, 
smaller feudal units (Spruyt,  1994, p. 20). But a Darwinian selection of the bigger at 
expenses  of  the  smaller,  would  end  up  to  be  too  naivily  deterrninistic.  Ideological 
evolutions,  technological  improvements,  economical  exploitation  led  to  diverse 
outcomes throughout Europe. Unlike England and France, many parts of Europe did not 
centralize, witness Germany and Italy, which survived decentralization until  the XIX 
century,  and other  small  units  survived well  beyond. There is  no such a thing as a 
teleological process in the European history and an abstract more efficient solution, the 
augmentation of the state, was not at all an inevitable outcome (Spruyt, 1994, p. 83).
Extraction of resources from their local subjects and from their conquests beyond 
Europe, is very important, a powerful explanation, following Tilly (1990) of the rise of 
European states, but Europe remained a plural, fragmented space of independent mainly 
petty or small-to-medium sovereignties. A restrict range of medium-to-large European 
states,  internally  unified  by  a  strong political  center,  by  a  language,  by  a  religion, 
decided to move further in internal extraction and farther in external expansion. A tiny 
group of European successful states named themselves empires, but their imperial idea 
was gradually shifting: from the traditional unification of local polities under a kind of 
international paramountcy, they were constructing a much more ruthless imposition of 
religion  and  culture,  settlers  and  strongholds,  plantations  and  mining,  slavery  and 
exploitation. The integration powers were becoming, in the reality, colonialist states (cf 
Tilly, 1990, pp. 91-95).
On world maps, from 1700 until the American Revolution, only eight colors are 
enough  to  represent  European  world  expansionism,  one  each  for  Danish,  Dutch, 
English,  French,  Portuguese,  Spanish,  Swedish,  and  Russian  ones.  Their  colonial 
enterprises  surveyed the world with soldiers,  scientists,  merchants  and missionaries, 
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thus building the basis of a shared common perception of European superiority over the 
«others».
Their  expansionisms  and  the  relative  colonial  violence  met  also  with  some 
criticism, starting with Bartolomé de las Casas, in XVI century, continuing in the age of 
Enlightenment,  with Adam Smith, Denis Diderot,  Johann Gottfried Herder and their 
XVIII  century's  contemporaries,  but  none  of  them ever  put  seriously  in  doubt  the 
European  civilizing  mission  and they  all  shared  an  enthusiastic  exuberance  for  the 
European conquering the world (Stuchtey, 2010). It is the same sort of enthusiasm that 
is looming about the coming, increasing conviction that the modern man – the European 
White  male  person -  can  understand,  and ameliorate,  and dominate  everything and 
everybody. More modern but more complicated times are ahead.
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1.7 Western Revolutions
The ingenuity and ferocity of the Middle Ages, the achievements of Humanism 
and  Renaissance,  the  spiritual  surge  of  hope  raised  by  the  Reformation,  all  these 
elements are comprehended and further developed by the Puritan adventure. Energized 
by their devotion and led by their imagination, they were the protagonists of most of 
what will be later be known as modern, with all its contradictions.
In a world where the only - and only relative - secure way of being believer 
without persecution and expropriation from different believers, in each polity, it was to 
follow the  religion  professed by the sovereign,  the Puritans  advocated for  allowing 
multiple religious denominations in a same country.  One of them, Richard Overton, 
pamphleteer and leader of the Leveler,  active all along the mid of 1600, during the 
English Civil Wars, demanded religious freedom in England for everybody, including - 
that is really striking for the time, in a Protestant country - Catholics, along with Jews 
(Watner, 1980).
They  loved  business  and  enjoyed  the  pleasures  made  possible  by  their 
enrichment,  music,  dances,  fine  clothes  and  alcohol  included.  The  Puritan  John 
Lilburne, coined the expression “freeborn rights”, meaning by it that every man, was, 
by birth, entitled to a certain measure of inalienable personal freedom. And even in the 
colonies, the Puritans were among the rare Europeans who treated the natives as human 
peers.
They strongly believed to be entitled to read and personally interpret the Bible, 
take care of  their  family and property,  support  their  parish,  choose their  parliament 
member, bear their own arms and serve the authority, when and if they judged that the 
government  was  legitimate.  And  because  they  mostly  preferred  peace  and  riches, 
instead of war and taxation, they arrived to their historical clash with the English king, 
Charles I.  After that,  for more than a century, Tudor's England and Wales had been 
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integrating very slowly and gradually into a unified state, but still without Scotland, the 
civil wars fought by the Puritans, ended up in a stronger empowerment of a bigger and 
tighter united British state.
We owe to them, also, the consolidation of modern use of the word revolution. 
As it is recorded by the etymological dictionaries, the word derived from the Late Latin 
and passed in English through the mediation of the Ancient French, originally meaning 
a revolve, a roll back, like in the Copernican  De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium 
(1543). Its political meaning was definitely grounded at the time of the deposition of 
James II in 1688, when the English Parliament decided the transfer of the crown to 
William and Mary, an event that was named the Glorious Revolution by John Hampden. 
This revolution was, moreover, only the coherent closing of almost half a century of 
Puritan transformation of the state.
Revolution, as a political concept, was then ambiguous since the beginning. It 
passed from meaning the end of a cycle to defining the cycle in its entirety. A same 
word came to mean several controversial steps: the revolt against an unjust order; the 
excesses  of  violence,  which  pave  the  way for  new tyrants;  the  stabilization  or  the 
overthrow of  these last  ones; the painful  process of  construction of  a  new political 
regime, not necessarily the originally prospected nor better than the point of start.
The first modern revolution undoubtedly led to a stronger English state, to which 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales were brutally subdued and colonized much more than in 
their past of dependency from the English crown. The most radical and anti-conformist 
instances of religious tolerance, equality, extended suffrage of the Levellers were soon 
marginalized. At the same time, the trial for treason and the execution of Charles I in 
1649, the treatment of a king as he was a commoner, it  ended up to be a powerful  
incarnation of the biblical warnings against all tyrants and of the Gospel's warning that 
G-d “hath  put  down the mighty from their  seats,  and exalted them of  low degree” 
(Luke, 1:52). In every epoch and place, in every vernacular language, this is a powerful 
image, whose consequences are indeed enduring in the human awareness. Even if the 
Cromwellian  regime  was  poisoned  by  religious  fanaticism  and  political 
authoritarianism, and it was short-lived, in the long term it became impossible, from 
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that  point  on,  to prevent  the spread of its  revolutionary ideas,  among an increasing 
cosmopolitan public, that was ready to welcome them.
By  the  second  part  of  the  1600,  throughout  the  1700,  inspired  by  ideals  of 
enlightened  absolutism,  many  European  rulers  centralized  power,  expanded 
bureaucracy, uniformed administration, unified the religion, the language, the culture of 
their states. And these states, because of the European successful economy, because of 
the possibility to search for fortune in the colonies, because the modern states needed to 
recruit an increasing number of officers and officials, were increasingly populated by a 
stratum of educated and relatively wealthy people.
Not only the rich, or the noble, but also the members of a kind of a middle class 
ante litteram, could travel, serve abroad, trade, learn, and come back home with new 
ambitions and ideas. In the memories of the XVIII century Tuscan intellectual, Filippo 
Mazzei (1810) – a  voyager and adventurer, advocate of European peoples' liberty and 
American  Independence  supporter  -  one  may  find  a  powerful  image  of  this 
cosmopolitan community of sailors and merchants, officials and diplomats, surgeons 
and bureaucrats, who were traveling from Tuscany to Istanbul, from Mediterranean to 
London,  from  Europe  to  America.  The  sense  of  their  mutual  respect  and 
comprehension, notwithstanding, their  social  origin,  their  nationalities or their  being 
Jews,  or  Islamic,  or  Christians  of  the  several  denominations,  is  striking,  namely  if 
compared with our XX and early XXI century experience.
This European working and wandering social stratum conceived and spread the 
Free  Masonic  spirituality,  the  interest  for  science,  the  pleasure  of  meeting  their 
intellectual and social peers in coffee houses and debating societies. And many of them 
resolved  to  be  philanthropists,  religious  and  social  reformers,  but  also  political 
conspirators.
A group of such persons, in Corsica, led by the famous patriot Pasquale Paoli, 
fought for the independence of their motherland, for most of the XVIII century. They 
were living under the domination of the declining oligarchic Republic of Genoa, and 
most of their economic and social interactions were with the relatively static and poor 
Tuscan state of the late Medici. In spite of their relatively peripheral position, in respect  
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to the more vibrant Atlantic Europe, in the eyes of Pasquale Paoli and his friends and 
supporters - and among them there was our Tuscan-American patriot Filippo Mazzei - 
post-revolution  England  meant,  if  not  yet  an  inclusive  republicanism,  at  least  an 
advanced state, with a high degree of personal freedom, and social opportunity, and 
equality before the rule of law.
The  Corsican  Revolution  for  independence  began  in  1729,  leading  to  the 
establishment of an independent Corsican Republic, with Pasquale Paoli as president, in 
1755. It lasted only until the French invasion and conquest, completed in 1769-1770, 
but it was, nevertheless, a seminal event. The colonization of Corsica aroused universal 
bitterness against the French absolutism and also a wide criticism against the English 
power,  for  its  ineffective  posture,  and  the  very  little  help  that  the  insurgents  had 
received from England (Brendan, 2008).
The Christian fervor that had inspired the political parable of Oliver Cromwell in 
England, and the Deist  Enlightenment of Corsican and Tuscan Freemasons,  were  the 
same  which  animated  the  Founding  Fathers  of  the  self-governing  North  American 
thirteenth colonies.  Both the Puritan mentality and the libertine beliefs  converged to 
inspire a strong sake of freedom. America became the place where non-conformists, 
dissidents, and rebels, from all over the world, could find shelter and even a base for the 
further spread of their – no matter how radical – evangelical and egalitarian creed.
Not surprisingly, the most famous American patriotic society, the Sons of Liberty, 
knew and revered the Corsican patriot Pasquale Paoli, and the Tuscan adventurer and 
universal freedom advocate Filippo Mazzei became intimate friend of Thomas Jefferson 
and one of his  political  confident. As the English domination became more extractive 
and  extraneous  to  the  life  of  the  colonies,  they  started  thinking  to  themselves  as 
republics that could live on their own, independent as some Tuscan republics and Swiss 
cantons were. It may be said that the Corsican unlucky republican dream was revenged, 
a few years later, by the American Declaration of Independence of 1776.
The thirteenth new independent republics shocked Europe, with the realization of 
their ideals of freedom. They were also luckier than Corsica had been. The latter was 
too near to its  French master,  while the formers were  protected  by  an oceanic gap. 
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England, though already having the most powerful military navy and colonial army in 
the world of the time, did not yet have steam-trains  or steamships, the much greater 
power that it would draw – not much later - from Industrial Revolution.
In the meantime the other most powerful state of Europe, France, decided to help 
militarily  the  American  Revolution,  because  of  its  rivalry  with  England.  But  the 
collapse of English power in America, was a short-lived political gain  for Paris. The 
costs and the losses of the French monarchy's wars were already enormous, having led 
to  an  unbearable  taxation  and  oppression,  and  eventually  to  the  rebellion  of  Third 
Estate's taxpayers.
The state power had been made so absolute and so centralized, in the country, by 
the Sun King, Louis XIV and his two successors, Louis XV and Louis XVI, that the 
French Revolution  produced,  along with  universal  civilization  achievement  like  the 
1789 Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, a devastating fight to seize this 
great centralized power, among political factions, revolutionary leaders, generals of the 
new people's  army.  Cromwell's  ruthlessness and hardness  paled in comparison with 
French events.
The  revolutionary  elites  seized  the  state  apparatus  in  1789-1790  and  rapidly 
displaced any other intermediary: landlords, clergy and local oligarchies as well. Local 
privileges were abolished, along with historical local liberties, as the principal of free 
consent to taxation, and any possible cultural and spiritual diversities. They recast the 
French map into a nested hierarchical system of departments and districts (Tilly, 1990, 
pp. 107-109). The most powerful revolutionary party, the Jacobin one, its cynical and 
resolute  leader  Maximilian  Robespierre,  the  cruel  and  fanatical  government  of  the 
Committee of Public Safety under his leadership, the regime of Terror they established, 
all these became source of inspiration and were imitated by many following political 
revolutionary movements, since then.
To  deal  with  their  dominated  territories  and  annexed  populations,  Parisian 
revolutionaries  multiplied  militias  and  hierarchies (Tilly, 1990, pp. 107-109). Starting 
from 1792 the central administration underwent its own revolution, that was, indeed, 
marked  by  an  ambiguous  continuity  with  the  past  absolutist  state  trend:  “the  staff 
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expanded  enormously,  and  a  genuine  hierarchical  bureaucracy  took  shape.  In  the 
process revolutionaries installed one of the first systems of direct rule ever to take shape 
in a large state” (Tilly, 1990, p. 109). In a state already quite centralized, submission of 
every territory to  state  nominated prefects,  put  a  definitive  end to  the last  survived 
thousands-year forms of self-governing local polities. Old indirect rule was completely 
replaced by the new direct rule.
The  French  revolutionary  state,  among  other  things,  confirmed  the  colonial 
control of Corsica. Pasquale Paoli went in political exile in London and Filippo Mazzei 
retired in Tuscany, both of them feeling uncomfortable and marginalized by the main 
course of the European events. The revolution had, again, only amplified and brought to 
further and more extreme consequences, the concentration of power already ongoing in 
the state,  and in  a  few hands of  those in charge.  Ironically  enough,  another  son of 
Corsica with Tuscan ancestry,  Napoleon Bonaparte,  had the chance to emerge,  in  a 
military  coup  on  18  Brumaire (November  9th)  1799,  as  the  Dictator  of  the  most 
authoritarian, centralized state of Europe in that time.
It  is  fair  to  briefly  mention  that  the  French  revolutionary  state,  that  was  so 
powerful on the continent, was  also, as the English was, very  vulnerable overseas. A 
minor  French  colonial  possession,  Haiti,  for  instance,  chose  to  embrace  the 
revolutionary  ideal  in  its  own  way.  It  abolished  slavery  and  proclaiming  its 
independence in 1804, thus becoming, not without contradictions and passing under a 
sort of Jacobin terror, the second modern American independent state, after the United 
States.
Besides the continuity between the absolutist centralization and the revolutionary 
centralism,  there  was  also  a  dramatic  military  shift,  as  a  consequences  of  the 
establishment of the new regime. For several centuries, European powers had feared 
raising  armies  from  their  own  population.  The  danger  of  domestic  resistance  and 
rebellion was ubiquitous with a local population bearing their own arms. It was cheaper 
and politically  less  risky to  hire  mercenaries.  This  trend was capped,  after  that  the 
French  Republic  had  voted  the  universal  male  conscription.  The  mercenary  armies 
practically disappeared.
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In words of Carl Von Clausewitz, after the French revolution, war “had again 
suddenly  become  an  affair  of  the  people,  and  that  of  a  people  numbering  thirty 
millions” (Clausewitz, 1968-1832, 384-5, cited by Tilly, 1990, pp. 82-83).
Napoleon, the military Dictator, had eventually in his hands an immense military 
power,  that  he  ably  transformed  in  political  consensus.  He  conceived  and  largely 
realized a project of rationalization and modernization of all of Europe, thus leaving 
after him a complex mixture of fanatical love, bitter skepticism, and convinced hate, a 
very controversial  heritage within the European historical memory,  that of course it 
cannot be discussed here. But certainly Napoleon, leading the powerful revolutionary 
French  army,  was  then  the  first  European  to  conceive,  and  almost  realize,  the 
unification of the entire continent, from Russia to Spain, under his personal absolute 
rule. The appearance of his crowning as Emperor of the French in 1804, and King of 
Italy  in  1805  are  somehow similar  to  the  old  European  imperial  tradition,  but  the 
substance was very different.  His rule  was mainly military and direct,  not certainly 
dynastic and indirect. His expansion was already expansionism.
The  French  revolutionary  ambiguous  triumph,  along  with  the  success  of  the 
United States and Haiti independence, were also a key factor in fostering the collapse of 
the  European  domination  in  Latin  America.  In  the  void  of  power  followed  the 
Napoleonic invasion of Spain,  throughout Central  and Latin America the local elite 
formed  provisional  juntas for  self-government.  In  1811  Paraguay  proclaimed  its 
independence, the first among the former Spanish dominations. The Latin American 
independence  process  went  on,  through  a  complex  and  contradictory  process  of 
disintegration  and  integration  among  its  political  units.  Spain  and  Portugal  never 
recovered  their  colonial  power,  not  even  any  decisive  political-economic  influence. 
These  little,  still  largely  rural,  underpopulated  peripheral  European  countries  could 
never  more  compete,  from  now  on,  with  the  world  sea-power  of  rising  industrial 
countries – that would be America and England.
Notably,  notwithstanding  the  generous  commitment  and  political  charisma  of 
continental  revolutionary  heroes,  like  Simon Bolivar,  the  liberal  dreams of  political 
unification or construction of large federations – on the model of the United States in 
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North America - never went too far in Latin America. The former Spanish colonies were 
too  socially  and culturally  heterogeneous,  and too geographically  distant  from each 
other.  And,  even  more  important,  they  had  no  common  enemy.  There  was  no 
international constraint comparable with that present in the North America, where the 
Thirteen Colonies had found themselves in the necessity of being united to cope with 
England, to compromize with France, to bargain with Spain.
After the defeat of the Napoleonic climb to continental power, and still before the 
explosion of the Industrial Revolution, at the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, Europe was 
drastically  redesigned,  and  it  was  done  from  above.  The  peoples  that  had  been 
conscripted  and  had  fought  and  suffered  all  over  Europe,  they  were  absent,  while 
patriots  and  freedom  lovers  from  any  corner  of  Europe  remained  unheard.  Local 
governments  and  communities  bodies,  along  with  the  European  most  famous 
intellectuals, very important persons of European aristocracy and clergy included, they 
all were irrelevant.
A tiny little group of leaders from an exclusive club of main powers - Russia, 
Prussia, Austria, Netherlands, Sweden, Great Britain - decided for everybody else in the 
continent. Their attitude was still that of the enlightened absolute sovereigns and the 
fight with the revolutionary state had made them only further stubborn in their political 
resolution:  after  the  ruin  brought  by  revolutionary  France,  an  enormous  and 
unprecedented power would necessarily end in their few hands and they should jointly 
and accordingly used it to protect states and statelets, mobs and elites, from themselves.
Their main geopolitical goal was to, as it was easily understandable, containing 
post-revolutionary France. Along the French border, a series of small-to-medium states 
were  established:  Hanover,  Baden,  Württemberg,  Bavaria,  Switzerland, 
Sardinia-Piedmont, Tuscany. The Holy Roman German empire, that had been liquidated 
by Napoleon,  was never  restored and the Napoleonic rationalization of  the German 
independent states, through their drastic reduction from more than 300 to less than 40, 
was  substantially  maintained  as  the  new  status  quo.  Many  other  free  villages, 
communes,  republics,  mainly in  Germany,  in  the Alps,  in  Italy,  found their  ancient 
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liberties crumbling under the grasp of new state administrative machines (cf Rosenberg, 
1988).
The  tiny  groups  of  powers  that  had  defeated  Napoleon  and  redesigned  the 
continent, felt sure of their special place in history and in the world. They acted more as 
a  collective  Leviathan  than  a  group  of  competing  European  powers.  The 
post-Napoleonic  century  then  was,  in  Europe,  at  least  in  the  beginning,  a  time  of 
substantial  collaboration  among  the  dominant  powers.  Polanyi  (1944)  wrote  of  a 
“Hundred Years' Peace”, under the control of the Holy Alliance, first, and later of the 
Concert of European Powers. As late as the second half of the 1800s,
“J.  J.  Rousseau  arraigned  trades  people  for  their  lack  of  patriotism 
because they were suspected of preferring peace to liberty. After 1815 
the  change  is  sudden  and  complete.  The  backwash  of  the  French 
Revolution reinforced the  rising tide  of  the  Industrial  Revolution in 
establishing  peaceful  business  as  a  universal  interest.  Metternich 
proclaimed that what the people of Europe wanted was not liberty but 
peace.  Gentz  called  patriots  the  new barbarians.  Church  and  throne 
started  out  on the nationalization of  Europe.  Their  arguments  found 
support both in the ferocity of the recent popular forms of warfare, and 
in  the  tremendously  enhanced  value  of  peace  under  the  nascent 
economies” (Polanyi, 1944, p. 7).
The European Concert's ruling elites managed to maintain stability, thus showing 
their capacity of acting together, keeping their grasp over peoples, manipulating their 
cultures, religions, social and political aspirations. They controlled the liberal riots of 
1820-1821 in many countries of Europe.  They survived, through compromising and 
allowing minor political-economic changes, the so-called European Revolution of 1848. 
Below this surface of political stability things, however, were still moving. After entire 
populations  had  been  conscripted,  and  the  state  extractive  power  had  developed 
enormously,  also  claims,  the  request  to  have  a  voice,  by  citizens,  veterans,  and 
taxpayers, were destined to increase.
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Reliance  on  mass  conscription,  confiscatory  taxation,  and  conversion  of 
production to  the ends of  war,  all  these processes  made any state  vulnerable  to  its 
people, and answerable to popular demands, as never before. As states and their wars 
had  changed,  so  the  relationship  between  war-making  and  civilian  politics  altered 
fundamentally (Tilly, 1990, pp. 82-83). And this process will be amplified, as we will 
discuss  below,  after  the Industrial  Revolution,  when,  with  unheard  concentration of 
peoples and machines, food and goods, guns and moneys, the modern political power 
became greater than ever and would need the cooperation of its subjects, more than 
ever.
New legitimization and justification of blind obedience, new calls to defend the 
fatherland from external enemies, new religious justification to states and their wars, 
were necessary and were to be created, by those in power, to control their subjects. A 
perverse  plot  began, between the creation,  from above, and the viral  shedding from 
below, of new words of freedom and independence. Words that, as in the Orwellian 
“Newspeak”  of  the  book  Nineteen  Eighty-Four (Orwell,  1949),  also  meant  greater 
individual enslavement and collective submission, along with diversity cleansing, land 
exploitation, nature destruction.
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1.8 Industrial Colonialism
We have seen that some European states arrived to combine significant sources 
of capital with a population great enough to yield large domestic military forces, thus 
playing the role of dominant powers on the international scene. In their competition and 
imitation, they generated, along with political centralization, the enlarging of their state 
apparatus (cf Tilly, 1990, p. 183). We are still telling – it is important to remember - of a 
geopolitical  rise  precedent  to  the  industrialization.  There  is  not,  at  the  end  of  the 
revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, yet the economical and technological divide that, 
after the Industrial Revolution, would have distanced the Europeans from the rest of the 
world.  Their political  power preceded the steam power,  to put it in a catchy phrase 
(Vries, 2002).
And before the advent of steam power,  they had also already met substantial 
limits to their rise in internal integration and external augmentation. We have already 
seen that their territorial expansion in Europe and the stability of their domination in the 
colonies met severe material, logistic, economical, political, religious and ideological 
problems.  American  independences  were  never  more  seriously  put  in  discussions. 
Revolutionary  national  liberation  suggestions  survived  Napoleonic  continental 
adventurism. Revolutions were contained but their effects could not be reversed, and 
every government, no matter how conservative or liberal it was, took in consideration 
further enlightened reformations.
Gradually or through sudden shifts, the XIX century Europe and Europeanized 
America enlarged suffrage, extended civil and political rights to religious minorities, 
emancipated  slaves.  Dei  delitti  e  delle  pene of  Cesare  Beccaria  (1764)  and  A 
Vindication  of  the  Rights  of  Woman of  Mary  Wollstonecraft  (1792) were  seminally 
circulating, and even if Jeremy Bentham kept his Offences Against One’s Self (1785) in 
the  closet,  for  fear  of  retaliation  and  persecution,  it  was  at  least  conceived,  while 
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persecution of sodomy  experienced a momentary loosening due to decriminalization 
established in 1791 by the new Criminal Code of revolutionary France. Montesquieu, 
Hume, de Saint-Pierre, Kant, Rousseau argued for division and moderation of power 
within each country, and use of legitimate and limited force abroad, conceiving and 
fostering an international framework populated by peaceful republics and other mostly 
petty states under the lean bonding of federal and confederal arrangements.
The post-Napoleonic world was indeed marked by increasing favor for internal 
freedom and external peace, by the limitation of internal absolutism within the main 
powers, and by political independence for many former European colonies and many 
continental medium and petty states. Why didn’t this favorable humanistic and liberal 
trend last?
The main reason, we argue, was The Great Transformation (Polanyi, 1944), that 
was ongoing, starting from England. Significant improvements in agriculture and public 
health had led to a substantial increasing of population. There had been also a series of 
dramatic technological shifts  in metallurgy, use of coal and control of steam-power. 
From the  poorer  and politically  dependent  territories  of  Cornwall,  Wales,  Scotland, 
North  England,  food,  people,  coal  and  raw materials  could  be  easily  deported  and 
concentrated  in  those  which  became the  first  modern  English  industrial  centers.  A 
famous excerpt helps to understand the scope of the change as enthusiastically seen by 
an almost contemporary: 
“Under the reign of just laws, personal liberty and property have been 
secure;  mercantile  enterprise  has  been  allowed  to  reap  its  reward; 
capital has accumulated in safety; the workman has gone  forth to his 
work  and  to  his  labour  until  the  evening;  and,  thus  protected  and 
favoured,  the  manufacturing prosperity  of  the  country has  struck its 
roots  deep,  and  spread  forth  its  branches  to  the  ends  of  the  earth. 
England had also gained by the calamities of other countries, and the 
intolerance of other governments. At different periods, the Flemish and 
the  French  Protestants,  expelled  from  their  native  lands,  had  taken 
refuge  in  England,  and  had  repaid  the  protection  given  to  them by 
practising and teaching branches of industry, in which the English were 
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then less expert than their neighbours. The wars which had at different 
times desolated the rest of Europe, and especially those which followed 
the French revolution (when mechanical invention was producing the 
most  wonderful  effects  in  England),  checked  the  progress  of 
manufacturing  improvement  on  the  continent,  and  left  England  for 
many years without a competitor. At the same time, the English navy 
held  the  sovereignty  of  the  ocean,  and,  under  its  protection,  the 
commerce  of  this  country  extended  beyond  all  former  bounds,  and 
established a firm connection between the manufacturers of England 
and their customers in the most distant lands” (Baines, 1835, p. 89).
Behind the English industrial success there were these favorable conditions, but 
it was also clear, since the beginning, to every early and near witness, that there was 
also a political factor: the kingdom had achieved a full internal integration, along with a 
geopolitical supremacy in the world. The concentration of manpower, and machines in 
the early centers of English industrialization would have been impossible, without a 
strong political state will, and power, and without many peripheral submitted territories 
that could provide human and material resources.
The ambitious  political  construction,  that  Polanyi  later  named as  the Utopian 
endeavor of economic liberalism, the hubris to set up a self-regulating market system 
(Polanyi, 1944, p. 29), must be kept distinct, and acknowledged as rather different, from 
older theorization. The self-regulating, free economy and society, capable of bottom-up 
innovation and increasing and diffusion of wealth, which Adam Smith described in his 
1700s'  writings,  was  conceived  before  industrialization.  The  same  is  true  for  the 
economical freedom that the French had asked to the absolutist  state –  laissez-nous 
faire the French business men had told the powerful minister Colbert at the beginning of 
the  1700.  Totally  lacking  in  any  imagination  and  understanding  of  the  imminent 
industrialization, it seems to us, were also the ideas of economic freedom that entered 
the American economical culture, via George Whatley, Benjamin Franklin and others.
Industrialization was anything but the result of free enterprises. On the contrary, 
England  industrialized  under  the  guide of  political  power,  and of  a  strong one, the 
English state. Without such a strong state power, it would have revealed impossible to 
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separate  masses  of  human beings  from their  rural  world,  their  fields  and vegetable 
gardens, their own  craftsmanship, in order to transform them into proletarians.  They 
became modern slaves,  urbanized workers, depending on politics for everything: the 
guarantee  of  having  their  wages  paid,  the  maintanance  of  their  suburban  poor 
accomodations, the welfare for the aging and the sick. 
Conditions of laborers were a political problem, and a very serious one, since the 
early capitalism, and went under the scrutiny of politicians and public intellectuals. A 
Scottish  non-conformist  thinker  as  Thomas  Carlyle  (1795  -  1881) denounced  the 
Industrial  Revolution's  dismal  cruelty,  as  he  had  similarly  criticized  the  oppressive 
dogmatism of the French Revolution, soon followed by the great Charles Dickens and 
many, many others. A prophet of Socialism as Robert Owen had as investor partners in 
his model factory, in 1813, the above quoted Jeremy Bentham - the founder of modern 
utilitarianism -  and the  Quaker,  William Allen,  a  radical  committed  to  abolition  of 
slavery.  Three  different  persons  –  Owen,  Bentham,  Allen  -  with  different  political 
opinions and interests, who stood together in a practical, not theoretical or ideological, 
enterprise to remove the excesses of exploitation of the workers in early industries.
Well before the development of modern ideological and social cleavages, it was 
already  clear  to  ruling  elites  that  masses  were  going  to  be  dishumanized  by 
industrialization. In the new environment, work could be debilitative and, in the same 
time, unemployment meant starvation and degradation, while children and young maids 
were exploited in mines and factories. The English government and parliament were 
also aware that Industrial Revolution rested on low wages offered to homeless workers, 
and that this unjustice accounted for the profits as well as the rapid accumulation of 
capital in the hands of the manufacturers (Polanyi, 1944, p. 156).
The political answer to such social dramatic changes, to the early protest of the 
Luddites and other popular riots, included repression, like the authoritarian, unfair and 
provocative measures taken by Liverpool's government from 1815 to 1821, but also 
reformation, welfare and the reduction of violence through the enforcement of a tighter 
social  control.  It  is  here  worth  remembering  a  couple  of  initiatives  that  became 
paradigmatic  in  every  other  successive  industrializing  country:  the  1817  Poor 
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Employment Act, that asked local authorities to employ poor people in public works, 
and the 1819 Factory Act, probably the first law for the protection of children from the 
cruel modern factory labor, setting a minimum of nine years of age for being hired.
Those early social measures were indispensable to create the Utopia, the political 
construction  where  fews  could  imagine  to  feel  free  to  compete  in  an  unremitting 
limitless industrial development, at the expenses of many more, of masses of workers - 
politically submitted, not only economically exploited - and of the entire creation. This 
legislative activity continued and increased, culminating in the setting of an ever more 
complex political machine. 
“The road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous 
increase  in  continuous,  centrally  organized  and  controlled 
interventionism. To make Adam Smith's «simple and natural liberty» 
compatible with the needs of a human society was a most complicated 
affair. (...) Just as, contrary to expectation, the invention of labor-saving 
machinery had not diminished but actually increased the uses of human 
labor, the introduction of free markets, far from doing away with the 
need  for  control,  regulation,  and  intervention,  enormously  increased 
their range. Administrators had to be constantly on the watch to ensure 
the free working of the system” (Polanyi, 1944, p. 140).
The industrialization, beacuse of its required concentration of people, revealed 
the importance of  cultural  and religious  homogenization,  of  the kind  that  had been 
realized by the European states in their modern history of integration. Having the same 
spirituality and culture, the same morality and reverence to social authorities, the same 
sense of civic duty and obedience to the political power, was more than important. This 
homogeneization was vital, when living and working concentrated in urban hives, big 
factories,  deep  mines,  large  military  barracks,  huge  ships.  And  conformity  was 
eminently necessary to those who were concentrated in schools, orphanages, hospitals, 
prisons and other large structures of asylums of the modernity.
Language,  in  particular,  became  strategic  within  the  modern  industrialized 
society. While living and working around enormous and dangerous machines, gears, 
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furnaces, explosives and guns, understanding each other on the fly, it was a question of 
success or death. Having a dominant language, spoken on a wide territory, by a large 
population,  unified  by  a  centralized  and  resolute  public  education,  spreading 
conformism  and  obedience,  all  these  combined  factors  became  a  key  feature  of 
industrialization. And such an important one that their absence has been interestingly 
interpreted as a concurring explanation of permanent underdevelopment (cf Negash, 
1990 and 2006).
Without  the  power  accumulated  in  the  modern  state,  without  its  common 
language,  without  its  religious conformism, without spontaneous obedience from its 
subjects,  without  its  laws  and  subsides,  without  its  protective  tariffs  and  export 
bounties,  this  great  transformation,  with  its  radical  alienation  of  human  life  and 
destruction of nature, would not have been possible (cf Polanyi, 1944, p. 139).
Thanks to a strong state, it was possible first to provoke and then to govern the 
consequences  of  the  social  earthquake  and  the  cultural  deluge  of  industrialization, 
“which transformed within less than half a century vast masses of the inhabitants of the 
English countryside from settled folk into shiftless migrants” (Polanyi, 1944, p. 157). A 
catastrophe  that  was  going  to  be  repeated  everywhere  else  a  center,  starting  its 
industrialization, also started to absorb human, financial, material resources from any 
available submitted periphery.
The  subordination  of  peripheries  to  a  center  was  a  key  feature  of 
industrialization,  making it  a process that  was,  since the beginning,  synonymous of 
uneven development. Having submitted, and homogenized, in its preceding history, its 
near territories of Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Cornwall, it was the necessary geopolitical 
advantage for the English state in the making of its Industrial Revolution.
The promotion of the industrial development of the core territory of the state, it 
always  required  the  exploitation  of  every  other  politically  dependent  territory. 
Concentration  of  people  in  industrial  site,  required  migration,  with  the  consequent 
overpopulation and urbanism in the center, and depopulation and abandonment in the 
periphery. Installation of big machines in a dominant place, required the importation of 
food,  energy and raw materials  from many submitted others.  Ever  wider dependent 
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territories should become the outlet of the growing volume of machine-produced goods 
coming from the industrial, dominant center. Any possible obstacle to the deployment 
of the industrial unevenness should be removed through political or military means: 
local  production,  and  cultural  diversity,  but  also  the  same  native  population,  if 
necessary. The ecological, social and cultural system of the locals should be shattered, 
to create room for a new open market, with its unequal exchange between center and 
periphery (cf Polanyi, 1944, pp. 178-179; Magdoff, 1978, p. 3).
With the diffusion of industrialization achievements in other countries, through 
political imitation and competition among modernizing states, in every other corner of 
the world it happened one of two things: either a political project was able to constitute 
a new center of modern, industrial power, or the local polity was destined to become, if 
not a colony, at least a politically and economically dependent territory.
Industrialization could be triggered only by a strong centralized political power, 
in  favor  of  its  centers,  at  expenses  of  its  peripheries.  An  early  industrialization, 
however, meant also an enormous increase of power. The states which embraced more 
coherently a dynamics of industrialization consolidate a great advantage over others. 
Military-industrial  complexes existed since the beginning of  industrialization and in 
many countries the first factories to be installed by the government were the military 
ones. The adjectives «industrialized» and «militarized» may be used as synonyms, in 
the following of the age of integration.
The  relative  more  industrialized  Piedmont  conquered  and  unified  the  Italian 
peninsula in 1861, starting to build a modern national Italian state, after the conquer, 
draining natural, human, financial resources from the South to the North. In the 1867, 
the poorly integrated and backward Austrian Empire decided to split into the two more 
homogeneous state of Austria and Hungary, each of them with a more coherent national 
ideology, uniformity of language and religion, a powerful military-industrial center, its 
own dependent territories.  The two states resulted much more stronger than the old 
empire and, maintaining a common foreign policy and combined armed forces, under 
the political leadership of Habsburg dynasty, their union, Austria-Hungary, remained a 
relevant power, at least at a European level. The relatively more industrialized Prussia 
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annexed the German states, that were already its economical  backyards and, after the 
fierce Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, while Paris was still under siege, in the Hall of 
Mirrors at Versailles, on 18 January 1871, the Prussian king William was proclaimed 
German  Emperor.  The  same  title  of  its  medieval  predecessors,  but  with  a  rather 
different meaning.
Not having a strong political center promoting homogenization, industrialization 
and militarization, the Ottoman Empire broke up. The combination of the European 
powers' joint action in search of influence over new client territories and of local elites' 
search of their own way to modernization and industrialization, produced along the XIX 
century the foundation of independent states as that of Greece (1821), Serbia (1835), 
Montenegro (1852), Rumania (1859), Bulgaria (1878), at the expense of the Ottoman 
decline.
Despite  these  early  consistent  geopolitical  consequences  of  industrialization, 
Europe in XIX century is not yet a reign of war of all against all. Many minor European 
territories remained or became independent, as neutralized, buffer states, like, Belgium 
in 1831, Luxembourg in 1867, Denmark after 1864. The Republic of San Marino, for 
instance,  was spared by Piedmont's  troops, because it  was an ancient and respected 
Libertas. The surviving of a few small and even micro nations among the European 
powers was a symbol of their mutual respect and of their joint interest of keeping peace 
in Europe, going on the industrialization of their centers, and the exploitation of their 
dependencies (cf Polanyi, 1944, p. 8).
The capacity of European powers to cooperate, despite their difference of status, 
government, dimensions, industrial and military power, at the end of the XIX century, is 
still striking. Their industrial and military dynamism was mostly released against the 
rest of the world, where they had to spread, to put it with the irony of Joseph Conrad, in 
his Heart of Darkness (1899), the “suppression of savage customs”.
England, thanks to its new industrialized power, maintained India after the Great 
Mutiny of  1857 and posed the basis  to  make of it  the main outlet  of its  industrial 
production. Russia expanded in Central Asia. China was forced to open to European 
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economical penetration, submitted to the yoke of the Unequal Treaties, from the 1841 
Convention of Chuenpee on.
The  opening  of  Suez  Canal  in  1869,  that  could  have  revealed  an  economic 
disaster because of winding problems for sailing vessels, became a successful logistic 
facility for military steamships, giving farther impulse to colonialism. The famous – and 
notorious - 1884-1885 Berlin Conference gathered thirteen European states, plus the 
United States that had sponsored the settlers of Liberia, to put an order to the scramble 
for  Africa,  setting  a  division  of  the  entire  continent  in  possessions  and  spheres  of 
influences.  The  submission  of  Africa  was  dramatically  different  from any  possible 
traditional  old  imperial-style  indirect  rule.  It  was  direct  rule  in  the  worst  sense  of 
systematic rape, destruction with every mean, not excluding genocide, of every local 
obstacle  to  the  industrial  exploitation.  The  cruel  fate  of  the  Congo,  as  a  field  of 
extraction of rubber and other goods, personal property of the Belgian king, Leopold II, 
set a model of industrial colonialism par excellence.
The  timeline  of  development  and  diffusion  of  telegraph,  railways,  gunboats, 
show us  that  industrialization  never  was  a  spontaneous  diffusion  of  entrepreneurial 
ideas and productive innovations, but that it was conceived, planned, financed, realized 
by political centers in their struggle to maintain or increase their power.
Among the early industrial powers, there were also the United States of America. 
Was  the  American  industrialization,  thanks  to  enormous  availability  of  spaces  and 
resources, a kind of more horizontal and more inclusive,  Jeffersonian pellmell? The 
Thirteen Colonies are rightly proud of the fact that some of their original plantations 
started under the sign of peaceful agreement and exchanges with the natives, but things 
went  very  differently  when  English,  French,  Spanish,  and  the  newborn  American 
Union, deployed their colonial troops to enlarge their territories at expense of American 
Indians.
After  the  triggering  of  industrialization,  the  continent  was  gradually  but 
relentlessly emptied of natives and buffalo, to make room for politically planned mass 
settlements  of pioneers and their  cattle.  By the time that  Alexis de Tocqueville had 
published his  De la  démocratie en  Amérique,  in  1835-1840,  the  United  States  had 
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already set the conditions of their coast-to-coast industrialized expansion. And it was 
exactly in America that political consequences of industrialization were first massively 
revealed.
Since the beginning, the States of America amalgamated in a strong union, able 
to meet the English power and to lead the continental  expansionism. A Jeffersonian 
republicanism,  that  wanted  to  maintain  strong  states'  rights,  had  always  survived, 
resisting  the  integrationist  mainstream,  those  of  the  Federalists.  When this  inherent 
tension turned up in secession, the resulting war became the first industrialized conflict 
of human history, where orders and news were transmitted by telegraph, and troops 
moved by railways and armed steamships. The Secession War, fought from 1861 to 
1865, was terrible, with almost one million lives lost.
Causes of secession and the following war to establish again the Union, were 
controversial  since the beginning to contemporaries actors of both sides, with every 
educated persons, not only elites, contended by opposite political narratives. The result 
was, on the contrary absolutely clear: the war resulted in further concentration of power 
in Washington, decline of state self-government, and the empowerment of Northeastern 
industrial  and  financial  core's  domination  over  the  entire  Union.  The  defeated 
Southerners, the formally emancipated black people, along with the natives, and the 
incessant  flux  of  new  immigrants,  all  of  them  entered,  as  obedient  checkers  and 
submitted  losers,  in  the  American  industrial  history  of  material  advancement  and 
spiritual anxiety, of imperial success abroad and irredeemable, structural inequality at 
home.
The  early  political-industrial  enhancements  found  early  imitators  in  a 
medium-to-big country, with a high grade of social homogeneity and political unity, 
Japan. The land of the Rising Sun started to look at the West, in Europe and America, in 
search of a way to overcome the unequal relationships it had met with the industrialized 
powers. In 1867 a fourteen years old boy ascended to the throne, becoming emperor 
Meiji. His government sent the famous Iwakura Mission to Europe and to the United 
States,  to  examine Western institutions and technology,  industries,  finance.  Students 
were left behind, to acquire a more profound knowledge. It was the beginning of the 
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fast Meiji Revolution that had also, as every revolution, its civil wars and its victims. 
While the old Confucian and Buddhist  traditions were despised, the national Shinto 
became the base for a new national modernized belief, able to unite the people, the 
country, around the Emperor, their living god, who was personally leading the national 
effort of modernization. It was, probably, one of the first successful cases of inventing a 
tradition, to prepare a population to a time of more modern political  obedience and 
industrial exploitation.
By the end of XIX century,  the European states were no more alone in their 
march over the world. With America's military rise from civil industrial war, and Japan's 
modernization  and  industrialization  from  above,  the  European  great  transformation 
demonstrated to  be reproducible  everywhere:  the world was going to  be unified by 
another globalization, that was correctly defined as a process of global «westernization» 
(Latouche,  1989),  an  expression  that,  from  now  on,  we  can  use  as  a  substantial 
synonym  of  industrialization,  modernization.  At  the  beginning  of  the  XX  century, 
thanks  to  industrialization  and  industrialized  colonialism,  the  world  is,  completely 
divided among Western or westernized states. Cecil Rhodes wrote in his 1902 testament 
the well-known and diffusely quoted statement:
“The world is nearly all parceled out, and what there is left of it is being 
divided up, conquered and colonized. To think of these stars that you 
see overhead at night, these vast worlds which we can never reach. I 
would annex the planets if I could. It makes me sad to see them so clear 
and yet so far”.
Vladimir I.  Lenin,  in his seminal pamphlet  Imperialism, the Highest Stage of  
Capitalism (1916-1917) wrote that the characteristic  feature of the period under his 
review 
“is  the  final  partitioning  of  the  globe  -  final,  not  in  the  sense  that 
repartition is impossible; on the contrary, repartitions are possible and 
inevitable - but in the sense that the colonial policy of the capitalist 
countries has completed the seizure of the unoccupied territories on our 
planet. For the first time the world is completely divided up, so that in 
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the future only redivision is possible, i.e., territories can only pass from 
one owner to another”.
Along  with  the  reach  of  its  geographical  limits,  the  industrial  colonialism 
evolved in something more than a political  adventure and an industrial  necessity.  It 
became an ambiguous ideological concept,  imperialism, one of the many dangerous 
«isms»  of  modernity.  To  put  it  with  a  Lenin's  expression,  the  «non-economic 
superstructure», stimulated rivalry in expansionism, well beyond the structural exigence 
of industrial colonialism.
At the end of XIX century, there was little left to conquer, so, to justify internal 
rising  inequalities,  economical  recurrent  crises,  social  and  political  submission  of 
people, and to maintain the ruling elites' privileges and the concentration of power in 
the hands of a few, it was necessary to construct an enemy. And in the world there were 
no others, but other colonial mates.
An older, hopefully weaker, colonial power was a perfect candidate to be spoiled. 
A newer, proudly rising, colonial power was a perfect candidate as aggressor. The joint 
old  European  powers'  action  to  maintain  a  general  international  peace,  letting 
industrialization grow in each motherland and extraction going on in every colony, was 
put in crisis by a series of conflicts, provoked by powers challenging the status quo. The 
1898 Spanish-American War saw in action the expansionism of the new centralized and 
militarized American republic. The 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War saw the victory of 
the newly industrialized Japan. The Anglo-Boer Wars and the Anglo-Afghan Wars were 
fought  by  the  English  Empire  beyond  any  political  reasonableness  and  economic 
rationality.  The  era  of  the  balanced  Concert  of  Europe  gradually  faded.  The 
industrialized colonialist  states started running in  the direction of  a  general  conflict 
(Polanyi, 1944, p. 14; cf also pp. 18-19).
So  unavoidable  did  the  rise  of  Western  industrial  powers  and  their  world 
hegemony  appear,  that  it  became and  in  many  ways  is  still  common to  fall  in  an 
ahistorical belief in their manifest destiny. The entire epopea of the modern states has 
been fallaciously summarized in cycle-phases, where a power rises, another challenges: 
Portugal and Spain; Netherlands and France; Britain and France; Britain and Germany; 
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United States and Soviet Union (cf Modelski, 1987a and 1987b). And so far a wide and 
various  hegemonic  rivalry  literature  mainly  focuses  on  the  predatory  nature  of  the 
international  realm,  where,  for  some,  selection  occurs  primarily  through  war. 
Consequently, if particular forms of organization fall aside, this must be explained by 
their inability to wage war as effectively as their rivals. The small has to fall prey to the 
large (cf Spruyt, 1994, p. 155-156).
Darwin's The Origin of Species was published in 1859 and a Darwinist discourse 
about a geopolitical survival-of-the-fittest came useful and such remained so far. The 
Western  expansionism  was  not  only  considered  as  something  natural,  but  also 
anachronistically projected back, beyond its very origin,  reconstructing the European 
past as a time of eternal internecine war, fatally destined to repeat. It was, perhaps, also 
a way to shadow the profound crisis of European external expansionism, in front of its 
reached  limits.  There was certainly  somehow the same old story of those in  power 
cheating their  subjects.  Something common,  in  human history,  and  not  natural,  nor 
inevitable.
The  world  industrialized,  militarized,  colonialist  and  imperialist  powers, 
however,  found themselves wrestling the search for external augmentation, that, from 
the beginning of XX century, could happen only at expenses of other powers.  Rulers 
were fueling fear and hates among their peoples, as a way of enforcing their internal 
power. It seems believable that those who triggered the coming Great War, were totally 
unaware of the scope and the consequence of a global, generalized, industrialized war.
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1.9 The Totalitarian Outcome
In the backstage of industrialization,  and of industrialized militarization, there 
was  something,  perhaps,  still  not  enough debated.  It  was  the  increasing  social  and 
political control and, consequently, a continuously expanding governmental structure. 
Within  each  state,  heavy  bureaucratization  preceded  heavy  industry,  and  heavy 
weapons.
No regime could industrialize without securing the acquiescence of its subject 
population  and the active  cooperation of  crucial  technical,  economical,  bureaucratic 
elites. Rulers enforced the collection of tribute, taxes, and levies of men or materials, 
but  they  also  bought  off  the  popular  consent  by  timely  payments  of  salaries  and 
pensions, public works and security. “In this regard, rulers resembled racketeers: at a 
high price, they offered protection against evils that they themselves would otherwise 
inflict, or at least allow to be inflicted” (Tilly, 1990, p. 75). Racketeering, however, was 
not  the  whole  history.  In  a  time of  science  and technology triumph,  while  religion 
«opium of peoples» was supposed to be declining,  there was something else which 
made states – and humans in charge of them – to seem so powerful as gods were once 
believed to be. This else was the modern ideological construction.
The first indispensable actor, and factor, needed to constitute and explain what 
XX century ideology was and how it could work so inexorably in the world history, was 
the modern believer, a human person so dramatically available to believe, to follow and 
to obey.
Obtaining obedience from one's own subjects through a combination of coercion 
and conviction,  is  an old phenomenon, but  what revealed to  be new in the modern 
industrialized  times,  it  was  the  possibility  to  get  spontaneous,  enthusiastic,  even 
fanatical obedience by immense masses of individuals, with a durability and reliability 
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largely superior to any older religious, traditional, dynastic, clan loyalty. Obedience was 
also industrialized, in quantity and quality.
After being separated from her livelihood, family, native land, vernacular culture, 
creativity and skill, the human creature was reduced to an isolated, uprooted, deprived 
person without  qualities  and qualifications.  She  was  made  easily  replaceable,  more 
similar to a spare part reproducible in series, in industrial quantities, than to someone. 
Universal  and  compulsory  education,  religious  homogeneity,  social  security, 
concentration in urban slums, recruitment in industry, mass communication, all these 
processes resulted in the making of masses who were completely dependent on their 
state, in a way absolutely unmatched in any previous season of human political history. 
Obedience to state became – this yes it did - an inescapable fate for individuals, because 
it was the state that was giving them food, salary, education, care, pensions, along with, 
even, a social recognition, a spirituality, their own self identity.
In  industrialized  states,  the  consent  was  so  industrialized  that  even  universal 
suffrage, at its beginning and up to certain limits which we will discuss better in the 
second part of this study, consisted in not much more than a series of plebiscites, where 
the nationals ended up to vote what their ruling elite had defined as the wealth of the 
nation.
When the state had to fight its industrialized wars, huge masses of subjects were 
also  given  arms.  Before  industrialization  of  obedience,  it  would  have  ever  been  a 
danger for the ruling elite,  to create  such armed masses.  After  the industrialization, 
those armed masses became so  maneuvrable that they could be armed with  industrial 
weapons  and  given  access  to  industrial  production  of  ammunition.  Masses  of  well 
armed soldiers became lamblike cannon fodder, available to launch themselves towards 
death, blindly obeying orders, no matter how stupid, cruel, or even inhumane they were.
The XX century cinema have immortalized powerful images of this mass modern 
obedience  until  death,  like,  for  instance,  those  of  young  Australian  rural  workers 
mowed by the industrial fire in futile attacks, senselessly killed at the battle of the Nek, 
in 1915, portrayed by Peter Weir in his Gallipoli (1981). Neither in moments of highest 
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revolutionary enthusiasm and personal charisma, Cromwell and Napoleon had probably 
been universally obeyed by their troopers, as the XX century's regimes were.
Without  the  comprehension  of  this  mass  obedience,  the  connected  mass 
production, the resulting mass militarization, the 1914 debut of XX century world wars 
would remain a sort of ahistorical irruption of irrational forces right in the middle of a  
time  otherwise  ruled  by  optimism  and  prosperity,  the  Belle  Époque,  the  British 
Victorian Era, the American Gilded Age, seen simplistically as too good to last.
The  American  Civil  War,  the  colonial  wars,  the  rivalry  between  Russia  and 
Japan,  and  most  importantly,  in  the  heart  of  Europe,  the  short  but  bloody 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870, were not a fatal inevitable, cyclic repetion of war. War 
had instead evolved for the bad, not because of any innatism or fatalism, but because of 
industrialization. And because of industrialization, war became more lethal than ever.
Along with old known problems, always present in every human conflict, new 
and  worse  ones  emerged.  Not  only  logistic  shortages,  privateers'  moral  collapse, 
officials' frustration, burecrats' prepotence, grew geometrically, not arithmetically, with 
the  development  of  industrialized  armies,  but,  in  addition,  industrialization  and 
industrialized war produced new blatant inequalities within the army and the society.
An in case of real military and political crisis, the modern obedience to the state, 
could turn in blind obedience to an anti-state. The Commune of Paris in 1871, gave a 
sample of how gullible urban masses,  impoverished workers and frustrated veterans 
without a professional future, would desperately coalesce and revolt, following weak 
utopias, falling in excesses, being drowned in blood by the still superior forces of the 
state.
After  the repression,  in the following decades,  the urban community of Paris 
remained bitterly divided among the repressed and the repressor, each side being highly 
influentiable by ideological constructions that could furnish a justification for the own 
party's violence.
The Dreyfus  affair,  as  Hannah Arendt  (1951) understood,  would reveal  to  be 
premonitory  of  the  possible  involution  of  modern  ideological  obedience.  After  the 
humiliating defeat of France in 1870, the German Empire had annexed the little country 
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of  Alsace,  on  the  border  among  the  two  countries.  A place  that  had  never  been 
completely made French, where a local vernacular Alsatian culture and language were – 
and are – still alive. The territorial loss was seen by many French nationalists as an 
unforgettable shame, for which internal traitors, along with international enemies, were 
to be blamed. Among those who were highly likely considered as traitors, there were 
immigrated people coming from peripheral French dependencies, altogether with, not 
surprisingly, cosmopolitan Jews, because of their not being completely French.
In  this  background,  in  1894  a  young  officer,  Alfred  Dreyfus,  was  unjustly 
convicted for high treason in favor of the German power. Having both Alsatian and 
Jewish ascent,  thus  not  being entirely and solely  French,  he came out  as  a  perfect  
scapegoat. He was deceived by the judges, persecuted by his superiors, muddied by a 
wide reactionary nationalist public. So embittered was a large part of the French public, 
after the national defeat in their first industrial war, and so scared by the Communard 
revolutionary  struggle,  that  the  most  educated  and  politically  sophisticated  urban 
citizenry of Europe, resulted to be also easy inflammable, and manageable, by its high 
political and military authorities' propaganda.
It  took years  to gather  a movement for truth and justice,  notwithstanding the 
personal commitment of great intellectuals and public figures like Émile Zola,  who 
published in 1898 his flaming open letter  J'accuse, along with Anatole France, Henri 
Poincaré,  Georges  Clemenceau.  It  was  only  in  1906,  that  Dreyfus  was  finally 
exonerated of any charge.
All these were warning signs that neither the ruling elites, nor the urban mob did 
comprehend.  A new  major  war  among  the  two  main  blocks  of  powers,  the  Triple 
Entente  (United  Kingdom,  France  and  Russia)  and  the  Central  Powers  (Germany, 
Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire) was in fact foreseen, but the lasting, irreparable 
affliction of such unheard mutual destruction, that derived from the explosion of the 
Great War, certainly was not.
On 28th June 1914, the heir of Austria-Hungary dual monarchy, the Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand of Habsburg and his wife Sophie, were assassinated in Sarajevo, in a 
conspiracy  where  Serbian  officials  were  implicated.  Austria-Hungary  answered 
90 / 272
Mauro Vaiani - Disintegration as Hope - 1. Integrations and their limits
(PhD public defense on 12 July 2013)
invading Serbia on 28th July. In the meantime both the contenders invoked the help of 
their allies and, within weeks, most of the world powers were at war. Only a few minor, 
small  states succeeded in remaining neutral.  The facility,  we would dare to say the 
reckless precipitation,  with  which so many states  entered war and,  even worse,  the 
fatalism with which they let the war embitter and endure in the following years, beyond 
any rationality, is still astonishing.
Not  only  in  England  and  in  the  United  States,  but  in  every  major  power, 
Germany and France, Austria-Hungary and Italy, in the Ottoman Empire and, up to a 
certain point, even in Russia, there were political organizations, independent churches, 
self-governing universities, free press, elected parliaments, but  all critical or hesitant 
voices  were  silenced  by  the  roaring  mainstream  of  chauvinism,  by  the  universal 
certainty that it was the unavoidable duty, for each individual, or social group, or local 
community, to side and align with their own state.
The German imperial Reichstag, for instance, was certainly an advance model of 
democracy in its time, expression of universal male suffrage, with high plural turnout. 
Its stronger political faction, though formed by anti-capitalist and anti-militarist Social 
Democrats deputies, voted war credits together with their political  rivals - Christian 
centrists, moderate Liberals, rightest Conservatives. All the factions were conditioned 
by the ideological call to national loyalty.
In  a  slightly  different  way,  in  the  parliament  of  the  Kingdom of  Italy,  most 
Socialists, Liberals and Catholic deputies were firmly opposing the war, but they were 
overtaken  by  nationalist  wild  propaganda.  Posing  himself  at  the  helm  of  the 
interventionist movement, the king Vittorio Emanuele III of Savoy dragged Italy into 
the tragedy of the World War I, betraying Italy's international alliances, the will of his 
parliament and the sentiment of his subjects. The worst part of that Italian drama, by the 
way, it was not the megalomania of its Savoy king, but the brutal reality that the entire 
machine of the Italian state,  though fragile and ineffective in many respects,  it  was 
however able to bring millions to obey that felon monarch, the same that will later be 
the godfather of Fascism and the signer of shameful antisemitic Italian Racial Laws.
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In these two countries and in many others, if not the people, still  wide social  
strata did want the war or did obey the state propaganda that told them to want it.  A 
moderate, conservative pope, Benedict XV, invoked the end of the Great War that he 
called a senseless slaughter, the suicide of Europe, scared by the spread of statolatry as 
a  mass  ideology,  able  to  replace  the  Christianity  (Vaiani,  1994),  but  most  of  the 
contemporary observers were instead fascinated by the power that was being displayed.
In the conduct and the lasting of war, every sense of proportion among means 
and  goals  disappeared.  From his  shelter  in  neutral  Switzerland,  Lenin  “saw in  the 
remarkable total mobilization of the German economy in World War I a vision of the 
smoothly humming machine of the socialist future” (Scott, 2012, p. XIII).
When the armistice was signed on 11th November 1918, up to 60 million soldiers 
had been mobilized. Almost 10 million of them had been killed by modern armaments, 
chemical  weapons  included,  and  the  fate  of  millions  survived  veterans  appeared 
obscure.  World  War  I  and  its  connected  events  also  included  domestic  political 
oppression, colonial repression, deportation of individuals and groups, persecution of 
minorities and stateless peoples. The spread of 1918 Spanish Flu among a population 
awakened  by  war  scarcities,  was  also  awful.  All  these  dramatic  war  facts  and 
consequences exacted among the civilians a toll that may be estimated even greater than 
the number of mobilized. And it was only the beginning of the XX century wars.
How could this  carnage,  along with the related immense social  uprooting,  be 
possible? It could, because the ideological political power could name the evil as good, 
war as peace, freedom as slavery, slaves as patriots. It was not only traditional power's 
cynicism. The capacity of believing its own lies is  one of the most open secrets of 
power, and leaders believing in their own self-justifying propaganda, are not unusual. It 
is  one  of  the  most  depressing  constants  of  war  that  those  who initiate  the  killing, 
become convince  of  the  morality  of  their  action,  or  of  the  necessity  of  their  crime 
(Ferguson, 2003i, p. 38).
In  the  ideological  totalitarian  time,  there  was  a  peculiar  mass  innocence,  a 
sentiment  able  to  change  ordinary  individuals  in  reckless  evil  machines:  siblings 
denouncing  their  parents;  ordinary  persons  killing  their  neighbors  and  colleagues; 
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doctors  suppressing  their  patients;  engineers  planning  genocide;  everybody  obeying 
unconditionally their own state authority.
During the long, cruel years of war, as a consequence, too rarely and too lately 
the mobilized masses of soldiers rebelled against the senselessness of so many lives 
devoured by the Great War's trenches.  Interestingly enough, one of this rare revolts 
occurred in one of the biggest but less alphabetized, organized, modernized country, the 
Russian one. While the Russian lines were collapsing, in February 1917 (according the 
old Julian calendar that was still in use in Russia, in March according to the common 
Gregorian one), in then imperial capital Saint Petersburg, a provisional government was 
formed to substitute the collapsing Tsarist autocracy.
Among the different Russian political factions, the Bolsheviks emerged as one of 
the  better  organized  in  the  competition  for  power,  but  overall  as  the  most  lucidly 
determinate to put an end to the pointless conflict with Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
They took the control of the state with their October 1917 revolution (November in the 
Gregorian calendar), established the power of their soviets – their militants' councils - 
and committed to peace as soon as they could, signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with 
Germany in March 1918.
Most  of  contemporary  revolutionary  and  anti-revolutionary  observers  were 
surprised by the Russian revolution. They were expecting a crisis of imperialist and 
colonialist  state  in  one  of  the  major  industrialized  and  militarized  state,  chiefly  in 
Germany,  elsewhere  than  in  the  largely  agrarian  and  still  backward  Russia.  This 
theoretical  expectation was not  basically  wrong,  but it  underestimated the fact  that, 
where there was a more advanced, industrialized and militarized state, along with a 
concentration of frustrated soldiers and angered workers, potentially supportive of a 
regime  change,  there  would  have  been  also  many  more  military  and  bureaucratic 
personnel,  ready  to  line  with  the  constituted  powers  and  play  a  decisive  role  in 
repression.
Also in Germany, in fact, as soon as the Empire collapsed a year after, in the late  
1918,  socialist  and  pacifist  elites  emerged  and  founded new provisional  republican 
governments in local states, as in Bavaria, and later in 1919 formed the new federal 
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Weimar Republic. There were also, like in Russia, radical political social revolts: in 
Berlin, in January 1919, there was the Spartacist revolution, in which Karl Liebknecht 
and Rosa Luxemburg were killed; other German Communists founded a soviet republic 
in  Bremen  and  another,  even  more  important,  in  Bavaria;  the  following  year,  in 
March-April 1920, another Spartacist Revolt upset the Ruhr. But all these revolutionary 
attempts  were  nipped  in  the  blood  thanks  to  the  presence,  in  great  numbers,  of 
Freikorps, that were formed by veterans whose repressing potential had been forged in 
the horror of trench warfare.
These repressive groups were united by a unique combination of political and 
human  factors.  Politically,  they  were  thirsty  of  self-indulgent  explanation  of  their 
military defeat and they were ready to believe in every possible domestic betrayal, and 
to  become  aggressive  against  any  available  easy  scapegoats:  the  Bolsheviks  had 
sabotaged,  the  Christians  had  been  cowards,  the  Jews  had  thought  only  to  enrich 
themselves,  and so on.  In addition to this,  as human beings survived to a common 
terrible experience, they still shared a profound spirit of camaraderie, along with mutual 
recognition,  help  and  respect.  The  paramilitary  corps  was  a  stable  shelter  for  each 
veteran, while they felt so uncomfortable in a civil society dominated, in their eyes, by 
defeatism and corruption.
In  Russia  the  situation  had  been  rather  different.  The  pacifist  and  socialist 
«Reds»  could  appeal  to  soldiers  and  veterans  coming  from rural  provinces,  whose 
obedience  had never  been  industrialized.  In  the  few main  Russian  cities,  industrial 
workers  and  the  petty  bourgeoisie  were,  up  to  a  certain  point,  free  of  a  strong 
conditioning  to  obedience  to  the  constituted  state  power.  In  the  Tsarist  Russia  nor 
instruction, neither welfare was so generalized as they were in more modernized and 
industrialized state. So there were less numbers of people depending on the state, and 
there were not a mass chauvinism either, not among the Russians, even less among the 
non-Russian nationalities.
The Russian Bolsheviks were a small,  smart,  resolute,  well-organized faction, 
boasting  a  superior  efficiency in  a  backward  political  environment.  The Reds  were 
certainly better organized than the Whites, than all the other elites and factions they 
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marginalized and fought in the civil war. They were able to understand the universal 
lack  of  loyalty  for  the  Russian  state  as  such,  and  that  broad  social  strata  did  not 
anymore want to die in the trenches for it. The Tsarist regime was so far from what they 
considered their home, and they were strongly interested only in immediate peace. To 
these  people,  the  Bolsheviks,  along  with  peace,  also  promised  honest  salaries  for 
industrial workers, land for the peasantry, dignity for the oppressed national minorities, 
and they won.
Rosa Luxemburg's social  vision was not certainly less ambitious then Lenin's 
one,  and the  German Communists'  organization  was  not  inferior,  but  the  Spartacist 
revolutions had the handicap of being pacifist in an environment that was populated by 
millions of veterans that had participated with obedience, if not even with enthusiasm, 
to the war effort. Those people, after the tragedy, could not bear the thought of having 
fought, killed and witnessed the death of so many of their comrades, in a pointless, if 
not wrong, enterprise. In the eyes of those veterans, Communists and other pacifists 
could not seem other than despicable ambushes, hate propagators, traitors. So, easily, 
the anti-Communist reaction found plenty of volunteers for repression of German Reds.
It may be sustained that the German revolutionary attempts failed not because 
there were not enough politically mobilized social strata, ready to join a revolutionary 
discourse, but because there were already too many of them. Other organized political, 
bureaucratic, military forces were on the scene, ready to fight and to compete for power, 
and they had the veterans on their side, namely the main and most active grass-root 
social force of the post-war.
The  Great  War  left  behind  this  planetary  cleavage  among  those  who  had 
questioned their state regime and its senseless war, and those who had obeyed their state 
authorities till  the end. The contents of opposing clashing platforms – Bolshevik or 
anti-Bolshevik,  pacifist  or  militarist,  revolutionary  or  anti-revolutionary  –  are  less 
important  than the reality  that,  in  the aftermath of  World War I,  displaced peoples, 
impoverished petty  bourgeoisie,  discharged veterans,  officials  whipped  by return  to 
civilian life, were ready to believe and follow either those who looked able to defend 
the present social order, or those who appeared able to fix it. No matter how misleading 
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were their  slogans,  how raw their  propaganda.  This  bring us  to  discuss  the second 
necessary factor of the ideological construction, the belief.
A modern ideological belief differed from a simpler political opinion in that it 
pretended to possess a key to history, the intimate knowledge of a key to an eternal truth 
about the human destiny within the chaotic cosmos. Its internal intellectual coherence 
was far less important than its potential of assuring the blessing of a warm inclusive 
sentiment, in the cold void loneliness of the industrialized and militarized society.
Its rationality, sometimes even its plausibility, was never really decisive. It could 
be founded indifferently on political hubris, racist bias, economic theories, historical 
reconstructions and expectations, prophecies of rise and demise, cultural similarities or 
coincidences, linguistic differences, religious rivalries, and all these could even may be, 
up to a certain points, real facts, but they were really functioning only because of their 
discriminatory potential, their ability to unite believers and to keep them separated from 
the  nonbelievers.  Scientific,  sociological,  historical  arguments  remained  largely 
unchecked in the background (Arendt, 1951, pp. 159-165). That explains why not only 
war comrades or factory mates found themselves united in an ideological sectarianism, 
but also historians and scientists themselves left their studies and hurried off to preach 
to the multitude new ideological interpretations of life and world. “The blame is not to 
be  laid  on  any  science  as  such,  but  rather  on  certain  scientists  who  were  no  less 
hypnotized by ideologies than their fellow-citizens” (Arendt, 1951, p. 160).
In the common experience of sharing an ideological  belief,  the experience is 
decisive, no matter how inaccurate may be the belief. And fallacious are all the scholars 
who,  looking at  these  tangles  of  experiences  and beliefs,  continuously  fall  into  the 
temptation of seeing in them the eternal return of the irrational, of the primordial, of the 
innate, instead of looking at the political and social, material and spiritual consequences 
of industrialization and modernization on concrete everyday life of human beings.
In every corner where industrial modernity arrived, wide uprooted social strata 
were also formed. The unsatisfied, deprived people were eager to belong someone and 
believing in something better than the painful reality. Every narrative able to unite them, 
to individuate easy scapegoats, to promise an easy way out of the crisis, could spread as 
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a contagion, become associated with a political domination project, be embraced by a 
political movement, and make the fortune of its leaders (cf Arendt, 1951, pp. 222-232).
Benito Mussolini realized, in our opinion, a paradigmatic grasp of state power, in 
the name of his believers, totally regardless of what their belief exactly consisted of. He 
was native of anti-monarchical and anti-clerical land of Romagna, northeast of Tuscany, 
in the center of Italian peninsula. He made a brilliant career as a socialist journalist and 
leader. When the World War I broke out, he fast understood how many people were 
fascinated  by  the  violence  that  set  fire  to  Europe  and  the  world.  Revolutionary 
hot-headed  people  of  many  diverse  factions,  young  scions  of  the  middle  classes, 
bureaucrats  and  military  personnel,  industrialists  and  financiers,  were  irresistibly 
attracted by the idea that the Italian state, entering the war, would have increased power 
and territory,  and all  those who would have participated in the war enterprise,  they 
would  be  rewarded with  honor,  prestige  and wealth.  Mussolini  came out,  in  a  few 
months of personal afterthought, from being a neutralist to be an interventionist, from 
witnessing pacifism to make propaganda in favor – nothing less – of a European war of 
liberation from the German militarist aggression (De Felice, 1965).
We are not concerned here,  of course,  whether the ideological arguments that 
Benito  Mussolini  developed  in  his  heart  and  in  his  editorials  to  explain  his 
transformation,  were  consistent  or  not.  What  matters  is  that  he  had  a  clear 
understanding that millions of people - especially young, educated and urbanized ones - 
they wanted to participate in the war, seen as the adventure of life. He decided to lead 
them, demonstrating to be extremely bright, and revealing to be extremely dangerous 
for his country.
But  Mussolini  was  even  more  able  after  the  war,  handling  the  immense 
frustration shared by those who had survived the great tragedy, and now felt lost in the 
social and spiritual crisis that raged after the conflict. As he had been able to lead so 
many fascinated by the war, he was even greater in leading thousands of men who had 
had in common the dramatic but also intensely fraternal experience of the trenches. He 
reorganized his pro-war socialist and nationalist followers in an organization that was 
conceived  to  keep  united  those  bewildered  veterans:  the  Italian  Fasci of  Combat, 
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founded in Milan in 1919. The word  Fasci is a collective name, meaning the famous 
bundle of wooden rods, often including one or more axes, an ancient Etruscan-Roman 
symbol of jurisdiction, that had survived along the Italian history as a symbol of civic 
solidarity and unity – how bitterly ironic modern ideological exploitation of ancient 
symbols may be.
In 1919-1920, Italy was shaken by an intense social conflict, that came be called 
Biennio Rosso (Two Red Years). There were strikes and manifestations that culminated, 
in September 1920, in land and factories occupations, and the foundation of soviets in 
Turin and in Milan, in the more modernized North Italy. In front of this social unrest, 
Mussolini saw his life opportunity. His movement should not merely be at the service of 
the  status  quo,  using  the  veterans'  strength  to  bring  into  line  the  subversive 
Communists, as the Weimar paramilitary groups had done in Germany. He did not want 
to be just another White pawn in the repression of the Reds.
He conceived the  possibility  of  a  playing a  role  on his  own,  with  his  Black 
movement, able to pursue a wider program of satisfaction of veterans' grievance, but 
also a new tide of order and progress for the entire nation. Conjugating social justice 
and  national  loyalty,  the  Blacks  could  advocate  for  a  third  way,  among  the  White 
capitalist greed, and the Red Marxist chaos. From this original position, he was able 
first to cajole most of anti-Bolshevik forces, uniting them under his hegemony, and then 
to realize his political masterpiece: the realization in Italy of a Bolshevik-style coup, to 
size the power with an anti-Bolshevik agenda. Mussolini - it is worth remembering – 
was an old Lenin's comrade in the international socialist movement, and he remained 
ever one of his sincere admirers.
While  Liberals,  Catholics,  Socialists  and  even  the  Communists  were  sharply 
divided  and  socially  divisive,  his  Fascist  movement  presented  itself  as  a  coherent 
militia, at the service of national unity. This was possible, because it was in a certain 
sense true: there was extreme variety of political provenience among its militants, and 
the cement of the Fascism was not certainly a coherent ideology. There was a much 
more concrete, physical experience, uniting them. It was rooted in the sense of intimacy 
and solidarity among males who were belonging to the same squad, where they could 
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revival the memory of war, the experience of brotherhood in the trenches, fear but also 
disinhibition, pain but also adrenaline.
Coherent was, along with their brutality and machismo, their interpretation of the 
past war sacrifice and an attractive appeal to those who had survived, to keep united 
beyond social classes and political clashes; to honor the deaths; to protect war orphans; 
to punish those who were responsible of the social,  political and economic post-war 
crisis; to restore national dignity; and, last but not least, to maintain universal absolute 
obedience to the state. An obedience that was the normal condition in which hundreds 
thousands of veterans had ever lived, but that the Fascism promised to reward, after so 
many suffering and scarcity.
In  the  wake  of  a  tradition  of  proud  opposition  to  Italian  colonialism  and 
oppression, the Sardinian author Marcello Fois wrote in his 2006 novel Memory of the  
Nothingness, that Fascism was a revolution of squads formed by resolute males, united 
by a dark and visceral solidarity, which took in their hands the future. Squadrismo, the 
movement of such male squads, became a synonym of Fascism. Males were invited to 
wear the «black shirt», a symbol of the new movement, and to participate in the game 
of XX century «isms». As the movement gained power, those who wore the black shirt, 
in fact, could not only eat their revenge, and rule the roost in their communities, but 
also always count  on support  in  high places,  and obtain more social  and economic 
opportunities, and privileges denied to the non-Fascists.
Further development of a Fascist identity, with the choice and the invention of 
friends and enemies, the positioning in class struggle, political  alliances, ideological 
constructions, came gradually, with the development of the mass political movement, 
not without frequent incoherence and change of direction.  And of course,  as in any 
political success, a good deal of social opportunists came in help of the winner, so that 
the Fascist Party, yet became establishment, was obliged in 1931 to suspend further 
adhesions, to prevent mass band wagoning.
In Italy the Fascism had gone in power in 1922, with the March on Rome and the 
blessing by the felon king, Vittorio Emanuele III of Savoy. In the same year, in Russia,  
the  Communists  overcame their  internal  and international  opponents  and arrived  to 
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transform  the  old  imperial  Russia  in  the  multinational  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics  (USSR).  The  Russian  Bolsheviks  and  the  Italian  peculiar  and  specular 
anti-Bolsheviks both arrived to create their geopolitical strongholds.
The  Bolshevism,  once  in  power,  concentrated  on  a  ruthless  project  of 
industrialization and militarization that they called the building of «Socialism in One 
Country», a regime conceived to last beyond the division among its founders and early 
leaders,  Lenin,  Trotsky,  Bakunin,  Stalin,  and  to  survive  them,  among  a  world  of 
capitalist and imperialist enemies. Any social or spiritual resistance in Soviet Union was 
crushed and millions of real or presumed opponents, those who had not fled or had not 
been  exiled,  were  deported  in  the  gulag  system,  or  executed.  Other  millions  were 
starved  by  economic  planning  hubris  and  social  hate,  as  the  Kulaks  and  other 
Holodomor's victims.
In the same time, however, to a much greater population – around 100 million in 
the Thirties - notwithstanding wastes and inefficiencies, corruption and bribery, Alexey 
Stakhanov's  revolutionary  enthusiasm  and  Pavlik  Morozov's  paranoic  myth,  the 
Socialist  state  brought  education,  housing,  health  and  pensions,  electricity  and 
infrastructure, and a huge number of new industrial, bureaucratic and military jobs, that 
assured the regime a high level of participation and consent.
The Fascism social and economic stance was anti-revolutionary and thus much 
more  conservative  of  the  balances  of  power  and  domination,  of  production  and 
exploitation  as  they  found  it  in  the  Italian  capitalism  of  their  times,  but  they  also 
promoted state-owned industry and state-planned social and urban transformation. They 
also improved education, public health, pensions. They founded state-controlled mass 
media. Their occupation of power, their social control, their military oppression was 
analogue,  since  the  beginning,  with  their  Leninist  model's  ones.  The  identification 
between the Fascist movement and the state became even more complete than that of 
their Bolshevik counter-part, since the early years of the new regime. Tutto nello Stato,  
niente al di fuori dello Stato, nulla contro lo Stato (Everything in the State, nothing 
outside the State, nothing against the State), Benito Mussolini said in a famous and 
widely quoted parliamentary speech on May 1927. The Fascism was indeed the first 
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movement  to  claim  and  happily  use  for  itself  the  adjective  «Totalitarian». 
Totalitarianism is certainly an ideologically overloaded term, but it may help to focus 
on so many common traits shared by the two early totalitarian states, Soviet Union and 
Fascist Italy.
The  first  Russian  one-party  system and the  first  Italian  one-leader  state  also 
became an international beacon for frustrated masses and unsatisfied elites, even in less 
industrialized and militarized peripheries of the world. The old Second International 
mates,  Lenin  and  Mussolini  had  set,  as  the  German-Tuscan  intellectual  Curzio 
Malaparte wrote in his 1931 Technique du coup d’état, a world model for the sizing the 
power,  with  the  participation  of  urban  masses,  in  the  modern  mass 
industrialized-militarized society.
When  the  post-war  crisis  arrived  in  America  Latina,  for  instance,  in  many 
republics  the  urban social  strata  heavily  depending  on the  state  followed  a  similar 
authoritarian  tide,  vested  by  different  but  all  ambiguous  mix  of  corporatism  and 
populism. In Brazil in 1930, Getulio Vargas looked at the Fascism when he inaugurated 
a season of political authoritarianism that went far beyond his 1950 suicide. In Mexico, 
the Revolutionary Party founded in 1929, established a paternalistic bureaucratic state, 
that lasted longer than its Bolshevik model.
When Adolf Hitler became the chairman of then still small Nationalist Socialist 
German Workers'  Party,  on the  on 28 July 1921,  Lenin and Mussolini had found a 
disciple able to overcome his masters: he built an efficient Leninist organization, which 
he led as a solitary, absolute, ruthless Fascist leader. Nazism prospered  thanks to its 
advanced organization and to its astute ideological syncretism. It offered a promise of 
redemption to the German nation that had been absurdly humiliated and stripped by The 
Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace,  against  which  John  Maynard  Keynes  wrote 
lucidly in 1919. And when the Great Depression came, Nazism appeared to the German 
voters, the only force which, although being anti-Bolshevik and thus economically and 
socially conservative of the status quo, it did not appear compromised with failures and 
betrayals of international finance.
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These  ingredients  may  explain  the  electoral  success  of  the  Nazi  Party,  who 
arrived in 1932, in the last two Reichstag elections considered relatively free, at at a 
percentage of 37,27 in July and 33,09 in November. The political cunning of Hitler may 
also help explain how he succeeded in being appointed as Chancellor of Germany on 30 
January  1933  by  the  president  Hindenburg.  Last,  but  not  least,  the  institutional 
weakness of the Weimar Republic and the sectarian divisions that paralyzed the Social 
Democrats,  the  Communists,  the  Cristian  Democrats,  may  help  to  understand  how 
Hitler could transform its legal power into a dictatorship. To understand, however, the 
wide,  unconditioned,  and lasting  popular  obedience  to  the  new regime,  one  should 
return to our reflection on the industrialization of obedience.
Why the most educated and modernized people of Europe followed so blindly a 
crass, unlikely, crazy race supremacy and world domination project, like Nazism was? 
The answer began in the fact that Germany was heavy industrialized, militarized, and 
almost its entire male population has been changed in a mass of obedient veterans. An 
old article - retrieved thanks to the internet crowdsourcing – reminds us that masses of 
Germans, who had wanted and had fought the war, they desperately needed to shield 
themselves from the awareness of their own inadequacy. They could not bear the think 
to have wasted their lives and destroyed their civilization. It was much more acceptable 
to think that Germany, and they, the German fighters, had been betrayed by internal 
saboteurs and by coward pacifist politicians who had signed an untimely armistice, on 
November 11 1918 (cf Hunt, 1958).
What,  if  not  Anglo-American  financed  betrayal,  or  a  Jewish-Bolshevik 
deception, or Papist cowardice, could have justified the signing of a so ignominious 
capitulation, while the imperial army had obtained the yield of Russia on the Eastern 
Front, and it had never been defeated on the Western Front? Hitler, who was personally 
a  decorated  veteran,  vehemently  denounced  “the  whole  brood  of  Hebrews”,  the 
“despicable Bolsheviks”, and the “November criminals who dishonored the nation in 
1918 by stabbing it in the back” (Hunt, 1958, p. 368).
In the  propaganda wars  of  the  Twenties,  while  most  German politicians  was 
merely blaming the Allies for their false accusations against German honor and for the 
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unbearable peace conditions, Hitler went much further. He boldly indicted the Allies for 
the  responsibility  for  the  war,  unburdening  every  German  veteran,  every  ordinary 
citizen of their  own personal  shame,  and promising to restore justice for  his  “right 
nation”.  Few  months  after  he  was  appointed  Chancellor,  he  told  a  mass  audience 
gathered in Nuremberg: “Heaven can bear witness. The guilt of our people is bottled 
out,  the  crime  is  atoned  for,  the  shame  is  removed.  The  men  of  November  are 
overthrown and their power is at an end” (Hunt, 1958, p. 369).
Once in power, counting on the consent of masses of veterans he had relieved, 
employed in state and party bureaucracies, and in new military and paramilitary corps, 
Hitler leaded Germany towards a new forced industrialization that consisted, needless 
to specify, mostly of rearmament.
A same process of centrally planned industrialization and militarization, counting 
on the blind obedience of soldiers, workers, urban masses, can be traced in Japan in the 
Thirties.  The  country  recovered  the  world  economic  crisis  under  an  increasingly 
authoritarian  military  leadership.  The  population  was  kept  obedient,  employed  and 
mobilized in the colonialist expansion in Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan, and further. For its 
authoritarianism,  geopolitical  relevance,  and  its  rivalry  with  the  Allies,  the  Nazi 
Germany and the Fascist Italy will find in this country the third leg of their international 
political  and  military  alliance,  the  Axis,  the  Tripartite  Pact  signed  in  Berlin,  on 
September 27, 1940, by Germany, Italy and Japan.
Fascist inspired movements and authoritarian strong men arose in many other 
places of Europe, from Austria and Hungary, to Romania and Bulgaria, among national 
minorities of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, in Poland and Lithuania, in Greece and 
Turkey,  and  even  in  a  peripheral  and  weak  –  but  fiercely  colonialist  –  state  like 
Portugal.
In one of them, Spain, a country bitterly divided by ancient injustices and modern 
inequalities, the military rebellion of Franco against the Spanish Republic triggered the 
well-known, terrible, bloody 1936-1939 Civil War. A particularly dramatic episode, the 
Spanish Civil War, that showed how even more cruel  way of fighting was becoming 
possible, not only because of tanks, uboats and planes, but also thank to the ideological 
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construction of the enemy, as a non-human monster, much easier to be hated and killed. 
Both the parties registered atrocities and war crimes, because of this dehumanization of 
the enemy.
Franco looked for and obtained active support from Nazi Germany and Fascist 
Italy.  Soviet  Union and Mexico  answered with  – much inferior  –  assistance  to  the 
loyalist Republican side. The governments of United Kingdom and France refused any 
intervention,  probably still  influenced by the -  wrong - idea that the Blacks were a 
wrong but not totally unacceptable answer to the right question, the containment of the 
Reds.
In  this  political  illusion  France  was  particularly  immersed.  Many Frenchmen 
were  fascinated  by  the  Fascism  promise  of  redemption  from  the  capitalist  crisis, 
through the path of the third way, a way to escape both the poverty under Jewish-led 
international plutocracy, and the chaos of anti-national Bolshevism. And after France 
was  invaded by Nazi  Germany,  the  authoritarian  side  of  the  French public  opinion 
supported the establishment of the Vichy Regime and its open collaboration with the 
Nazi-Fascism.
Two  powers  remained  relatively  less  influenced  by  the  international 
anti-Bolshevik  Fascist  surge,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States.  Social 
unevenness,  racist  bias,  imperialist  daemons,  mass  conformism and mass  obedience 
were certainly under the control of bolder institutions. We are among those convinced 
that British Westminster and American Congress were strong collective bodies, formed 
by local leaders selected through the First-Past-The-Post voting in little constituencies, 
an  electoral  system  that,  in  centuries,  had  demonstrated  to  be  a  long-term,  tough 
antidote against the rise of sectarian parties and fanatical leaders. But it must also be 
remembered  that,  in  these  two  countries,  the  energies  of  millions  of  demobilized 
veterans after the Great War, and of unemployed workers during the Great Depression, 
found an outlet in their wider imperial spaces, and thanks to the worldwide economic 
hegemony of the Anglo-American alliance.
The liberal domestic atmosphere and the New Deal  policies in favor of their 
impoverished citizens,  did  not  prevent,  or  more probably  required,  exploitation  and 
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violence  in  the  economical  peripheries  and  the  political  dependencies.  British 
exploitation and oppression were at the roots of South African apartheid and of Indian 
Communalism, for instance. Western, and namely American, imperialism in the Pacific 
and Asia was the model of Japanese expansionism.
Thanks to our historical distance from those years, the dark heart of the “short 
century”  (Hobsbawm,  1994),  we  can  easily  agree  that,  in  order  to  comprehend 
totalitarianism, one must go back to the original long-run factors of exploitation and 
oppression, which wrecked the Industrial Revolution in its English birthplace and, with 
even  more  tragic  complications,  in  its  expansion  to  the  big  absolutist  states  of  the 
Continent, as Polanyi had early sensed (cf Polanyi, 1944, p. 30).
In  every  human  society  invested  by  Western  colonization,  industrialization, 
militarization,  the state power had been incessantly rising,  while  ever larger  masses 
went  uprooted  and  deprived.  Humans,  once  made  meaningless,  superfluous, 
replaceable, in the Western modernity, they found a relief in adhering strictly to the state 
authorities that had nurtured and took care of them, and in case of regime crisis, they 
could easily become blind defenders of the state self,  or the ruthless followers of a 
revolution promising the construction a new, smarter, more powerful one.
Whatever reactionary or revolutionary, authoritarian or liberal, was the evolution 
of the XX century state, much before that those who will later be called totalitarian 
forces would seize the power, every state was already set for the totalitarian outcome. 
And  when  Italy  and  Russia  became  the  representatives  of  Fascism and  Socialism, 
respectively, in the world, that achievement could be reached only adhering strictly to 
the real distribution of power in their societies, along social and political cleavages that 
were already set by industrialized and militarized states and their wars. And also the 
state that remained internally less authoritarian, thanks to their economic exploitation of 
dependent territories, were not left untouched by the rise of totalitarianism in the world.
The narrative of the specularity among the totalitarian forces, that Bolshevik and 
anti-Bolshevik powers fed each other  and, in  their  rivalry,  precipitated the world in 
another world war, is reassuring, but it contains at least two main fallacies.
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First, it can lead in a slippery mutual indulgence among opposite totalitarianisms. 
The Russian gulag system was certainly created before the German lagers,  but  this 
cannot lead to imagine that Hitler would have been less tough if Stalin would not have 
been so cruel. Speaking of an ideology as a reaction to another ideology, as well as idle, 
contains  the risk of distracting from a much more material,  prior to the ideological 
construction, and more universal reality that colonialist and imperialist states, with their 
mobilized industrial military machines, had started to fight each other relentlessly much 
before  that  Bolsheviks  and  anti-Bolsheviks  could  even  image  their  own 
stronghold-states.
Secondly, and consequently, the coming new world war was not triggered by the 
ideological rivalry among the Russian and the German totalitarian states. And not only 
because  of  the  brief  non-belligerence  that  the  two  powers  settled  with  the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.  The cleavage  among Communism and  Nazi-Fascism was 
overshadowed by the much deeper fracture among the hegemonic and the frustrated, 
among  the  military-industrial powers.  Against  the  hegemonic  America  and  Great 
Britain,  it  was  directed  the  reaction  of  the  frustrated  Fascist  Italy,  Nazi  Germany, 
Nationalist Japan. These latter ones' expansionist and colonialist foreign policy, their 
inscrutable urge to claim a greater share in the record of the race – to put it with a  
Polanyi's expression (1944, p. 29) – it was only the prosecution of a long began global 
competition for lebensraum. 
The new round of such a global confrontation lasted from 1939 till 1945. This 
Second World War involved even more nations than the First. All the natural and human 
resources, and the industrial and scientific potentialities, were put at the service of a 
total  war  that  shadowed  Ernst Jünger's vision of Total  Mobilization (1930).  The 
mobilized people had been estimated near to 100 hundred million men, almost doubling 
the Great War's numbers. The late generations of air, sea and land weapons erased any 
difference among the conditions, the rights, the fate of civilians and soldiers. Among 
many other atrocities and war crimes, it included the centrally planned Holocaust of the 
entire  European  Jewry by the  German Nazi  regime,  in  a  network  of  extermination 
camps that swallowed, along with 6 million Jewish persons, other estimated another 5 
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million, who were people with diseases and disabilities, Romani people, war prisoners, 
political  opponents,  slave  laborers,  civilians  from  the  occupied  countries,  and 
homosexuals. The war terminated with the use of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.  Direct  war  casualties  are  estimated  no  less  than  60  million,  here  again 
multiplying the scale  of  state  crime capability.  This  time,  in  the end,  there was no 
armistice, but unconditional surrender and full and lasting occupation of the territories 
of the losers by the winners' armies.
In such a total war, victory and, after such unheard destruction, recovery and 
reconstruction possibilities were mainly a matter of dimensions. Italy and other minor 
allies  of  the  Axis  were  soon defeated  and  occupied,  but  the  two biggest  and most 
industrialized and militarized powers carried on the war by paying the price of utter 
destruction on their core national territory: Germany resisted until the capitulation of 
7-8 May 1945, and Japan surrendered only after the atomic bombing, on 15 August of 
the same year.
The winner powers were those which had bigger territories than the Axis' ones, 
and  mostly  out  of  the  reach  of  the  enemy  invasion;  with  more  natural  resources, 
specially oil for energy and transportation; a more numerous population to conscript; 
heavier  industrialization,  for  the mass production of weapons and war furniture.  51 
allied  countries  were  the  original  signers  of  the  United  Nations  Charter  of  San 
Francisco in 1945. Only five of them were considered worthy of being the permanent 
members of a new world directorate, the United Nations Security Council. Only three 
world  leaders  –  Stalin,  Churchill  and  Roosevelt  -  were  present  in  the  famous 
conferences where the future of the planet was set:  Tehran on November-December 
1943 and Yalta on February 1945. Never ever in world history such a big power over 
the entire mankind and our mother Earth had been concentrated in the hands of such a 
tiny group of old male political and military leaders.
Eventually  only  the  two  biggest  countries,  United  States  and  Soviet  Union, 
became the superpowers, the two pillories of bipolar regime, the two rival of the Cold 
War. We can put it with the widely quoted prophecy of Tocqueville (1835-1840):
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“There are, at the present time, two great nations in the world which 
seem to tend toward the same end, although they started from different 
points. I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have 
grown up unnoticed and, while the attention of mankind was directed 
elsewhere, they have suddenly assumed a most prominent place among 
the nations; and the world learned their existence and their greatness at 
almost the same time. All other nations seem to have nearly reached 
their  natural  limits,  and only to be charged with the maintenance of 
their power; but these are still in the act of growth. All the others are 
stopped,  or  continue  to  advance  with  extreme  difficulty;  these  are 
proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which the human eye 
can assign no term”.
Every  statistic  with  a  political  meaning  –  health  and  education,  science  and 
technological  achievements,  industrial  production,  infrastructure  reconstruction, 
rearmament, extension of diplomacy and intelligence, international aid – was dominated 
by  United  States  and  Soviet  Union for  the  following decades.  Even when Europe, 
Japan, and later many other giant countries, namely China and India, recovered and 
started to develop in Western style and terms, the two superpowers maintained and even 
ameliorated their scale advantage, till the fateful 1989.
The totalitarianism did not completely disappear with the defeated and destroyed 
Axis powers. It survived in the immense power concentrated into these two final racers 
of such a long age of integration, we have been describing in this first part of our study. 
In the same time, such a powerful integration process, like all human realities, would 
reach its limits before the end of the XX century. The Cold War time is much more 
complex than its geopolitical stable balance of power would suggest, as we will see in 
the second part.
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2. The Turn and a Conjecture
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2.1 Nationalism and Its Deceits
We have arrived to this point, at the beginning of the Cold War, without having 
yet used the slippery word and the deceptive concept of nationalism. The abstinence 
was deliberate and motivated by the fact that nationalism has been used as an umbrella 
term to mean too many different and even opposite things.
One of the most common of them - that nationalism would be a sort of ahistorical 
force, that was with us since the beginning of human politics - is also one of the most 
incorrect. As Deutsch wrote in 1957, no improperly reified “force of nationalism” may 
really help in the understanding of our geopolitical history. On the eve of the American 
Revolution  some  North  American  colonists  considered  themselves  patriotic  British 
subjects; others spoke of themselves as Americans; still others attached their loyalties to 
their  colony,  such  as  Virginia,  or  Massachusetts,  or  New  Hampshire,  which  they 
considered their country. Any one of these patriotisms - British, American or Virginian - 
could have prevailed, resulting in a very different political outcome. In each of the three 
different cases, we could have spoken, afterwards, of something described as force of 
nationalism,  thus  using  a  very  vague  concept,  the  same  word  naming  three  very 
different political outcomes (Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 19).
Patriotism and other spiritual and cultural loyalties, in every human polity, at all 
times,  demand  explanation  and  cannot  be  given  as  endogenous.  Devotion  to  the 
independence of a free colony in America, or obedience to the Cromwell's dictatorship 
in England, had roots in the same Puritan sentiment, but they became factors of two 
very different processes: the disintegration of the British colonial empire in America, 
and  the  integration  of  the  British  Isles  under  a  stronger  English  domination.  The 
Corsican  and  the  French  revolution  originated  from  the  same  milieu  of  the 
Enlightenment, but they aimed at a completely opposed outcome: the independence of 
the little  island under  a  republican regime,  the first;  the enforcement  of  the French 
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centralized state power and its hegemony over wider continental territories, the second. 
And many more and even more striking contradictions will be found in the nationalisms 
and their revolutions after the Great Transformation, in the westernization of the world, 
where nationalism came literally to mean wealth and power for those who were living 
in industrialized and militarized centers, and uprooting and exploitation for all living in 
the peripheries.
The central deceit that had kept confusing both liberals and Marxists, nationalists 
and socialists,  Fascists  and Bolsheviks, colonialists  and anti-colonialists, friends and 
enemies  of  nationalism,  was made clear  since the very beginning of the Gellnerian 
reflection,  in  Thought  And  Change,  when  the  supposition  that  nationalism  was 
somehow “natural” was frontally attacked. Humans have not a “nationality” just as they 
have height, weight, sex, name, blood-group, even if this conception is part of the air 
we breathe and generally taken for granted uncritically - wrote Gellner (1964, p. 150).
It was somewhat the contrary. While humans, as they spread all over the planet, 
since their original globalization, have greatly differentiated, the rise of the European 
state contained a strong trend of reduction of human diversity. Prior to westernization, 
human appearance, gesture, dressing, diet, education, religion, language manifested an 
immense range of diversity and this diverse characteristics and habits contributed to 
create infinite local and social identities.
On  the  contrary,  the  European  state  experienced  massive  homogenization.  It 
increasingly and progressively required its subjects an immediate obedience, without 
any  further  mediation.  Even  if  the  state  renounced  the  assimilation  of  the  entire 
population to the same national religion, public cults were put under state control and, 
as in the United States, a strict conformism was commanded in private life and family 
matters. We have already noted how critical was, at regard of constructing obedience 
and building a cleavage among those who were included and those who were excluded, 
the imposition of  a sole  national  standardized language.  To speak fluently the state 
official language meant that everything was easier in the social gear: instruction more 
effective; taxation more regular; trials shorter; agreement in the market clearer; orders 
in the army fast and fully understood.
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All these were the key feature that made Industrial Revolution possible: strong 
homogenization of a core territory, with a population big enough to outnumber or at 
least  cope with neighboring rivals;  the  use of  a  standard  language;  the  presence of 
state-controlled cults, control of personal and family lives – sex included; the existence 
of a centralized authority, with the possibility of easy exploitation of peripheries and 
dependencies.
With the Great Transformation, the state was empowered in its political center, at 
the price of the depredation of its peripheries, and of the exploitation of its submitted 
social  strata.  Because of the necessity of homogeneity and interchangeability of the 
industrial  society,  the  only  identity  left  to  the  individual  was  the  state-sponsored 
nationality,  a mere portable identity,  the sole left  after  the erosion of the traditional 
society, of the intimate structures of human life rooted in a local community, of every 
social niche (Gellner, 1964, p. 157).
The  aspirations  of  nations  did  not  create  nationalism,  it  was  a  nationalistic 
political project of power which created each modern nation. Nationalism is one of the 
modern “isms”, one of the simplistic answers given to masses, one of the late tools of 
submission  in  the  modernity,  whatever  its  constructed  ethnic,  cultural,  religious 
discourses may consist of.
Prior to the crystallization decided by those who held political power, in many 
places one could not even predict which “nation” would emerge. There was an inherent 
“arbitrariness” in any nationalist idea and, even more, in every of its deployment as an 
artificial social planning. The only nationalism which became a political force, was that 
adopted,  as official  ideology, by strong industrial  states,  strong economic elites and 
political movements, and even – as in the case of the foundation of Israel by the Zionist  
movement, of a geographically dispersed, but financially strong diaspora (cf Gellner, 
1964, p. 174-175).
The XX century modern states, those which fought each other the World Wars 
were – all of them - the outcome of a top-down political and social construction. In the  
so-called oldest nations of Europe, from England and France, to Germany and Poland, 
to  Italy  and  Greece,  the  making  of  the  modern  industrialized  and  militarized  state 
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required population transfers and suppression of diversities, as well as it happened in 
every newer settler state or colonial dominion.
The political rises of the European state, the colonial expansion of the West, the 
industrialization and the militarization of a tiny group of major powers, the World Wars, 
all these main steps of the geopolitical process of integration we have discussed, they 
all  constructed  their  national  ideology  as  a  justification  to  obedience.  And  mass 
obedience set all the main powers towards their common totalitarian outcome – this was 
really a Darwinist selection, because total militarization and total war led to the defeat 
of every major powers, but the two biggest ones. The geopolitical complexity of the 
human  world  was  reduced  to  two  main  blocs,  each  of  them  led  by  one  of  the 
superpowers, United States and Soviet Union.
The Second World War was just if concluded, the planet was still full of ruins, 
but the two superpowers met a series of severe competition in many friction points, 
along the Iron Curtain, the frontier among the two blocks. In China, to cite a major 
national  crisis  in  the  biggest  political  region  of  the  world,  the  Civil  War  between 
Soviet-sponsored Communists and pro-Western Nationalists lasted four more bloody 
years after the end of the Japanese invasion, from 1946 till 1 May 1950. And after the 
victory of Chinese Communist, in the near Korea, from June 1950 till July 1953, the 
two world blocs had three long more years of open bloody confrontation with hundreds 
of thousands of fatalities and millions of wounded people.
Many came to believe that this new global fracture would have made obsolete 
any other ideological and material cleavage. Communism, anti-Communism, and the 
efforts to keep a neutrality or to search a third way positioning among the two, became 
fundamental ingredients in any later ideological construction.
This  stiffened  political  and  cultural  climate  also  helped  to  consolidate  the 
misleading belief that totalitarianism had been defeated, or, in the worst, that it was still 
a risk only in real-socialist countries, because of the dangerous concentration of power 
in the hands of the dominant Communist parties. It would take time to make a wider 
public aware that totalitarianism was a direct outcome of westernization and it was not, 
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by any means, going to disappear, along with the Nazi-Fascism, the old colonialism, 
and Stalin either.
It  is  true  that  the  enormous  geopolitical  strength  of  the  two  superpowers 
enchanted - and still does, and forever will - people of all ideologies, cultures, religions 
and  social  backgrounds.  And  it  is  also  true  that  the  sentiment  of  their  natural, 
irredeemable, inevitable ideological rivalry was perfectly functional with the material 
interests of the immense military-industrial complexes – to remind the expression used 
by the President of the United States, and former general, Dwight D. Eisenhower in his 
famous Farewell Address to the Nation on January 17, 1961 – that were established in 
the two superpowers.
But instead of confronting each other, the two superpowers ended up building a 
realistic balance of power,  conventional and atomic,  even though a tough and risky 
geopolitical evolution. We have repeatedly sustained that war is never an inevitable and 
fatal human destiny, not even in such a powerful and centuries-old integration process, 
but a further explanation is needed, to understand how and why the two did not engage 
in a final war for world domination, or mutual destruction. We will offer it, below, in 
this study.
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2.2 Decolonization and Its Bias
For what we have seen till now, nationalism has been the main ideological vest of 
ruthless integration processes. E. H. Carr, echoing Neumann (1915) and more generally 
a positivist and colonialist geopolitical mainstream, considered the division of the world 
into a few large main powers and their spheres of influence, as the most likely evolution 
of human society in the industrialized world. The general need was for larger units, 
because only extensive, self-sufficient powers, metropolis and their own dependencies 
together, could survive the new world wars and the recurrent international economic 
crises (Carr, 1939-46, pp. 229-230).
In a world divided in such big blocs, the  concept of independence, sovereignty 
was to become even more blurred and indistinct, formal labels, to be regarded without 
liberal hypocrisy:
“The  British  Dominions  are  more  independent,  relatively  speaking, 
than many other weak and isolated states.  Some formal independent 
states,  as  Egypt  and  Iraq,  are  under  a  strong  British  economic  and 
political control. It is unlikely that the future political blocs will take 
much account of formal sovereignty. There is no reason why each unit 
should not  consist  of  groups of several  formally sovereign states so 
long  as  the  effective  (but  not  necessarily  the  nominal)  authority  is 
exercised from a single centre” (Carr, 1939-1946, p. 231).
In  this  background  of  integration,  nationalism was  correctly  understood  as  a 
political construction by which social unevenness and class clashes were fogged and 
transcended, within each geopolitical block. Nationalism was a tool of domination, in 
the  interest  of  the  ruling  elites  and  of  the  status  quo,  within  each  country  and, 
internationally, independence movements were possible only if driven and controlled by 
the great powers' games. Not surprisingly, Carr was highly polemical with Woodrow 
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Wilson's  so  called  principle  of  national  selfdetermination  that  was  considered  a 
hypocrite concession by the winner at the expense of the loser. The Wilsonian naivete 
was possible only because the American position of strength and it was only American 
power which led in 1918 to the creation, artificially, from above, of many new weak 
states, in the heart of Europe, adding problems, deprivations, rivalries, accelerating the 
coming of the Second World War (Carr, 1939-1946, p. 230).
A periphery would always consider the possibility of separation from its political 
center, if it was declining, or too demanding, or simply too far to keep the grasp. An 
imperial  system would often loose or gain a  satellite.  A local  polity,  a  buffer state, 
would sometimes realign, in case of rise of a new power which may become attractive 
as  new paramount,  preferably  one  which  may  be  looser  than  the  former.  To  these 
accidents, we  may add, in our westernized world, another and much more important 
rationale for the construction, in a colonized territory, of a movement for independence, 
starting from the Gellnerian intuition.
It  became  progressively  more  evident,  in  fact,  in  the  eyes  of  Western  and 
westernized elites, that unevenness among a power's core territory and its dependencies 
have been continuously  increasing.  The contrast  between the  prosperity  of  imperial 
political  centers and the backwardness of their  peripheral  territories  could easily  be 
discovered  as  irredeemable.  Development  of  a  few,  stated  Gellner  echoing  Gunnar 
Myrdal's  Economic  Theory  and  Underdeveloped  Regions,  1957,  required  the 
underdevelopment of many (Gellner, 1964, p. 176). From then on, this discourse about 
geopolitical  unevenness  has  never  lost  its  stubborn  actuality,  ,  unless  of  profound 
reformation and redistribution – that we will discuss better in the third part of this study 
– and despite the different interpretations it met in a literature about development and 
dependency.
c was  creole  since  its  beginning,  driven  as  it  was  by  affection  for  the 
newfoundland  by  settlers  and  their  descendants,  by  desire  of  redemption  of  their 
motherland by westernized local elites, and by complex combination of – or conflict 
among - the two (Anderson, 2001; but see also Brading, 1973). It was, at the same time, 
an imitation and a refusal of colonizers' nationalism. It was, as its colonialists' models, 
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variously vested of liberal  myths,  socialist  utopias,  syncretism among universal  and 
local political and cultural elements. Ideological eclecticism and political pragmatism 
were very welcome, in order to gather a powerful political movement, able to size the 
power over the new independent territory. Not surprisingly creole nationalism evolved, 
invariantly, in a westernizing economic planification, social engineering, a project of 
state-building.  Colonized  ones'  nationalism  became,  on  a  local  scale,  a  tool  of 
domination as well the colonizers' nationalism had been on a planetary scale.
After the end of the Second World War,  the vast destruction of resources and 
lives  had weakened every old  colonial  power and a  measure of  self-government  in 
colonies and dominions became suddenly not only possible,  but necessary.  The two 
superpowers early understood that the dismantling of old colonial empires called both 
of them to act as incubators of many new post-colonial states. Each new self-governing 
polity was a candidate to become one's or the other's geopolitical satellite.
The  biggest  and  largest  single  colony,  the  British-ruled  Indian  Raj,  achieved 
independence  in  1947,  through  the  well-known,  bloody  partition  into  two  artificial 
states.  The  roots  of  the  separation  had  been  long  set  by  the  British,  through  a 
divide-and-rule policy, whose roots could be traced in the Morley-Minto Reforms in 
1909, that instituted separated communal Muslim and not-Muslim representatives; in 
the Lord Curzon's first Partition of Bengal in 1905; and even before, in the aftermath of 
the Great Mutiny, when the British, as an answer to the Indian rebellion, desired the 
formation of a quisling social stratum, an homogeneous community of collaborationists, 
and they tried to carve it from the Muslims (Wali Khan, 1987, pp. 8-31).
Communalism, it must be underlined, was set up by the British. It was a modern 
bureaucratic creation, not the consequences of any kind of primordialism. The immense 
diversity and complexity of the Indian subcontinent needed to be brutally simplified, in 
the interest of the British power. In a few generations, in the colonizers' schools, local 
elites grow educated to see themselves  no more as people coming from one of the 
hundreds of Indian native communities, local polities and princely states, but just and 
merely  as  Muslim or  not-Muslim.  And,  on  the  eve  of  independence,  Muslims  and 
not-Muslims local nationalistic elites were divided, not by anything traditional, or by 
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the  return  of  anything  irrational,  but  by  a  constructed  and  modern  –  and  not 
astonishingly very modern also in its unscrupulous cruelty - sectarianism cleavage, the 
direct consequence of a colonizer-led social engineering.
The British - in this soon joined, reached and exceeded by the United States - 
was so used to see the world - to put it with Carr's words - “from a position of strength”  
(quoted in  Cox, 2001, p. XIII), that they easily saw as something natural what was in 
reality their own political creation. And the same belief in political consequences of 
innate and natural divisions has been transmitted, by the Anglo-American hegemony, to 
the  global  mainstream.  The  existence  of  a  Muslim  nonviolent  political  leader,  like 
Bacha  Khan,  an  intimate  collaborator  of  Gandhi,  who  believed  in  Pakhtun 
self-government and democracy, in Indian unity, in women rights, in social reforms, and 
was a pioneer of ecology, is so disturbing that not only was he kept in prison one-third 
of his  88 years long life (Vaiani,  2011), but he is still  totally ignored,  in a kind of  
international conjure of silence, probably necessary to justify the indefinite extension of 
Western presence in Afghanistan and drone war in Pakistan.
Bacha Khan's existence and experience, by the way, is the living proof that we 
should leave to their own destiny and to their own freedom, both Pakhtuns of Pakistan 
and Pashtuns of Afghanistan. They are not doomed to eternal civil strife and external 
terror.  They,  and  the  rest  of  the  world,  have  been  deprived,  by  Pakistani 
military-security complex primarily, of early teachings of the greatest Pashtun-Pakhtun 
patriot, Bacha Khan,  whose words  to his beloved “misguided Pathans”  may prove a 
well found lesson in every time: 
“We are being swept away by the flood [...] If I have to wander round, 
poor, helpless and distressed, it  is only for your sake. I want you to 
promise me that you will never let anybody deceive you in the name of 
Islam. [...] I shall grasp anybody's hand in order to save you from the 
flood. I am telling you this so that you will never again be cheated in 
the  name of  Islam,  like  you have been cheated all  your  lives.  I  am 
telling the Russians and the Americans, that if they really want peace in 
this country, you must tell those who are ready to start the fire, to settle 
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the  question,  lest  there  be  an  explosion.  And  I  am  telling  China, 
Pakistan is very much influenced by you, you might persuade it to settle 
our  dispute,  before  the  fire  engulfs  your  neighbour.”  (Bacha  Khan's 
speech  in  Afghanistan,  on  Pakhtunistan  Day,  31  August  1967,  as 
reported in his autobiography, Bacha Khan, 1969, p. 248). 
The Pashtuns in Afghanistan and the Pakhtuns in Pakistan never was – nor are - 
in need of  Western,  Russian, Chinese assistance,  to fight their dark,  primordial side. 
Rather many bands have been – and still are - fighting to justify foreign aid, and grab or 
snatch to most part of it.
Aside of their geopolitical hubris and neocolonialist dishonesty, however, on the 
side of the Western ruling elites in Washington, London, and in India and Pakistan, we 
must stay at the fact that creation of a Muslim state carved from the Indian subcontinent 
was,  by  the  way,  in  their  constructed  geopolitical  interest  -  and  how  it  could  be 
otherwise?
The conception of Pakistan, formed of the Muslim majority areas, was favored 
because  the  new  artificial  state  promised  to  become  a  pro-Western  stronghold,  a 
guardian of South Asia, an actor able to contain Soviet Union and the still revolutionary 
and unstable China; to have an influence in Iran and Afghanistan; to be a counterweight 
to India, that many, in the West, thought it might result an unaccountable, fragile, poor 
dominion (cf  Wali  Khan, 1987, pp.  98-101).  All  these geopolitical  imagination was 
interesting  and  in  the  sole  but  direct  interest  of  the  surviving  of  the 
colonial-bureaucratic  complex,  along  with  the  military-industrial  one,  beyond 
decolonization.
The Pakistan-India partition led to one of the biggest population transfer recorded 
in history, with estimation of more than 14 million refugees in both sides and hundred 
thousand  of  lost  lives  (Chatterji,  2007,  p.  105).  When  one  is  looking  for  a  vivid, 
dramatic image of how totalitarian has been the making of the modern state – in every 
state, not only in the defeated totalitarian Nazi-Fascist powers - one must look at these 
masses  who  trespassed  the  brand  new  artificial  frontier  among  the  dominions  of 
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Pakistan  and  India,  on  the  eve  of  their  independence,  in  August  1947  and  in  the 
following months.
We would like to think that Gellner was thinking also to these too often forgotten 
victims, when he first spoke about individuals who were spoiled of everything, by the 
modernization of their society, and were left with a “mere portable identity” (Gellner, 
1964,  p.  157),  that  was  a  reduction  to  being  Muslim  or  not-Muslim,  the  only 
characteristic valued by those in power who were building the two new states. Uprooted 
from everything they were or owned, left with only their portable identity, the Muslim 
had to walk towards the Muslim state, the non-Muslim towards the non-Muslim state.
The Raj had conserved, along with the British provincial  administrations  and 
tribal  agencies,  565  princely  states,  which  were  sort  of  client  states,  under  the 
paramountcy of the British Empire of India. All of them were formally sovereign, but 
with very different levels of real political self-determination. The British authorities and 
the nationalist ruling elites that presided the partition, obtained the accession of all of 
these  local  polities  to  one  or  the  other  of  the  two new states,  opposing firmly  the 
possible independence of any of them, no matter how minor, small and marginal they 
could be.
As they pursued the cruel and destructive partition,  they instead opposed any 
further  fragmentation,  as  a  matter  of principle,  not  because of any real  geopolitical 
consequence, but because they feared the so-called balkanization of India. This word, 
balkanization, had been meaning an established geopolitical prejudice since the end of 
the First World War that was apparently and accidentally originated by a single, seen as 
irrelevant, Balkan state, Serbia. In the eyes of positivist geopolitics, of those who were 
thinking in terms of continental super-states and world powers, only such great bodies 
deserved the force and thus the right “to look after their own interests within the world's 
system” (Naumann, 1916, p. 193). Small nations would have been unsatisfied, unstable, 
and warring for trivial reasons. They were seen as the necessarily negative result of the 
decline of large stable empires.
The far-sighted movements of Mahatma Gandhi and Bacha Khan for the Swaraj, 
a process of community building from the bottom, for the redemption of India, village 
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by village, province by province, were defeated, or rather, temporarily forced to remain 
underground, like waters under the apparent aridity of a karst region.
After independence, Pakistan took on the royal road of ruthless integration. Local 
authorities  were smashed and the  power was concentrated  in  an authoritarian state, 
pretending to  be  united  by  the  sole  Urdu language  and a  simplified  Sunni  Islamic 
ideology that was conceived both as a state religion and as a secular unifying ideology. 
India followed a similar pattern of integration, under Nehru's centralism and statism, but 
with a somehow minor coherence, for reasons that are intertwined with the evolution of 
international  socialism and its  nationalities politics  that  will  need further  discussion 
below. The birth  of  India and Pakistan was emblematic  of how decolonization was 
directed by the old colonial powers, with the blessing of the new super ones.
The following political progress of decolonization, in British Burma, in Dutch 
Indonesia, in French Indochina, in the British and French retreat from the Arabic world, 
in the independence of Belgian Congo, in the partitions of French and British Africa in 
new  artificial  independent  states  in  the  1960s,  resulted  generally  in  the  advent  of 
leaders,  elites  and,  most  of all,  of local  hegemonic movements  of  liberation,  which 
become the  local  party-state,  the  classical  dominant  actor  of  the  typical  Fascist-  or 
Bolshevik-style one-party regime. In Gellnerian terms, there was a direct connection by 
their  attempt  of  modernization  and  the  rise  of  an  authoritarian  development.  The 
moderation of some post-colonial regimes was a local exceptional blessing to a general 
rule of economical submission and political violence.
Mao Zedong's  Communist  Party in  China,  the Nehru-Gandhi family in  India, 
Sukarno in Indonesia, Peron in Argentina, Ayub Khan and Ali Bhutto in Pakistan, the 
military juntas in Nigeria, the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico, Castro in 
Cuba, Marcos in the Philippines, the National-Communist Viet Minh in Vietnam, the 
Zionists  in  Israel,  Nasser  in  Egypt,  the  Ba'ath  Party  in  Syria  and  Iraq,  Shah Reza 
Pahlavi in Iran, the Kemalist ideology in Turkey, emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, 
had  perhaps  little  in  common,  speaking  in  terms  of  ideological  vestments  and 
international  political  alignments,  but  they  all  certainly  shared  a  same  integration 
project, in order to create their own modern state.
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They all intended the unity of their subjects under the same national language, a 
common culture,  a universal  conscription,  and the establishment  of strong, planned, 
centralized  bureaucracy,  military,  industrialized  economy.  All  of  them  would  have 
subscribed,  for  their  country,  the  statement  widely  cited  by  many  scholars  of 
nationalism:  D'Azeglio's  observation  that,  after  having  invented  Italy,  it  was  then 
necessary to create Italians.
In most the countries, in all the biggest and most populated, that meant the end of 
colonial oppression and the beginning of a no less tragic self-colonization, with violent 
policies  of  centralization  and  assimilation.  State-building  in  the  new  post-colonial 
countries meant the concentration in a few generations of the centuries-old gallery of 
horrors that nation-building had been in England and in France, at the origin of the 
modern state. Decolonization, driven by this westernizing creole nationalism, should in 
fact  be  seen  as  a  conclusive  phase  of  the  same integration  process  we have  being 
discussing in this study.
Not  only  this  universal  wave  of  centralist  statism  disrupted  every  previous 
political units and local authorities and institutions, even the few that the old colonial 
powers  had  left  survive  in  change  of  their  loyalty  to  their  paramountcy,  but,  more 
dramatically, in the new centralized, hierarchical, authoritarian political environment, 
new and more acute cleavages were created among sets of people differently hit by the 
wave of bureaucratization and militarization. 
Most  of  the  new  post-colonial  political  centers  persecuted  actively  their 
peripheries, minorities and diversities, thus paving the way for new poverties and more 
conflicts, among  the more and the less advanced and receptive of the change, among 
those who were much tamer and those who rebelled, among those who obeyed and 
those who alienated themselves in their desperate resistance (cf Gellner, 1964, p. 171).
The  totalitarian  outcome  of  this  decolonization,  that  was  in  reality  the 
prosecution of westernization by the new local regimes, was inherent, and independent 
from the ideological diverse mix adopted by those in power, and independently from 
their  international alignment with the old colonial  powers,  the United States,  Soviet 
Union, or, from the Sixties, with the Non-Aligned Movement.
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Not surprisingly, these wretched attempts to build, on the base of old Western 
colonies,  in  every  other  corner  of  the  world,  new  westernized,  bureaucratized, 
militarized  states,  was  rarely  able  to  mine  existing  relationships  of  political  and 
economic  dependence.  Westernization  had  disrupted  any  local  or  traditional  ruling 
group, in order to allow the new centralized ruling elite, with its bureaucracy and it’s 
military, to plan and to realize the transformation of local subsistence economies in a 
modern system of  extraction and exploitation.  So, the westernized local  elites  were 
weak  since  their  early  formation  and  were  sponsored  by  foreign  help  only  in  the 
measure that they consented that their countries remained economically and politically 
dependent on old or new imperialist powers.
Maneuvering  economical  domination,  political  manipulation,  military 
«assistance» and, often, armed presence, along with international assistance and charity 
aid, the weak new states were formally independent, but at the same time suited to the 
perpetuation  of  substantial  economic  dependence.  Everywhere,  in  the  interest  of 
strongest industrialized centers,  politically submitted  peripheries  long continued to be 
spoiled, and still obliged to provide their natural resources at politically imposed prices 
(cf Magdoff,  1978, pp. 140-141).  Development and underdevelopment were always, 
reminding  Harvey's  lesson,  a  profoundly  geographical  affair  (cf  Harvey,  2000,  pp. 
23-24). It was what Magdoff defined “imperialism without colonies” (Magdoff, 1978, 
pp. 143-145).
In this vast geopolitical upheaval, the bipolar constraint was certainly effective. 
Neither  European  or  other  regional-continental  integration  processes,  nor  the 
Non-Aligned  Movement,  nor  other  international  force  or  organization,  nor  any 
trans-national actor, were never able to put in discussion the bipolar world order (cf 
Waltz, 1979, pp. 176-183). And each state was, in many ways, stabilized by the bipolar 
system, no matter how artificial - or even monstrous - was its conception. Consequently, 
independence movements, social revolutions, nationalist parties, and strong men, could 
be  despised  or  sponsored,  depending  on  how  they  were  internationally  aligned. 
Regimes  and  leaders  could  be  bastards,  but  they  could  easily  become  one  of  the 
superpowers' own bastards, and, playing their cards in the international bipolar rivalry, 
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they could find international legitimacy, political and military protection, technological 
and economic assistance, from one, the other, or both of them.
This does not allow in any way the deceptive belief that leaders of the client, 
satellite,  dependent  states  were  somehow puppets  in  the  hands  of  the  superpowers' 
leadership.
It would be totally misleading to look in the Soviet Union for any responsibility 
for the long history of China modernization horrors portrayed by  Jung Chang in her 
Wild Swans (1991), even before the 1961 Sino-Soviet split. And it is not Chinese, either, 
the  responsability  of  the  Cambodian  genocide,  a  modern  crime  against  humanity 
provoked by the agrarian ferocius utopia, enacted by Pol Pot and its Khmer Rouge, at 
the end of the Seventies.
Analogically,  one  would  not  find  in  the  American  imperialism  a  satisfing 
explanation of the rise of South African Apartheid in 1948. And the racist regime of 
South Africa was not the cause of the Rhodesian segregatory regime, that lasted from 
1965 to 1979, in the region now known as Zimbabwe.
Ideological differences and rivalries, once built, were certainly not insignificant. 
But meaningful were both the ideological alliances and the ideological contagion: the 
development  of  strong  similarities  between  ideologies,  once  in  power,  among 
apparently  different  if  not  opposed  regimes,  were  certainly  easy  to  find.  This  was 
particularly  true  if  similar  was,  as  it  was  in  the  Cold  War,  the  social  and political  
modernization project of different elites.
Scott recently wrote that virtually “every major successful revolution ended by 
creating a state more powerful than the one it overthrew” (Scott, 2012, p. X). Vietnam, 
China and Cambodia became a symbol of disillusionment about revolutions that were 
meant for the redemption of the largest class in world history, the peasantry. And the 
Western bloc did not offer to poor nations a real alternative to the state violence of «real 
existing  socialism».  If  revolutionary  elites  imagined  deranged  projects  of  social 
engineering  in  collectivist  vein,  Western  educated  and liberal  oriented  development 
specialists  were  able  only  to  deliver,  from above,  abstract  reforms,  infrastructures, 
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cash-cropping  agriculture,  generally  leading  to  ecocide,  amplifying  inequalities, 
strengthening – again and only - the state (Scott, 2012, p. XI).
Politics  and  politicians  are  not  all  the  same,  and  even  less  that  struggle  for 
freedom and justice, tolerance and recognition, are a universal illusion, not at all, we 
argue. But universal was certainly the destruction of environment in every modern or 
modernizing state. Inescapable was the compulsory education in state-imposed official 
languages, along with temporary or permanent universal conscription. Ubiquitous were 
the inequalities required within the giant organizations of modernity, big bureaucracies, 
factories, farms, banks. Globally diffused became the  Asylums (Goffman, 1961), the 
so-called  total  institutions,  orphanages  and  hospices,  hospitals  and  prisons,  insane 
asylums and work camps for punishment or reeducation of the dissident.
In old colonial  powers,  in both the superpowers,  in  every post-colonial  state, 
everywhere,  universal  became  political  conformism,  social  control,  bigotry, 
stigmatization of religious and racial minorities, nomads and stateless people, women 
and queers. If there were various degrees and emphasis of oppression, it was because of 
variety of victims and scapegoats were available, not because the machine, producing 
obedience and repression, was really different.
If the bipolar order certainly confined warfare on the borders between the two 
blocks, it could not stop, the machine of many modern states, launched in their internal 
self-colonization, destruction of their own territories, genocide of their own subjects: 
Brazil's  modernization of Amazonia,  Romania in  Transylvania,  Morocco in  Western 
Sahara, China in Tibet, and many others.
In different parts of the world, elites involved in the concentration of power in 
the  organs  of  a  modern  state,  its  maintenance  over  time,  and  eventually,  its 
augmentation,  they  remained  firm  on  their  position,  well  beyond  their  ideological 
positioning or geopolitical  during the Cold War. Their totalitarian outcome was not a 
consequence of their condition of being the satellite of a totalitarian superpower. They 
had their own one and this was strikingly confirmed by the fact that some of these elites 
continued their struggle for totalitarian power on their own territory, well beyond the 
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end of the Cold War. Three most known and terrible examples of this persistence of 
totalitarianism were registered in the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda and in Sudan.
After the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1981, Serbia struggled -  for many bloody 
years - to keep control of territories which the Serbian ruling elite treated as colonies 
which  they  were  entitled  to,  and  where  those  who  were  belonging  to  the  Serbian 
nationality were to be considered as a superior dominant caste.
The German and Belgian colonialism in Rwanda and Burundi had racialized and 
crystallized  the  social  cleaveges  among  a  minority  of  privileged  people  that  were 
collectively labeled as Tutsi, and the majority of commoners, that were labeled as Hutu. 
The transformation of class division in a rigid racial identity, led to a long history of 
Hutu-Tutsi political violence. The last, and one of the biggest and worst episode was the 
1994 Rwandan Genocide,  a  mass  slaughter  of  the Tutsis  by Hutus  militias,  a  cruel 
squadrismo motivated  by  the  defence  of  the  Hutu  power  over  the  Rwandan  state 
(Mamdani, 2001; 2001m).
The decade of war and indiscriminate killings in Darfur, roundly 2003-1013, was 
only  the  late  consequence  of  a  long  history  of  violent  attempt  to  keep  united  the 
post-colonial Sudan.
These and other terrible political violences since the end of the Cold War have 
been treated, perhaps too hastily, as cases of “absolute evil”, a perversion, an exception, 
a return of something dark from the past. From this perspective,  the Post-Cold War 
world would still be divided into our own societies – the civilized, the liberal societies – 
and all the others. This mistake is still feeding the belief that ethnic conflicts, religious 
fundamentalism,  racial  pogroms,  happened  and  may  happen  again  in  failing  and 
disintegrating states that experienced a perverted modernization. Had they followed the 
Western, the right road to modernity, it is implied in this reasoning, they would not have 
become failed and rogue states, ending up perpetrating any sort of political crime and 
genocide on their own or neighboring populations (Moses, 2006).
This  bias,  meanwhile,  flies  superficially  over  the  fate  of  several  losers, 
indigenous and peripheral  populations,  religious and cultural  minorities  devoured in 
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centuries of European expansionism, Western revolutions, industrial colonialism, and 
totalitarian outcome of Western modernity.
It also regards uncritically the West as the redeeming power in world affairs, a 
sort  of  agent  of  liberalization,  the  international  donor,  the  world peace-keeper,  “the 
cavalry that rescues victims from genocidal elites and their militias” in the rest of the 
world (Moses, 2006; also referring Levene, 2005). In this deceptive muddling view, war 
and state crimes are thought to be treatable with a very questionable hypertrophy of 
international law, courts, charities' hypocrisy and wastes, along with the multiplication 
of the so-called humanitarian intervention. 
A further  consequence  of  this  fallacious  belief, is  the  continuous  renewal  of 
repetitive, circular debates among constructivism and primordialism, modernism and 
perennialism, reductive primitivism and an undoubtedly more fruitful ethnic-symbolist 
synthesis, whose mapping (Conversi, 2006), though important in idiographic terms, it 
risks to reveal parochial.  With respect to the  universal pattern of totalitarianism, the 
ideologies,  the  class  conflicts,  the  national  aspirations,  the  religious  and  cultural 
rivalries, are merely instrumental and exploited as calls to absolute obedience and total 
mobilization. War and state crimes, genocide included, are potentials that exist in every 
society when mobilized by the state to crush internal resistance to a political project of 
concentration of power. “Not for nothing are the victims of genocide usually demonized 
as terrorists and partisans by a state, for instance, Jews by the Nazis, Armenians by the 
Ottomans, and Darfurians by Khartoum” (Moses, 2006). 
The contemporary geopolitical cleavages are still  vested of national, religious, 
ethnic discourses, but they were and are still rooted – we are writing near July 9 th 2011, 
the South Sudan independence day - in the hardness of the concentration of economic 
and  political  power  in  the  modern  state,  and  the  increasing  inequalities  that  this 
concentration implied, and the dramatic scale of state crime and violence mainly against 
each state's own subjects, that this concentration made possible. That concentration of 
power  in  the  state  was  what  made  the  XX  century  so  bloody  and  that  same 
concentration of power is the problem humans have to deal with in this 2000s.
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2.3 Integration Self-Exhaustion
The  totalitarian  modernization  early  produced  sane  signs  of  rejection  among 
those who could access the modern world with a critical sense, those who were invested 
by social awareness and mobilization. The seeds of a profound afterthought may be 
found in many  early  writings, and let us list here the names of an imaginary cenacle 
with Henry David Thoreau and John Muir, Simone Weil and Emma Goldman, Albert 
Camus and Nicola Chiaromonte, Nancy and Dwight Macdonald, Pier Paolo Pasolini 
and Forugh Farrokhzad, Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin.
Following  Tilly,  we  have  already  began  to  understand  that  industrialized 
obedience was going towards self-exhaustion. The quantitative and qualitative rise of 
civil servants, required by the modern military-industrial complex was leading to the 
multiplication  of  intellectual  employees.  The  very  incorporation  of  an  increasing 
powerful military structure into the state, with the creation of modern standing armies, 
and  finally  the  shift  to  mass  conscription,  to  form well-paid  armies  and  organized 
reserves, also created new socially active people. Drawn essentially from the state's own 
citizenry,  these modern soldiers soon claimed to political  representation,  in order to 
have their direct representatives in the legislative oversight on veterans benefits, which 
they highly depended on (Tilly, 1990, p. 122). Bureaucrats and veterans asked for more:
“as  rulers  created  organizations  either  to  make  war  or  to  draw the 
requisites of  war  from the subject  population -  not  only armies and 
navies  but  also  tax  offices,  customs  services,  treasuries,  regional 
administrations,  and  armed forces  to  forward  their  work  among the 
civilian population - they discovered that the organizations themselves 
developed interests,  rights,  perquisites,  needs,  and  demand requiring 
attention on their own” (Tilly, 1990, p. 117).
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Indeed, every development in the modern state evolution, had always resulted in 
widening and empowering of a stratum of socially active citizens,  and not only adult 
male workers and soldiers, but also a better educated youth, socially and economically 
empowered  women,  recognized  queer  people.  All  of  them  able,  furthermore,  to 
emancipate from the industrialized  obedience and from the mass conformism, and  to 
become aware of the reality of power, and in possess of at least a chance to have a voice 
in the political evolution of their state.
The development of the modern state was, invariantly, made by a process of mass 
urbanization,  mass  education,  mass  enrollment  in  industry,  mass  conscription, 
enlargements of suffrages, foundation of mass political parties, establishment of wide 
and tentacle nomenclatures, the expansion of every kind of bureaucracy.
All  these  transformations  were making  an  ever  increasing  number  of  people 
aware of Tacitus's arcana imperii – inner rules of power. Thucydides' words attributed to 
an  oration  of  Pericles  in  the  V  century  BCE,  about  the  tiny  and  narrow  Athens' 
democracy, are in the modernity applicable not to modern masses – a slippery concept 
which  may refer  to  gullible  mobs,  conformist  crowds,  obedient  squads – but  to  an 
increasing number of emancipated, educated, socially and politically aware individuals, 
in a process that deserves to be more properly defined as an enlargement of the number 
of people who want to belong the ruling elite. An elite enlargement, we argue, with 
political and geopolitical consequences, that this study tries to better explore.
The  current  ruling  elites,  after  the  World  Wars,  while  keeping  concentrating 
power,  homogenizing  the  population,  developing  military  capacity,  reshaping  their 
territory,  and  modifying  the  very  climate,  they  were  posing  the  basis  of  their 
enlargement, or, at least, of the enlargement of the numbers of those who would pretend 
to share their condition of power and privilege.
While restraint in the international system by the bipolar hegemony, they were 
still  relatively  free  to  self-isolate  in  their  domestic  sphere,  pursuing  or  not  the 
industrialization of obedience of their subjects, along with modern state-building and 
related state crimes against the people and the environment. Most of them, by the way, 
decided to join the unparalleled technological, industrial, economic developments that 
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were possible, after the release of all the enormous resources that had been formerly 
mobilized for total wars.
Most  of  ruling  elites  decided  to  have  power  plants,  phone  systems,  ports, 
airports, railways, motorways. Such growing network of infrastructures was gradually 
integrated with those of their international allies and friends. And it was kept separated - 
or connected only under a heavy political control - from those of rivals and enemies.
The economic boom of many open economies, as well as the more modest results 
of the planned ones, were both possible thanks to state decisions about exploitation of 
nature and human work,  communication and education,  property and security,  civic 
duties and rule of law.
The development  of urban capital  cities,  in  particular,  was pursued,  by many 
regimes,  as  an  exhibition  of  their  modern  power.  Not  always  politicians  planned 
everything – and we do not absolutely mean that planning was always either good or 
even necessary – but their power assured – or sometimes made awfully scarce - water,  
food, energy, a minimum level of care, welfare, and security. 
Last,  but  not  certainly  least,  mass  education  in  the  state  official  language, 
intertwined with the development of state-owned - or at least dominated by the state 
mainstream - mass media, became another measure of the success of each state in the 
post-Second World War. Everywhere arrived at least the radio, while each independent 
state had, among its first achievements, its state television.
All  these  developments  always  required  a  growing  army  of  engineers, 
technicians, and white collars, along with the ubiquitous increasing employment of civil 
servants, tax collectors, policemen and other officials. 
We do not mean to treat  ideological difference and geopolitical  alignment,  as 
merely  superstructural  but  the  structural  augmentation  of  bureaucracy  is  really 
universal. It is highly indicative that, in the center of the Western bloc, where power 
constructed and viewed itself as the liberal vanguard - in the sense of less state, and 
more open society and free economy - the same concentration of state power that was 
able to wage total wars, was also able to create the mass welfare state. In the Sixties, the 
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same  American president  Lyndon Johnson directed the development of Great Society 
legislation at home, as well as the American escalation in Vietnam War.
At the same time, Japan's, West Germany's and Italy's political elites, under the 
American political  paramountcy,  elaborated their  experience  of  self-destruction,  and 
their  history  of  redemption  from  the  horrors  of  totalitarian  mobilization.  They 
remarkably  cleared  out  every  left  trace  of  chauvinism,  by  accepting  to  be  fully 
integrated within the Western security system. Internal contradictions of their post-war 
recovery were of course many there - and cannot be discussed here - but one has at least 
to remember that their historical political choice in favor of low international profile, 
minimal armaments, civil liberties, social reforms, open economies, institutions based 
on political pluralism, produced their successful inclusion in the mainstream of Western 
economic development, and led to standards of social equality and personal freedom, 
relatively high confronted with those of many other countries, both from the Western as 
well the Eastern bloc.
In every country, by the way, no matter the ideological and political mainstream, 
the number of socially and politically aware persons augmented. Before the end of the 
Sixties  they  were  not  yet  definable  as  internationally  active  citizens,  or  global 
protesters, or members of any transnational movement, but they were already aware that 
total obedience to totalitarian state had led to destruction and self-destruction. They had 
already developed personal consciousness objection, social resistance, political revolt, 
not only against those totalitarianisms that the World Wars had defeated but also to the 
totalitarianism that was still present and acting, in their own society.
There was a curse – or better a Providence – in this fact that every expansion of 
modern state power implied the increasing of the number of those who want to share it. 
Deutsch early understood that the tasks assumed by centralized governments continued 
to  grow, and so did the number of people who were in need of public governmental 
services, and thus the number of those who were working to provide them. And along 
with the rise public health, nutrition, literacy, mass communication, the potential and 
often the actual participation in politics was likely to be rising as well. Among so many 
and profound political and economic differences, every small or big success of modern 
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states, in the West, in the East, in the Non-aligned countries, they all contained the seeds 
of wider and greater “social mobilization” (Deutsch, 1953-1966, p. 2).
In  his  pioneeristic  article,  Social  Mobilization  and  Political  Development, 
published in 1961, Karl Deutsch depicted social mobilization as an increasing universal 
phenomenon. A little before the works of Marshall McLuhan about the expansion and 
the scope of mass communication and the risk of mass control - The Gutenberg Galaxy, 
1962, and Understanding Media, 1964 – Karl Deutsch set coordinates to measure the 
rise of economic autonomy of each individual. From economic autonomy, consequently, 
individual consumes, dealings, preferences, could consequently be measured, revealing 
something  about  coming social  activism,  political  rebellion  (Deutsch,  1961),  in  the 
process that  had already,  well  before,  defined as  the availability  of  more and more 
westernized literate people to what Karl Mannheim, in his Man and Society in an Age  
of  Reconstruction (1940)  had  called  the  long-term  and  world-wide  process  of 
“fundamental democratization”.
The article was certainly conceived in a special moment of hope, dominated by 
the charisma of world leaders as Nikita Khrushchev, John F.  Kennedy, John XXIII, 
before that in 1961 American personnel was sent in Vietnam and the Berlin Wall was 
erected,  and before the 1962 Cuba Missile  Crisis.  Karl  Deutsch,  however,  that  was 
personally an uprooted refugee from Nazi- and war ravaged  Mitteleuropa, knew well 
that social mobilization was not going to be a free meal. While the international bipolar 
confrontation was already in his eyes a clear  stabilizing factor in the arena of world 
politics,  within  each  state  new  giant  social  and  political  struggles  were  certainly 
looming.  Too  many  peoples  wanted  not  only  to  follow,  but  to  lead,  in  a  dramatic 
civilizational change.
In every modern society, state was left the chief political instrument for getting 
things done, but the basis of its power was, now more than ever, the consent of the 
governed,  the  confidence  of  the  people  (Deutsch,  1953-1966,  p.  4-5).  In  still 
modernizing societies, this was only truer, because the post-colonial state happened to 
be the only political structure left alive after the westernization-desertification of local, 
traditional  polities.  In the long run, everywhere, even in the most backward – from a 
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Western or Eastern point of view - corners of the world, the modern militarized and 
bureaucratized state's requirements for men, money, supplies, grew so demanding that 
rulers had to bargain with the bulk of the population as well (Tilly, 1990, p. 94-95).
The  totalitarian  outcome  that  we  have  seen  impending,  when  and  until  the 
industrialization of obedience and the mass submission to the state had been looming, 
has been overcome by its own impetus to control everybody, and to plan everything. By 
the  continuous  increasing  in  number  and  responsibility  of  educated  workers  and 
sophisticated employees, the totalitarian modernity move towards its self-exhaustion. 
All these people that have been recruited in the structures of modernity,  have become 
the social basis of its future crisis, because they are no more so easy substitutable as  
industrial  workers  and  private  soldiers  were  in  the  time  of  industrialization  of 
obedience. They are requested to understand the system they work for, allowing them to 
advocate for their political and social inclusion in its privileges, to question its structure 
and  legitimacy,  to  conceive  the  ambition  of  joining,  or  sometimes  substituting,  the 
ruling elite.
Time and space lags in such process of social awareness and mobilization are 
unavoidable,  along with territorial,  social  gaps, exactly as it  had been for precedent 
uneven development, and social inequality, after the industrialization. We dare to argue 
that,  even  in  the  most  late  developmental  autocracies  and  predatory  authoritarian 
regimes, of whom China has been considered an emblematic and even admired beacon, 
the dark lenses put on by many, as Pei (2006), may be too pessimistic.
Integration self-exhaustion is the outcome of  every  post-totalitarian, developed, 
technologically advanced,  interconnected societies.  Even Syria, Iran, China, and even 
North Korea - the so-called SICK countries - are getting full  of netizens. Activism, 
pluralism, decentralization, politically and social evolution, are particularly impressive 
in  China,  as  Michael  Anti  (aka  Jing  Zhao)  had  explained,  talking  about  the  China 
copycat Internet 2.0 social networks, in his Behind the Great Firewall of China (TED, 
2012).
In addition, there is also another interesting difference: the speed and the scope of 
diffusion  of  the  social  mobilization,  is  increasing,  as  well  as  the  international 
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communication system is. Even the most ruthless surviving regime, even North Korea, 
required officials, white-collars, technicians, security forces, and so many, many other 
well educated people, and this people cannot be prevented to join the post-1989 global 
communication system. Social awareness and mobilization occurred ubiquitously, both 
when the regime was successfully developing the country, and even – we will return on 
this - in the most dramatic cases of state collapse.
Again,  a  special  attention  must  be  paid  to  the  existence  to  the  centrality  of 
language,  in  the  modern  life,  and  to  language  gaps.  In  the  second  half  of  the  XX 
century, language homogenization could not work as inexorably as it did in the early 
modernity,  as  in  the  Anglicization  of  Wales,  Scotland and Ireland,  or  when French 
marginalized Occitan, or German erased Prussian. England, France and Germany, had 
centuries to homogenize their subjects. Most of modern states did not lack the same 
will, but they lacked the same amount of time.
Time of  eradication  of  vernaculars  was over,  because the modernization had, 
among many oddities and cruelties, also this peculiar characteristic, that it invested also 
those who were cut off from its advantages. Not only  industrialized  food,  cycles and 
cars  as  universal means of transport,  minimal  health  and welfare  improvements, mass 
products and black economy may arrive even in the most backward places, but also, in 
addition,  mass  literacy  and mass  communication,  always arrive  faster  than  political 
inclusion, economic opportunity, let alone social justice.
All over the world, even the poorest, the most isolated, were willing to adopt a 
Western colonial language, if it was useful as a lingua franca. Besides the great history 
of XX century statism, and its coming crisis and demise, there are common stories of 
ordinary families, where the grandparents were living as isolated peasants,  speaking 
only their local vernaculars,  barely knowing who was in power;  the parents became 
workers in promising industrial centers, where they strove to learn the standard national 
language, and also to hide their rural or foreign accent, and to accept the modern state 
and its modern power as a god, no matter how criminal was its nature; many of their 
children, in the following generation, succeeded to keep integrated, finding a place, a 
role,  a  job,  in  their  state,  but  many others  failed,  because  they  were  prevented  by 
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technological  leaps,  professional  gaps,  economic  crisis,  social  injustice,  political 
oppression, state violence, and the nostalgia for the ancient lost vernaculars became a 
powerful  ingredient  for  those  who  looked  for  a  political  revenge  against  their 
marginality. In the vortex of late modernization and its unevenness, its interconnection 
and  its  universal  media,  the  acceptability  of  the  dominant  state  ideology,  national 
culture, official language, could only result highly volatile.
Deutsch was an easy prophet when he wrote that if a government would fail to 
meet the burden put upon it by the process of social mobilization, a growing proportion 
of the population was likely to become alienated, disaffected from the state. And he was 
one of the first who understood that social mobilization and its potential of rebellion, 
could  be  measured,  monitoring  average  income,  literacy,  newspaper  readers,  radio 
audience,  number of people employed as civil servants, and other index of what he 
called “exposition to modernity” (Deutsch, 1961).
Even if the world was geopolitically almost paralyzed during the Cold War, that 
Deutsch righteously called “a competition in exporting ignorance” (1980, p. 651) from 
the superpowers to the rest of the world, social mobilization continued to rise. In 1980, 
Deutsch could write that, having – for the moment - avoided the nuclear apocalypse and 
ecological  self-destruction,  and  notwithstanding  the  excesses  of  urbanism  and 
industrialism, and the gap between poor and rich, in the same time, for the first time in 
human history, “many millions of people in poor nations are gaining access to enough 
science, technology, and power to do something about it” (Deutsch, 1980, p. 645).
The information revolution had also begun. “Now we have more people occupied 
with manipulating symbols, item of knowledge, and pieces of paper - or bit and dots 
and pixels - than we have working on farms, in mines, or on production lines” (Deutsch, 
1980, p. 647). 
A few  years  later,  it  became  clear  that  low-cost  computing  and  connected 
communication  improvements,  would  have  carried  decentralization  further,  that 
information would have been processable without centralization, that optimal scale of 
production would have been reduced. Less middle management would have needed and 
hierarchies would be flattened (Dudley, 1991, p. 292). During the 1980s, it was getting 
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clear that centralization, heavy taxation, military-industrial spending would have led to 
economic decline. On the contrary, the  revolution launched by the introduction of the 
integrated circuit,  would have meant the end of empire (Dudley, 1991, p. 304),  but at 
the same time a universal amelioration of individual and local potentialities.
We  were  witnessing  the  increasing  intellectualization  of  society,  and 
consequently the increasing political pluralism, which were compensating the enormous 
cultural and spiritual loss of the modernization (Deutsch, 1980, p. 647). It was clear that 
we were avoiding the most dangerous thing next to a nuclear war that would have been 
to try to press all human kind into the mold of a single ideology (Deutsch, 1980, p. 
651).
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2.4 Liberation Movements
Political integration, economic modernization, mass communication, as we have 
seen, generated a social stratum aware of itself opportunity and of their unevenness. The 
industrialized  obedience  of  people  to  their  state  was  shaken,  in  a  time  of  social 
awareness and mobilization. With lags of time and space, certainly, but the liberation 
movements spread universally  in  a world that was already-  well  before the time of 
World Wars - westernized, and therefore globalized.
Social awareness and mobilization, in the political centers of the modernization, 
produced a strong reaction against mass society, its intrinsic authoritarianism, its total 
institutions.  Protest  and  liberation  movements  were  promoted  from and  among  the 
working  classes,  women,  queer  people,  the  racial  and  cultural  minorities,  students, 
familiar  and  sex  relationships,  disabled  people,  psychiatric  patients,  consciousness 
objectors and veterans. 
In every periphery, on the contrary, the central matter of the liberation movement 
always became the relationship with the center, a geopolitical challenge.
There was also a certain complementarity, but also contradiction, and perhaps 
opposition, among movements in the center and movements in the periphery. These are 
the words of a witness, who was active within the Western left in 1960s and 1970s:
“The summer of 1968 marked the end of a certain sort of hope. The left  
grew tired of attacking the State at its strongest point. The left began to 
look in other places... outwards towards the environment and inwards 
towards  sexual  politics  and  religion.  The  revolutionary  focus  in 
America turned from city Blacks to Reservation Indians... from city to 
country, capital to province. In Britain, Scottish and Welsh nationalism 
began to gather strength. Autonomist movements sprang up in many 
corners  of  France.  The  ecology  movement  grew  viable  after  the 
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summer of '68, as liberals focused on the virtues of country rather than 
city. Provincial youth began to say for the first time since the Industrial 
Revolution:  'We  don't  want  your  cities.  They  are  uninhabitable.' 
Ecological consciousness plus political defeat sent city youth out of the 
cities [...]. From London to Wales, New York to New Mexico, Paris to 
Occitania.  City  underground made  contact  with  ethnic  underground; 
they were nourished by the same enemy, the State. Not any particular 
brand of State but ‘The State’.” (Zwerin, 1976, p. 4)
Peripheral  liberation movements against  the centralized state were also called 
nationalism,  in this way generating the use of the concept and word of nationalism in 
connection with a positive process of liberation, in opposition to the bad nationalism 
that led to World Wars, a socialist, democratic, civic nationalism was opposed to an 
ethnic one, a liberal to an oppressive, a Western against an Eastern (Calhoun, 2005). 
This double meaning of nationalism is not proper, in our view.
We cannot, of course, change the title of the intense, moving  Nationalism and 
Liberty that  Hans  Kohn in  1956  dedicated  to  “The  Swiss  Example”,  and  we can't 
change the habits of many liberation movements that call themselves nationalists. We 
can, however, insist to remind the necessary distinction among two distinct geopolitical 
processes that are really enacting,  behind their ideological vestment:  integration and 
resistance  to  integration.  We would  consider  clarifying  talking  about  nationalism in 
connection with an integration process, and it would be higher preferably to not use the 
same word in relation to a resistance to the integration.
Following Tom Nairn (1977), we remind that English expansionism came long 
before Scottish and Irish resistance. Nationalism was the ideology of homogenization 
within the most powerful European state, homogenization that revealed essential to the 
triggering  of  their  process  of  industrialization  that  changed  them  in  industrialized 
colonialist world powers. Only later, in colonized, peripheral societies, suffering from 
ecocide and uneven development, a wave of local resistance, of opposition to former 
integration, arose.  So, it must always be clarified that  Scottish, Irish, Welsh, Cornish, 
Ulster «nationalisms» did not only opposite the English nationalism – and the much 
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older and more dramatic process of Anglicization that had originated the English nation 
and nationalism - but they meant exactly an opposite geopolitical conception: diversity, 
instead of homogenization; equality, instead of unevenness; self-government and strong 
local  democracy,  not  only  a  hierarchical  giant  republic,  where,  from time  to  time, 
leaders  selected by ruling elites  are  confirmed  by people's plebiscite; peace and good 
neighborhood among peoples, not colonization and submission; disintegration, instead 
of integration.
In the post-Second World War world, divided in two ideologically rival halves, 
many geopolitical liberation movements were involved in proxy wars, or were at least 
conditioned  by  the  fact  that  local  parts  fought  under  or  look  after  one  of  the  two 
superpowers'  sponsorship, thus making things confused. Dividing the settler  and the 
native, the exploiter and the exploited, the oppressor and the oppressed was never easy, 
for the global dominant media and their story-telling have been continuously biased by 
their ideological positioning.
Notwithstanding the  ideological  fog,  and their  immense  internal  political  and 
moral contradictions, in every liberation movement of the Cold War time, historical 
scrutiny may more usefully  search  those who were mobilized in favor of old or new 
integration  projects,  and those who were resisting to them,  escaping the  intellectual 
narrowness that always accompanied studies about opposed nationalisms.
Tom Nairn wrote  since  1975 that in an uneven warring world  it was absurd to 
award  one or another  nationalism  with  a sort of patented right on one's own side. A 
moralizing  perspective  could  only  prevent  from  understanding  the  unfolding  of 
great-power  nationalism,  and  their  political  and  economic  dominations.  Core-area 
nationalism and peripheral nationalism developed along similar feature,  but they were 
seriously  opposing  each  other.  Nationalism  required  to  be  treated  as  -  another  - 
Janus-headed  human  reality,  a  key  feature  of  modernity,  not  a  reactionary  reaction 
against it (Nairn, 1975).
The so-called ethnic-religious divisions, considered - with a certain measure of 
Western racist hypocrisy - the most ancient and the least respectable, found their better 
explanation in modern inequalities, not in any ghost or remnant from the past. Gellner 
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may  help  us,  again, in  the  explanation  of  why  modernization  have  produced  new 
conflicts, which often assumed a nationalist guise, even with racial connotations, within 
many  vast,  heterogeneous  and,  more  importantly,  economically  and  socially  deeply 
divided  countries.  Not  only  post-colonial  ones,  but  every  modern  state,  a  profound 
cleavage emerges among those who are dealing with the modernity,  and those who 
remain peripherals and felt deprived, in respect to it. Among these divided and mutually 
diffident social strata
“Hostility can express itself with particular sharpness if the more and 
the  less  advanced  populations  can  easily  distinguish  each  other,  by 
genetic or rigid cultural traits. These aid discrimination and humiliation, 
and thus further exacerbate the conflict. If such differentiae are lacking, 
nothing  happens:  the  «backward»  area  becomes  depopulated,  or  a 
depressed area within a larger unit, or an object of communal charity 
and assistance.  If,  however,  the  differentiating marks are available – 
whether  through distance,  «race»,  or  cultural  traits  such  as  religion, 
they provide a strong incentive and a means for the backward region or 
population to start conceiving of itself as a separate «nation»” (Gellner, 
1964, pp. 171-172).
In every  modernized and westernized state, population is entirely card-indexed 
and minutely classified, in a French revolutionary style. And many countries have also 
been influenced by the  maniac  attitude  with  which  the  British  evaluated  the  racial 
characteristics of their livestock, dogs, and subjects. The importance, and the rigidity, of 
physical and cultural traits, however, is constructed entrenched with many and complex 
economic, social, geographic and geopolitical cleavages.
Most of the conflicts in decolonization, and later in Post-Cold War time, did not 
begin as ethnic, tough some took this character in time. Other ethnic-vested conflicts 
did not lead to violence. There is no such thing as a natural, inevitable clash among 
diversities. Heterogeneous people can get along well, while nearly identical ones may 
be driven by factional strife. Ethnic is a symbol that means many different things to 
different people, eliciting strong reactions. It conjures with the idea that something old – 
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tribalism,  ancient  animosities -  bubbles  up from the people once central  restraining 
power has weakened (Ferguson, 2003i, p. 22).
On the contrary, we register the development of political movements, that hook 
up  economic  and  social  gaps,  geographical  lags,  gender,  age,  residence,  education, 
occupation,  and,  of  course,  religion  and  language,  not  to  mention  physical  traits, 
everything useful to build a belonging, to separate those who are with us, from those 
who are against  us.  Interest  and identity  are not separable,  but  fused,  and the most 
simple  pragmatic  issue  may  take  identity  overtones.  “A  successful  pitch  for 
mobilization will play to existing material needs, and threaten tangible punishment for 
recalcitrance,  but  is  much  more  compelling  if  it  becomes  a  matter  of  identity” 
(Ferguson, 2003i, p. 27).
This fusion of interest  and identity,  of need and passion, of selfish claim and 
generous militancy deserved, in the work of Ferguson, the creation of the word and the 
concept of identerest. An identerest is a social construction, and a very modern one. An 
idenderest  group is  an amalgamation of  people who,  in  a  given historical,  political 
situation, unite to pursue common material and spiritual gains. An identerest conflict 
happens when one such group perceive another group as a threat (Ferguson, 2003i, p. 
28). This perception is constructed, because the same groups, the own and the other, are 
constructed. The leaders are ethnic entrepreneurs,  that select through their constructed 
racial  filter  their  militants,  but  they  are  also  selected  and thus  the  product  of  their 
militants.
Also  this  process  happens  within  a  social  mobilization  and  this  brings  good 
news: even the most radical of them may develope violence only compatibly with the 
level of complexity reached by its environment. So, once more, there is not wreckage of 
an ancient past, but movements as evolute as their society is. They may be ignited by 
deep infighting, or they may produce nonviolent revolutions.
Peoples,  after  having  been  westernized,  were  transformed  in  maneuverable, 
gullible masses, uprooted individuals reduced to their “mere portable identity” (Gellner, 
1964, p. 157), involved in a vicious game of power with other identities, and in even 
more dangerous roads of collision with those who had more, or those who had less. But 
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there  were  a  way  out.  We  can  rephrase  Otto  Bauer,  from  his  The  Question  of  
Nationalities  and Social  Democracy (1924):  the  nation is  not  a  frozen thing,  but  a 
process of becoming. It cannot be defined as something given, based on a homogeneous 
fate, but as a community growing out, escaping from a fate (cf Baier, 2011).
In  the  time  of  the  industrialized  obedience,  men  have  been  convinced  that 
nationality  was an accident,  to  be accepted  submissively as  fate.  In  fact  it  was  the 
outcome of a much more complex, and discoverable, process; and as soon as one was 
becoming aware of this process, a change was beginning (Deutsch, 1953-1966, p. 164). 
Individuals, wrote  Karl  Deutsch in the Sixties, had not watched the development of 
their own nationalism in the last decades as passive spectators. Discipline and cohesion 
of the great Eastern and Western blocs of powers in world politics had declined. Despite 
the international images in its ideology, Communism had not abolished any nation-state 
and  even  less  any  nationality.  Within  peaceful  and  relatively  well-governed 
constitutional  democracies  as  Belgium and  Canada,  political  collaboration  between 
different  language  groups  had  to  be  renegotiated.  Switzerland  had  become  an 
exemplary collection of strong local cantonal democracies, withstanding well the twin 
pressures  exercised  by  growing  social  mobilization  and  the  increasing  scope  of 
governmental tasks upon the political consensus of its citizens, but even there, however, 
a  sharpening  local  conflict  in  French-speaking  Jura  districts  of  the  predominantly 
German speaking Canton Bern paralleled the worldwide trend. In India, by the 1960s, 
the main internal  political  and administrative divisions shifted to a system of states 
established chiefly on the basis of language (Deutsch, 1953-1966, pp. 2-4).
Peoples  were  increasingly  involved  in  modern  processes,  as  urbanization, 
education, industrial production, mass consumption, pollution, urbanization, inflation – 
wrote Alger in 1978 – mostly against their will. They were mostly even unaware of 
them. Large powerful states and organizations thrust those processes upon them. This 
was an integration of the people within their modern state. Now, in turn, a disintegration 
was beginning, that Alger saw as a combination of three new processes, that we quote 
keeping  his  numeration:  (i)  decentralization  was  taking  place  because  national 
governments,  particularly  in  larger  countries,  faced  with  a  growing  social  and 
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economical agenda, could not adequately serve public needs from a single center; (ii) 
developed diverse populations within the state desired control of their resources and 
territories, and eventually new direct relations with other countries and their  subunits; 
(iii)  technological improvement in transportation and communication,  were allowing 
every periphery to look for integration with other regions and countries, different from 
their political center (Alger, 1978, p. 234). Discussions about role of peoples in future 
world order were then early began.  The mainstream was assuming that existing states 
should  be  the  building  blocks  of  the  new  international  order.  Those  who  were 
advocating development and fulfillment of needs tended to imply that decolonization 
would be stopped at existing borders. Subunits of existing nation-states,  instead, were 
searching for direct linkage to the world,  or  delinking from dependency, oppression, 
exploitation (Alger, 1978, p. 235).
The resistance against  all that power concentrated in Washington and Moscow 
with  their  grasp  over  the  entire  planet,  and  the  resistance  against  any  other  big, 
expensive, authoritarian, artificial state, were set. If social movements, within the center 
of the  Western capitalist  world, remained  in many ways  weak, contradictory  - if not 
narcissistic  and  whimsical  – and  failed  in  their  attempts  to  change  their  state  of 
oppression and exploitation, things were going to be different in the peripheries. More 
radical, geopolitical, changes were ripening, with many more ordinary people as active 
protagonists, at the very bottom and in remote corners of modern empires.
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2.5 Big Brother's Self-Restraint
Lenin  took  seriously  Custine,  a  French  visitor  who  wrote  early  in  the  XIX 
century that Russia was a «prison of peoples» and decided to seriously fix the problem. 
Following his vision, Bolsheviks promised to all the non-Russian subjects of the Tsarist 
Empire,  a future of complete  self-determination,  within delimited territories  of their 
own, right to secession included.
Rosa Luxemburg, instead, believed that national self-government, after the social 
uprooting of capitalism, was a naive illusion. Otto Bauer advocated for cultural and 
linguistic  rights,  but  he  was  also  convinced  that  people  talking  different  native 
languages could live side by side and, consequently work in the same factory, serve in 
same army, vote for the same party. Both their arguments were, not only in our opinion,  
relevant  and  demanding,  but  Lenin's  position  was  much  more  pragmatic  and 
practicable.
The  Soviet  state  was  conceived,  since  the  beginning,  as  a  federation  of 
nationalities.  His  aide,  Grigorii  Zinoviev,  pretended  that  the  national  question  was 
resolved  since  the  1924  (Laqueur,  1994).  Leninist  nationalities  politics,  along  with 
being a key ingredient of the Reds' victory in the Civil War, succeeded in maintaining 
united the Russian imperial space. On the contrary, the Bolshevik-inspired regime that 
had been established in Hungary in March 1919, lasted only till August of the same 
year, and one of the reason of its fast collapse was its blindness in treating with the 
internal minorities of the Hungarian state.
By the way, the Soviet Union was a very violent and problematic reality. The 
fracture among Russians and non-Russians was – and long remained - terrible in places 
like the Baltic states and Ukraine, the western republics that have been under Tsarist 
oppression, then independent after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, then ground of the Civil 
War  among Reds and Whites,  then occupied  by Soviets  and Nazis  alternatively.  In 
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addition to these western grievances and hates, Stalin, the Lenin's successor, imperiled 
the  Leninist  politics,  because  of  his  hate  and  his  crimes  against  the  Jews,  Tartars, 
Meskhetians,  Greeks,  and  many,  many  others.  He  was  paranoid  in  redesigning 
complicated and artificial borders among some republics, to weaken them, to create 
among  them  diffidence,  in  a  cynical  divide  et  impera style.  And  it  must  also  be 
remembered that total industrialization at home, and total war with Germany, certainly 
led  Russian,  and  non-Russian  as  well,  Bolsheviks  elites  towards  an  increasing 
centralism.
We must also state, however, an interesting, early witness that there was a sense 
of self-restraint, within the core of the Soviet power. Somewhere in the destroyed, torn 
apart,  bleeding heart  of  Europe at  that  time,  in  Ukraine, in  the  spring  of  1944,  an 
important Communist Yugoslav official heard from a commander of the Red Army, this 
unexpected thought that he found strange, but bold: “When Communism triumphs in 
the whole world, he concluded, wars would then acquire their final bitter character”.
The official was the Montenegrin Milovan Djilas, for years one of the closest 
aides of the Yugoslav Communist leader Tito, later fallen in disgrace, thrown in jail, 
eventually marginalized. These witnesses may be read in his memorial  Conversations  
with Stalin (1962). According to a Red Army official, one of the many Russian freedom 
heroes of the victory against the Nazism, what was wrong with the universal diffusion 
of Communism?
“According to [their]  Marxist  theories […],  wars are exclusively the 
product  of  class  struggle,  and  because  Communism  would  abolish 
classes,  the  necessity  for  men to  wage  war  would  also  vanish.  But 
[they] came to realize some further truths in the horrors of war: that 
human struggles would acquire the aspect of  ultimate bitterness only 
when all  men came to be subject  to the  same social  system, for the 
system would be untenable as such and various sects would undertake 
the reckless destruction of the  human race for the sake of its greater 
“happiness” (Djilas, 1962, p. 50).
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The scions of the slogan «Workers of the world, unite!», the followers of the 
universal  appeal  by  excellence,  with  their  faith  in  a  humanity  free  of  profound 
antagonistic inequalities, were aware that letting grow arithmetically a set of human 
beings, it would end invariably to a geometric growth of struggle for the power to lead 
it.  This sense of geopolitical  self-limitation revealed to be a frequent pattern, in the 
following history of the Soviet Union and of many other real-socialist countries.
After the Second World War, and Stalin's death, Lenin's nationalities politics was 
brought on forward, along with a more general thaw. The Soviet Union became an even 
more comprehensive, multi-level, very articulated federal system, contributing to the 
entrenchment, and in some cases even to the construction of national identities of the 
great majority of its nationalities. The non-Russian minorities - in Siberia and Central 
Asia  more  than  in  Europe  perhaps  -  were  afforded  cultural  privileges  and  social 
investments, while a few benefited also from preferential treatment within their own 
eponymous ethnic-territorial homelands (Walker, 2003, p. 182).
Among many problems and failures the Soviet Union suffered, ranging from the 
political  oppression  to  a  frightful  environmental  crisis,  the  national  question  was 
undoubtedly and successfully devolved upon effective institutions, the most important 
of which were the fifteen member republics, constituting the Union, whose institutional 
resiliency would soon reveal decisive, in 1991, on the verge of disintegration.
Cyclical  repressions  that  happened  in  Eastern  Europe  every  twelve  years  - 
Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1980 (Aron, 2011) – were bloody, 
but they were also an indicator of the fact that the Soviet client states in Eastern Europe 
had economically and socially recovered, that their citizens had become less gullible 
and obedient  than they were before the World Wars,  that  the Communist  parties  in 
power had to work hard, give proof of pragmatism, be ready to compromise, in order to 
win, if not their consent, their people quietness, at least.
Communism, real-socialism and other forms of statism, animated an uncountable 
number of liberation movements at every latitude, and they became the state ideology in 
many other countries. Not all the firsts were Soviet puppets, however, and not all of the 
seconds became client states of the Soviet block. China remained unfortunately closed 
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in a wretched isolation; India was never a real satellite; Yugoslavia led the Non-aligned; 
and many others,  like Ethiopia and Nicaragua,  followed their  own original  political 
evolution.
When Voslenskii's Nomenklatura (1970) was diffused as a samizdat, it portrayed 
the  Eastern  block  as  a  dangerous  warmonger  launched  towards  global  geopolitical 
expansion,  but  in  that  same  reading  one  could  find  the  figures  of  the  growing 
complexity, that also meant the necessity of more inclusion, and more bargaining, with 
a  greater  number  of  well  educated  and  well  paid  bureaucrats,  technicians,  military 
personnel, from more countries and nationalities, from much more cultural, linguistic 
backgrounds.
From the  point  of  view of  an  important  observer  from the  neutral  Yugoslav 
federation, the answer to the dangerous illusion of a world revolutionary war to build a 
“united socialist world” was clear: the predication of the inevitability of a such a war 
was a dangerous illusion; not only because the suffering and devastation that such a war 
would have brought peoples, but also because - much more importantly from a Marxist 
point of view – it would have been a challenge to a structural impossibility. This was 
the opinion of Edvard Kardelj,  the Slovenian intellectual that,  though in a complex 
personal relationship with Yugoslav political centralism, was however one of the main 
theorist of Yugoslav economical, bureaucratic, and political decentralization.
“Even if we assume that socialism would indisputably win the day in 
such a war - although actually this would cease to be indisputable the 
moment other socialist countries decided to force their system on others 
–  we  must  not  forget  that,  in  itself,  socialism is  not  a  magic  wand 
abolishing  all  evil,  making  all  men  good,  putting  an  end  to 
contradictions, antagonisms and conflicts among men […], especially 
not after a devastating war. […] In other words, history would take her 
revenge on anyone who by the forcible export of socialism thought to 
ignore  the  objective  laws  governing  social  development  […] 
Development  of  socialism  under  such  conditions  [by  war  and 
hegemony] would unquestionably be attended by great deformations” 
(Kardelj, 1975, p. 196).
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Socialist  and  revolutionary  wars  for  the  purpose  of  forcing  socialism,  added 
Kardelj,  would  be  reactionary,  generating  new  cultural  and  political  contradictions 
among  unified  people,  new  economical  inequalities  during  and  after  the  war,  new 
bureaucracies and greater armies as tools of domination. The Socialist world, the Third 
World revolutionaries, the masses of the capitalist societies, had a chance of a common, 
democratic  and  progressive  evolution  “to  the  extent  that  every  nation  is  freer  in 
choosing the roads and forms of its socialist development” (Kardelj, 1975, p. 203), in a 
course of peaceful coexistence among nations. Each nation had to be free to choice, 
with a sovereignty that Kardelj, saw extended, thanks to the social development, not 
only  to  independent  countries,  but  also  to  nationalities  and  peoples  living  in  his 
Yugoslav federation and in every other federal system.
Deutsch in 1980 still registered the substantial loyalty of the people to the Soviet 
system, but he also expressed an interesting opinion about the Soviet leaders of the 
generation of the poet  Yevgeny Yevtushenko, a liberal  intellectual who was born in 
1933, whose family, after having suffered Stalin's persecution, was now well anchored 
in the nomenclature wealth. Those who had been in their early twenties when Stalin's 
crimes were revealed to the Soviet people, they would promise to be more willing to 
cooperate  with  popular  demand  for  reform  and  liberalization,  once  arrived  in  key 
control positions (Deutsch, 1980, p. 326-352).
When the  Soviets  entered  Afghanistan  in  1979,  called  in  to  put  an  end to  a 
complex  and  cruel  feud  among  local  Communists,  they  met  not  only  a  powerful 
resistance on the field and a universal international disapproving, but something else 
cracked,  something that  was very thin and fragile.  The nomenclature's  officials  and 
executives, the intelligentsia, the Party's militants and ordinary members, they all saw 
the Soviet Union, that had always denied the imperialist label end up in the troubles of 
an imperialist adventure. Those who were educated to believe in personal freedom and 
international liberty, under the Communist official civil religion, they did hardly resign 
themselves to welcome death along far, remote, pointless borders.
Not only in the Russian people's soul, or in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's meditations, 
either,  but  till  in  the  very  heart  of  the  Russian  power,  in  the  Moscow's  ministerial 
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buildings, universities, military academies, party organs, the ruling elites, most of the 
ruling elite came to feel the Russian imperial system as a burden and a drain that they 
sought to discard (Strayer, 1998, p. 200).
In the same passage from the 1970s to the 1980s, Presidents Jimmy Carter and 
Ronald Reagan were both imagining, though with different emphasis, a restraint to the 
arrogance of the American power in  the world and onto their  same citizens.  Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher was tempting the demolition of the bureaucratic side of its 
British welfare state. India and China were approving liberalization and market reforms. 
Pope John Paul  the Great,  Karol  Wojtyła,  elected  in  1979,  gave  salutary shocks to 
Catholics, inviting them to struggle for freedom in their church and outside the church, 
against  both  real-socialism  and  national  security  dictatorships  (Vaiani,  1994).  The 
spectre of dissent was haunting Eastern Europe  (Havel, 1985).  A universal quest for 
justice and freedom was animating the democratization struggles in Latin America, the 
international  anti-Apartheid  movement,  Iran  Revolution,  Poland's  Solidarność (cf 
Dudley, 1991, p. 315). In a time were masses, elites and a new generation of leaders 
were looking not only for thaw but for change, the late Big Brother, Michail Gorbachev, 
ordered  the  Soviet  Red  Army  to  come  home back  from Afghanistan.  The  Russian 
withdrawal was completed on February 15, 1989.
The exhaustion of the Soviet world power, as the last territorial multinational 
imperial system, was imagined by very few, for instance by the geopolitical reflection 
of Collins (1986). The dominant feelings in international politics and political science, 
however, were ignorance, hatred and fear of a stereotyped image of Soviet power that 
had only to be contained by a stronger America (Collins, 1995). Not only the Soviet 
collapse  was  unexpected,  but  even  more  surprising  it  would  be  the  discover  that 
Leninist nationalities politics, long thought to be good in keeping united heterogeneity, 
it had been even better in building institutional conditions and political permission for 
peaceful dissolutions.
The world had been worrying about  bipolar  confrontation and atomic mutual 
assured destruction for decades, fearing the showdown war for the final hegemony. The 
fall of the Berlin Wall, on November 9th 1989, happened, instead, soon followed by the 
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disbanding of the Warsaw Pact. Formally shutdown on 1 July 1991 in Prague, and by 
the  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union  on  26  December  1991  with  the  contextual 
independence of the constituent republics.
This relatively peaceful dissolution was a confirmation that in the Soviet Union 
the most dramatic stage of integration and modernization process, the industrialization 
of  obedience,  had  been  passed  behind.  When  in  1991  the  Communist  hardliners 
attempted the August Putsch against the Soviet federal president Mikhail Gorbachev, 
they were stopped by civil  resistance led by the Russian republican president Boris 
Yeltsin on the streets  of Moscow, along with the general lack of compliance of the 
majority of party and army cadres and elites. 
Thanks to the studies collected by Aleksandar Pavkovic and Peter Radan (́ 2007, 
2008), or the research on the construction of the Asian Soviet Republics by Olivier Roy 
(2000), we have come to know better the force of institutional forces that were dormant 
inside the Soviet federal architecture. An even more profound comprehension of Soviet 
collapse comes, in our opinion, from this change of point of view: Soviet Union frailties 
and faults deserve less emphasis, while the timed, coordinated, and peaceful action of 
its fifteen former members republics need to be considered as one of the real last and 
lasting  successes  of  the  Soviet  real-socialist  experiment,  instead.  Internal  social 
awareness  and  mobilization  had led  Soviet  ruling  elites  to  distribute  and  share  the 
power once concentrated in the Kremlin, with a wider range of people, in many more 
political centers.
After the dissolution of the Eastern bloc and of the Soviet power, energies were 
subtracted to every other conflict where the global contraposition between the blocs had 
intertwined with local cleavages. The two main Middle East regimes agreed in 1988 to 
put an end to the eight years long, bloody, pointless Iran-Iraq War, emblematic conflict 
whose  only  goal  had  been to  fortify  internal  oppression  in  both  the  countries.  The 
dismantling of Apartheid regime in South Africa in 1990-1994, the Oslo Accord among 
Israel and the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine in 1993, the 1991 ceasefire 
between the Polisario Front and Morocco, and the end of the El Salvador Civil War in 
1992, were among other notably events.
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Social  and  political  reforms,  democratization  and  liberalization  spread 
everywhere, and even the martyrs who were ravaged on 4th June 1989 in Tienanmen 
Square, ended up to become an international beacon of future revolutions. Along with 
The Third  Wave of  democratization (Huntington, 1991),  there was a more profound 
geopolitical softening.
During the Cold War, under the bipolar hegemony, and the apparently ordered 
pattern of internationally-driven decolonization, there had been not only the freezing of 
state borders, but also a certain intellectual rigidity. With the exception of Marxists' 
emphasis  on  international  economic  dependency,  and  of  some  structural  realists' 
concern for peace through the stability of the two superpowers' formal and informal 
empires, there had not been enough deepening of feasible crises of statehood in the 
world (O'Leary, 2001i, pp. 9-10).
More  than  this,  the  self-determination  principle,  that  had  in  the  beginning 
inspired the decolonization process, ended up to be strictly subordinated to the principle 
of  territorial  integrity  of  the  existing  states.  Unilateral  secession  and  any  possible 
revision of post-colonial borders became taboo. The well known secession of Katanga 
from Congo was crushed in 1963 with the crucial consent of both the United States and 
the Soviet Union, and the consequent help of international peacekeeping forces sent by 
the United Nations, a precursor of future humanitarian interventions.
From that point on, for the rest  of Cold War time, no post-colonial,  sub-state 
entity was allowed to become independence, with only two exceptions: Singapore in 
1965 and Bangladesh in 1971. The first was a city-state who peacefully left Malaysia in 
1965,  after  only  two  years  of  always  leased  integration.  The  last  was  one  the 
consequence of a national Bengali rebellion against Pakistani authoritarian integration, 
a dramatic geopolitical case, well beyond the superpowers' range of real influence.
Ironically - and maybe meaningfully – one could notice that Pakistan, which had 
been  artificially  created  by  the  British  and  the  British-close  Muslim  elites  with  a 
shameless  geopolitical  hubris  -  it  came  out  to  be  the  first  successful  episode  of 
disintegration.  What has changed, in East Bengal,  from 1947 to 1971? Local social 
awareness  and  mobilization  had simply  increased,  enlarging  Bengali-speaking  local 
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elites  who  had  access  to  modernity  and  communication.  And  state  integrationist 
centralist oppression, in the passage from the submission to British colonialist political 
pragmatism,  to  submission  to  Pakistan's  “nationalism  without  a  nation”  (Jaffrelot, 
2002), had become unbearable.
Thanks to the dismantling of the Iron Curtain, the reunification of Germany and 
of  Yemen became possible,  in  1990,  but  more  than  a  signal  of  further  geopolitical 
unifications, these also were anticipations of a time of geopolitical emancipation. Once 
depleted the international systemic constraint of the bipolar international regime, the 
independence bell  rang for many movements advocating for the self-government of 
their  territories.  Territorial  movements  had  continued  to  grow  under  the  apparent 
immobility of the Cold War. Between 1989 and 1994, in five years, there were thirty 
new members admitted in the United Nations.
Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania,  the three Baltic  states  had early declared their 
independence,  without  any  resistance  by  Gorbachev's  Soviet  Union.  Faded  the 
superpowers'  interest  in  their  rivalry,  the Northern Democratic  People's  Republic  of 
Korea and the Southern Republic of Korea did not merge, but both entered the United 
Nations. Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau, were admitted 
to the United Nations after their independence from the United States.
Belarus and Ukraine, that were Soviet-client delegations present at the United 
Nations since the foundation, at the moment the Soviet Union dissolution and of their 
full independence, were joined by all the other sister republics – Moldova,  Armenia, 
Azerbaijan,  Georgia,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan,  Uzbekistan. 
The nuclear codes and the permanent seat in the Security Council were given to Russian 
Federation that was proclaimed, with the consent of its sisters former Soviet republics, 
the successor of Soviet Union. As a consequence of another peaceful dissolution of a 
Communist country, Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia also entered the 
international organization.
Apart  from  Soviet  Union  and  Czechoslovakia,  the  dissolution  of  a  third 
Communist country – ironically enough, the one considered the less Communist and the 
more open among the three – was not peaceful at all, but instead produced a dramatic 
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aftermath that will deserve further comment in the following. By the way, in these same 
years, four of the eight former Yugoslav republics, were admitted as sovereign states: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Yugoslav Macedonia.
In a  world still  dominated by the conviction that  we must  study “how states 
collapsed in order to learn how to put them back together” (Zartman, 1995, p. 267), the 
end of the competition among the two superpowers also facilitated the independence of 
Namibia, from South Africa, and of Eritrea from Ethiopia. And, last but not necessary 
the least, a bundle of micro-states were admitted in these years, thus confirming that 
there had been a change in international mentality: Andorra, Liechtenstein,  Monaco, 
and the ancient serene Republic of San Marino.
Along  with  the  fear  of  balkanization  and  the  intangibility  of  post-colonial 
borders, another long consolidate prejudice of the age of integration was coming down, 
the  undisguised  contempt  for  the  so-called  statelets,  along  with  their  presumed 
impracticality,  in  the  stubborn  belief  that  only  medium-to-large,  standardized, 
centralized nation-states, “something like France” (Nairn, 1997, p. 133), could be viable 
and resilient. The geopolitical 1989 was only at the beginning, as we will soon argue. It 
was  time for  the  mainstream to remember  an  important  lesson from history,  that  a 
narrow territory could be successful, not only viable and resilient, thanks to its ability to 
maintain political, social and economical equality among those who live in the center 
and those who are living in  the periphery.  Smallness,  freedom and respect,  internal 
justice and external peace, were intimately connected, as it had been discovered within 
the political invention of Swiss cantons (Deutsch and Weilenmann, 1965).
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2.6 Leviathan's Overstretch
Since the end of the Cold War, we are rediscovering the world is much messier 
than the frameworks we were looking at with, often based on slim empirical evidence 
and simple-minded interpretations, tend to presume, recently wrote Agnew (2012). The 
necessity of an afterthought is likely to invest also the United States, the apparent Cold 
War winners, notwithstanding their immense global power.
At their origin, after their independence, the Thirteen Colonies formed a strong 
military confederation, because they had to face the European colonial powers. This 
early stage of integration, once dangers would be overcome, could be easily reversed, 
but it was not, because of the United States collective bargaining about Louisiana, the 
conquest of New Mexico, the colonization of the West. All actions that are commonly 
portrayed as a common interest of the Union's member states, and that could be realized 
by a strong unified colonialist power. But, as an integration to this narrative, it can also 
be argued that a strong political center decided all these enterprises, primarily to justify 
its existence in the eyes of diffident local republics, jealous of their independence, that 
in fact resisted to political centralism, and militarism. The chain of causality presentes 
an ambiguously circularity, but the late consequence of concentration of power, in terms 
of oppression of every periphery, is absolutely self-evident.
Even after having colonized the continent coast-to-coast, the United States could 
have  evolved  as  a  loose  commonwealth  of  states,  following  the  pattern  of  other 
post-colonialist relationships, like, for instance, those among the British center and the 
British dominions. But the Northeast concentrated economic and political power, thanks 
to  its  industrial  superiority,  decided to  keep submissive the weaker  Southern states, 
fighting resolutely the first industrial war of history, the Secession War. A geopolitical 
drama that, we argue, in all its complexity, it would be dishonest to keep portraying as a 
«slave liberation war», while it was a ferocious integration project, a colonialist war.
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Eventually, the United States, thanks to their colonial and industrial expansion, 
reached an integration in such dimensions that they could overtake any other world 
power, during and in the aftermaths of the World Wars. They also created the first total 
armament, the nuclear bomb, and they only used it twice.
Their geopolitical augmentation, that had been based on the occupation of their 
continent, through the foundation and the annexation of contiguous American states, 
went  far  farther  with  the  notable  entry  of  two former  remote  colonies,  Alaska  and 
Hawaii, that were admitted as federal states both in 1959, thus probably meaning that 
the Union was at least tempted by its eventual transformation in a world state.
The  temptation,  however,  has  been  kept  under  control.  Their  main  historical 
colony,  the  Philippines,  was  given  independence  since  the  1946.  Apart  from  the 
conservation  of  sovereignty  over  a  bundle  of  territories  as  Puerto  Rico,  Guam,  the 
Virgin  Islands,  Samoa  and  Northern  Mariana  Islands,  the  United  States  has  found 
congenial and satisfying enough their role as main neocolonialist actor, in a Magdoff's 
style imperialism without colonies.
The United States always were the main contributors of most of the international 
organizations and agencies, included those who have been charged wrongly or rightly 
of anti-Americanism. As international bureaucrats may had hated America, it is hard to 
believe that the real consequence of their action might not have been useful to further 
concentration of power in a world center, and that this center of world power may really 
have been very far from Washington's one.
While the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, its Western counterpart, the North Atlantic 
Treaty  Organization,  survived  and  enlarged.  It  was  certainly  a  deeply  entrenched 
international bureaucracy, which was well  able to resist  its  possible dismantling.  Its 
vigor, by the way, according the realists, was primarily a mean of maintaining a strong 
American grip on the foreign and military policies of European states (Waltz, 2000).
According to CIA and SIPRI estimations, as reported by Wikipedia in 2013, the 
United  States  alone  still  represented  little  less  than  one  quarter  of  the  world  gross 
product, but still little less than one half of the world military expenditure. In the same 
first quarter of XXI century, extension of American military presence worldwide, an 
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empire of more than one thousand bases, was still surviving, as a natural fact, resilient 
to any budget discussion or proposal of cuts (Gusterson, 2009), well beyond the Cold 
War, not to mention the so called War on Terror presumed necessities.
Finally, one has to remember that, all during the United States history, the federal 
powers have been continuously increasing at the expense of state rights and other local 
authorities'  autonomy.  In  the  first  decade  of  XXI  century  -  notwithstanding  the 
explosion,  in  September  2008,  of  the  long,  severe,  global  debt  crisis  -  the  only 
American  city  to  thrive,  thanks  to  the  expansion  of  federal  bureaucracies,  was 
Washington (Kotkin, 2012).
The  United  States'  concentration  of  power,  because  of  and  after  the 
industrialization of America, moved from the original philosophical tension between 
Federalist  and Jeffersonian,  to further steps, that were much greater in quantity and 
quality:  the  Jacksonian  democracy;  the  militarism  of  Zachary  Taylor;  Abraham 
Lincoln's  militarized  democracy  where  the  American  troops  were  his  main 
constituency; the Reconstruction presidencies, from the war hero  Ulysses S. Grant to 
the Ellis Island establisher Benjamin Harrison, who were committed to inclusion in the 
modern  industrialized  and  militarized  American  society  of  former  slaves,  submitted 
survived natives, and masses of European immigrants, overall.
Along with the impetuous industrialization of the American continent and the 
expansion  of  its  world  power,  every  successive  main  political  phases  of  American 
history  consisted  of  promising  opportunity  and  inclusion  to  the  individual,  while 
concentrating  enormous  powers  in  inaccessible  pyramids:  Theodore  Roosevelt's 
progressivism, and ingenuous trust in progress, from the Panama Canal to eugenics; 
Woodrow  Wilson's  liberal  hubris;  Herbert  Hoover's  belief  in  humanitarianism  and 
devotion  to  efficiency;  Franklin  and  Eleanor  Delano  Roosevelt's  New  Deal;  the 
presidents of the space and arms race during the Cold War, with their commitment to 
the Great Society and Civil Rights at home and their imperialist deal abroad.
There is something of Napoleon, the liberator of individuals and the enslaver of 
peoples, in this trajectory of American presidents, and not surprisingly four of them 
were assassinated as tyrants - Abraham Lincoln in 1865, James A. Garfield in 1881, 
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William McKinley in 1901, and John F. Kennedy 1963 - and many more assassination 
plots were attempted.
This big machine, this unheard concentration of power on the Earth, needed its 
ideological narratives, at the time, to last and arise so far. American elites, since the 
beginning, were aware that they were symbolizing a beacon for all mankind. And it 
must be always remembered that the dream became true for those individuals that in 
great numbers could find in America a haven of freedom and opportunity. Doors were 
and remained open not only to the persecuted, the nonconformists, the adventurer, the 
gifted, the ambitious, the braver, but more widely to masses of people in search of relief 
and hope.
The American individualism, if not a coherent ideological system, was at least a 
unifying secular religion, and it was crucial to the immigrant: the last comer was ever 
the most enthusiastic believer.  American faith in freedom and opportunity for every 
individual became essential to define what Americans had in common, despite their 
increasing  diversity  of  origins  (Huntington,  1981,  p.  231).  The  myth  of  universal 
equality of opportunity became a promise of, nothing less, the same divine Providence, 
wrote Huntington, echoing a intuition of Tocqueville (1981, p. 225). And if the G-d 
predilection was late to become manifest in one's endeavor and career, there was always 
open the gate of Uncle Tom. A well paid life-term enrollment in the American army was 
the best welfare answer to structural poverty and capitalism unevenness, in the United 
States.
Every  centralization  of  power  produced  the  expansion  of  governmental 
bureaucracy, that American elites tried – when they tried – to mitigate by dispersing 
power  among  several  agencies,  committees,  lobbies.  Yet  increasing  political  power 
concentration  at  home  and  ever  more  active  involvement  in  world  affairs  created 
stronger  needs  for  hierarchy,  big  government  specifically  and  bigger  organizations 
generally.  Both  things  were  indeed  contradictory  with  the  values  of  the  American 
individualism  (Huntington,  1981,  pp.  228-229),  while  they  were  consistent  with 
American  imperialism.  This  gap  between  ideals  and  reality  has  been  “a  persistent 
source of tension and cognitive dissonance, which Americans have attempted to relieve 
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through  various  combinations  of  moralism,  cynicism,  complacency,  and  hypocrisy” 
(Huntington, 1981, p. 221).
Among the many American contradictions, that were rising along with America's 
role in the world, one of the most problematic has been the inherent tension between the 
pretense  of  enhancing  liberty  at  home  by  curbing  the  power  of  the  American 
government and pretending to enhance liberty abroad by expanding that same power 
(Huntington, 1981, p. 259).
Strong, wide social – and electoral – consensus to this American religion was 
barely  cracked – not  broken -  by a  major  crisis  as  that  of  the Vietnam War,  when 
veterans,  women,  youth  rebelled  to  conscription  at  home  and  imperialist  brutality 
abroad. Interestingly enough, a federal law was approved in 1974, as an answer to this 
consensus crisis, to enact the first economical affirmative action of American history, in 
favor of more than 8 million veterans of Vietnam War. To understand the proportions - 
and the imperial hubris - of the Vietnam crisis, it is worth remembering that Americans 
enrolled in the World War II, thirty years before, had been 16 million. The imperialist – 
and failed - containment of Communism in a far remote pointless geopolitical field had 
required  half  the  manpower  used  to  win  the  total  war  against  the  totalitarian 
Nazi-fascist powers.
The United States have been the emblematic zenith of a long Western history, a 
Janus-headed god, which presented as the liberator of individuals on one side, and on 
the other one as the Hobbesian Leviathan, the destroyer of native environments, local 
communities, state republicanisms at home, and natural diversities and peoples' rights 
abroad.
Even if not a divinity America has been the biggest machine ever created by 
humans.  No matter how deep could reveal to be every recurring crisis of the world 
capitalist  system.  The  center  was  ever  hit  much  later  than  the  periphery,  and  the 
American center's periphery has been the entire vastness of the rest of the world. Even 
the  most  modest  American  consumer  could  long  acquire  cheap  goods,  thanks  to 
exploited laborers somewhere abroad.
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The American technological leadership has been certainly due to its openness, 
and to the restless attraction of capitals, talents, ideas, from the rest of the world, but it 
has  been  also  eased  by  the  favored  prices  of  every  imported  natural  and  human 
resources.
Critical  geopolitics recognized since the Seventies that the American machine 
was the heart of an uneven world, as the Cold War drew towards its close. They feared 
that the gap between the world center and the rest of the world could be crystallizing, 
along with inequalities within the United States, among genders, generations, territories, 
communities, sects, and races. Their criticism made a wide public aware that American 
power,  along  with  American  welfare,  has  been  -  literally  -  paid  not  only  by  the 
American production and taxation, but also by uneven extraction of resources from the 
rest  of  the  world.  They  have  questioned  the  machine  and  its  ideological 
self-justification, criticizing binary views which were implicitly if not always explicitly, 
dividing the world into “a good and a  bad;  a light  and darkness;  an inside and an 
outside; an 'us' (the Nation, the West) and a 'them' (the East, the South)” (Parker, 1994). 
Their criticism was deeply motivated and politically fertile, but not completely able to 
theorize the geopolitical grand trend. The United States remained the economic world 
center and kept absorbing any kind of resources from the rest,  well beyond the XX 
century,  but  the  rest  of  the  world  was  not  doomed  to  submission,  destruction,  and 
exploitation.
After the 1989, the American power unfolded in the world, no longer balanced by 
the Soviet one. The United States welcomed under their political and military protection 
a bulk of former Soviet clients and many others. They engaged Russia and China, and 
later also India, Brazil,  South Africa,  and other major countries in a partnership for 
international peace. The international capitalist market and its financial institutions were 
universalized, ending up including also those which later will be called, rhetorically or 
not  «rogue states». They cooperated with every available country in extending to the 
entire  planet  mobile  communication  and  the  internet,  and  other  technological 
achievement. They made American English the base for the definitive development of a 
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universal lingua franca, an internationalized Simple or Special English – a Spinglish? - 
to be seen if influenced more by Spanglish, Chinglish or whatever.
The  solitary  superpower  led  the  international  coalition  for  mantaining  the 
independence of Kuwait,  in 1990-1992, an expensive,  bloody, and inconclusive war 
against the authoritarian Saddam Hussein's Iraq, dangerously poised between the liberal 
engagement of world police responsibilities and the realist containment in defense of oil 
at reasonable prices.
From 1990  till  1995,  the  United  States  supported,  eventually  with  American 
troops, the United Nations intervention in Somalia, a rare combination of geopolitical 
ignorance,  humanitarian  intervention's  hubris,  and  consequent  military  disaster.  The 
1995 Western bombing in Bosnia and Herzegovina was something little more realistic, 
thoughtful, limited in scope, and, not surprisingly, it came too late to save many lives 
from the ferocity of Serbian squadrismo. From March to June 1999, Serbia itself was 
bombed  by  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization,  in  order  to  stop  another  of  its 
neocolonialist surge, this time in Kosovo.
As  a  reprisal  for  the  bombing  of  the  United  States  embassies  in  Kenya and 
Tanzania,  occurred  on  August  7th 1998,  Americans  launched  cruise  missile  attacks 
against two suspected terrorist bases in Afghanistan and a suspected factory in Sudan. 
In  December  of  the  same year,  American  and British  forces  conducted  a  bombing 
campaign on Iraq, to lessen the regime's capacity to produce and stock weapons of mass 
destruction. The United States also intervened, along with the United Nations, to restore 
East Timor independence, a process that was completed by 2002.
Letting aside a multitude of minor interventions and incidents in not less than 
thirty other countries in twenty years after the end of the Cold War, we had also the 
terrible 2003-2011 Iraq War and, last but not least and not yet concluded while this 
study is being written, Afghan occupation.
The United States entered Afghanistan, which really deserves to be known as the 
graveyards  of  empires,  in  response  to  the  tragedy  of  September  11th 2001.  They 
certainly demonstrated to the world, down there in South Asia, that they were ready to 
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nip in the bud a new Islamist Hitler, but at a very high price, for them, their enemies the 
innocents within.
In this season of unbalanced power, the United States have obtained a few fragile 
results, where they had clear and limited geopolitical objectives, while they have failed 
dramatically where they did not.
We  do  not  discuss  here  the  reality,  the  opportunity,  even  less  the  label  – 
imperialist,  neocolonialist,  liberal,  conservative,  neoconservative – of these years  of 
imperial overstretch. We limit to register that those who believe that American power 
might have reduced the world to a mere economically exploited, politically dominated 
Globalistan,  irredeemably immerse in  a  never  ending “liquid war” (Escobar,  2006), 
were not, fortunately, completely right.
Goliath met his  David? Yes,  looking in  a mirror.  American projects  of world 
domination  would  have  required  a  gargantuan effort,  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States declined, because it would have risked to be beyond their capacity and it would 
have undermined their  interests elsewhere in the world and at  home, wrote recently 
Kaplan (2012).
They assisted a few rebellions, albeit avoiding any responsibility for the course 
of events on the ground. They toppled two regimes with the project of redefining the 
Iraqi and the Afghan societies, but their attempt resulted to be fallacious, because the 
American  society  refused  to  invest  even  a  particle  of  what  it  was  required  by  a 
neocolonialist project, something comparable with what was done, in postwar Germany 
and Japan.
The United States' ruling elites have been recklessly and pointlessly requiring 
their people power enough to patrol the entire world, after the end of the Cold War, but 
they had never met consent enough to really conquer and dominate it. 
In  an  important  speech  delivered  on  23rd May 2013,  president  Obama  stated 
“clearly and unequivocally” that then current, huge and expensive universal deployment 
of  combatants,  robots,  drones,  and  other  massive  military  means  “on  a  perpetual 
wartime footing”  was  unsustainable “for a democracy”  and it ought to be bring to an 
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end (The New York Times' Editorial Board, 2013). Americans had come to feel, as the 
Soviets did, the burden of their world empire.
An immense literature, from Brzezinski (1997) to Kupchan (2012), was stuck in 
this  obsession  for  world  supremacy.  Some  provided  recommendations  to  keep  the 
American  superpower,  prophesying  clash  of  civilizations  and  advocating  a  bunker 
mentality  to  wall  out  the  impending  anarchy  (Ferguson,  2003i,  p.  39,  referring 
Huntington, 1993, and Kaplan 1994). Others, with even more pessimism, wrote painful 
prose about the possible shift of power from the United States to other – naturally? - 
dangerous countries, or even to something worse, like sub-state rebels, non-state actors, 
transnational  criminal  or terror actors and so on,  imaging that global governance is 
going  to  be  a  mess  in  the  meantime  (Drezner,  2012,  commenting  the  bulk  of 
pessimists).  Only  a  few were  instead  optimists  about  the  building  of  a  new order, 
shaped by the temporary lonely hegemony of the liberal Leviathan (Ikenberry, 2011). 
We argue that those who believed that America should keep directly ruling the world 
and those who believed that  America should sustain the establishment  of  a  kind of 
world government had eventually in common a very similar imperialist hubris.
Gellner  wrote,  about  the possibility  of a  world government,  that  a  politically 
united, culturally homogenized, fully industrialized world, would see underprivileged 
populations struggling for full citizenship within the same imperial unit (1964, p. 177). 
Such hypothetical world empire, we add, would be based on an unlimited exploitation 
of underdeveloped peripheries from the center, not to mention - we will return upon this 
–  the  radical  crystallization  of  every  even  minimal  cultural  difference  and  social 
inequality. “This united world might well come to resemble the present condition of 
South Africa” (Gellner, 1964, p. 178). The South African Apartheid, thought Gellner, 
but even after the introduction of racial equality, South Africa long had remained – not 
surprisingly, given its political and economic centralization - stable at the top of social 
and economic inequalities.
The establishment of such a global South Africa, in any case, would require the 
consent  of  peoples.  We  argue  that,  at  the  present  level  of  social  awareness  and 
mobilization, possible orders to unify the world – upon a unilateral initiative of a single 
162 / 272
Mauro Vaiani - Disintegration as Hope - 2. The Turn and a Conjecture
(PhD public defense on 12 July 2013)
superpower or through multilateral agreements – would not easily find compliance, or 
would  be  considered  megalomaniac.  And  not  only  this.  Understood  that  present 
concentration  of  power  had  almost  led  us  to  self-destruction,  why  would  a  further 
concentration be still believed the right answer to world problems?
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2.7 Disintegration and Peace
We are inviting  our readers to rethink the relatively peaceful disintegrations of 
the giant Soviet Union and of the dwarf Czechoslovakia, as both originating from the 
successes  of  these  two  real-socialist  experiences,  not  from their  failures.  We  have 
already seen that a Post-Cold War's positive outcome – even if not always an immediate 
one -  was the drop of  Soviet  and American  funding to  many regimes,  movements, 
parties, agencies, that were fighting each other in various forms of geopolitical rivalries, 
often real proxy wars, along the borders among the two old blocs.
With time, despite the dramatic redistribution of power that has been underway 
after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, studies and sources point out a substantial drop of 
political and military violence, challenging a certain conventional wisdom that, in the 
Post-Cold War, conflicts are becoming more frequent, persistent, or bloody.
Not  only  outspoken  warfare  and  political  violence  is  declining,  but  also  the 
biggest  fears:  the  atomic,  bacteriological  and  chemical  menaces.  Weapons  of  mass 
destructions,  impossible  to  be  used  given their  suicidal  inherent  nature,  were  made 
illegals  by  universally  accepted  international  law,  and  the  two  superpowers  were 
obliged  to  cultivate  a  reputation  of  strength  conjugated  with  moderation,  since  the 
beginning of Cold War, because of their possession (Deutsch, 1953-1966, p. 5). The end 
of the arms race among the two world superpowers reduced reserves of such weapons 
and intensified the international  cooperation powers to control  their  possible  further 
proliferation.
Apart for North Korea, whose regime is using the nuclear menace merely as a 
tool of internal oppression of its  people,  no new real dangers emerged, because the 
nuclear powers were intrinsically balancing and paralyzing each other (cf Waltz, 2012). 
By the way, everywhere the concentration of power required for the conception of an 
arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, has been called into question. Their realization 
164 / 272
Mauro Vaiani - Disintegration as Hope - 2. The Turn and a Conjecture
(PhD public defense on 12 July 2013)
and  custody,  in  addiction,  ended  up  only  enlarging  the  social  awareness  and 
mobilization,  within  every  country.  Their  costs,  furthermore,  have  become 
unsustainable, as well as morally and politically questionable, in every country, Iran 
included. A country, this last, where, beneath the apparent stability, the industrialized 
obedience to the state, the universal reverence to the mullahcracy, the consent to the 
revolutionary regime, thanks to social awareness and mobilization, were already in a 
profound crisis, in the early 2010s, when this study was elaborated.
Post-Cold War peoples had less fear of being atomized by foreign rivals, while 
they long remained very worried by the weapons their own ruling elites possessed and 
used as an excuse to justify their powers and privileges.
This  trend of  reduction of  violence and fear  was defined “a rare  message of 
hope” by Desmond Tutu (Mack, 2005). The Human Security Report (2012) confirmed 
that  this  positive  trend  has  exhibited  a  meaningful  endurance,  notwithstanding  the 
problematic effects of War on Terror, and despite the fierceness of political violence like 
the Syrian Civil War started in 2011.
Why,  after  a  centuries-old  bloody  process  of  integration,  we  had  entered  a, 
though relatively, less violent time?  In our opinion, the answer is in the further and 
farther widening of social awareness and mobilization.
Notwithstanding  ecological  contradictions  and  economic  crisis,  a  mix  of 
geopolitical thaw, open markets, domestic reforms, increased circulation of ideas and 
technologies,  had  produced  improvements  in  most  of  the  countries,  in  many  basic 
fields:  eradication of  hunger,  universal  primary education,  health  improvement.  The 
number of overweight people have surpassed  that of malnourished: the first are more 
than one billion, the latter are less than one billion.
Among the most astonishing numbers are those of the growth of communication 
and interconnection. In  the barely four years required by the writing of this study we 
have seen the number of people who have access to internet rising from one quarter to 
almost  a  half  of  the whole mankind.  In 2009, every four  persons,  there were three 
connected with a  mobile phone; in 2013 the number of mobiles, most of which were 
internet integrated smartphones, outnumbered the estimated number of living humans, 
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having gone beyond seven billion. This interconnection take-off geometrically boosted 
personal  awareness,  social  mobilization.  Such  a  cultural  and  social  change  reached 
every corner of the planet, arriving even earlier and faster than food, health, welfare, 
education,  becoming  an  important  feature  even  in  the  most  ravaged  and  poorest 
countries.
If Deutsch, Tilly were right, the rise of awareness and mobilization should keep 
pushing people to ask for more.  Not  only individual  freedom, social  and economic 
liberties, electoral democracy, but also transparency, accountability, participation and, 
last but not certainly the least, power. What is told by the every movements' song of 
songs,  People Have the Power, the 1988 rock song by Patti Smith and Fred "Sonic" 
Smith,  have  passed  from  imagination  to  political  reality:  “And  the  armies  ceased 
advancing - Because the people had their ear”. This is important, for us, at this point of 
this  insight,  because  it  may  explain  substantial  and  enduring  reduction  of  political 
violence, at every level, in every corner of the human world.
Political violence, internal oppression and external expansion, used to work, as a 
basis for ruling elites' power and privileges. Those who applied substantial force to their 
subject got compliance and draw multiple advantages of deference, riches and access to 
pleasures denied to less powerful people (Tilly, 1990, p. 70). After the industrialization 
and its totalitarian outcomes, by the contrary, political violence, state crimes and wars, 
need too many people and resources, and they procure in exchange much less.
It can be easily understood that a complex society is much more fragile, and it 
has much more to  lose from any kind of crisis.  Their  infrastructures and structures 
require much more qualified, decision-making capable, interactive and interconnected 
people.  People  very  different  from  the  easily  replaceable,  anonymous  executors 
employed  in  the  totalitarian  factories  and armies  of  the  early  industrialization.  The 
entire state machine, in its growing complexity, has become ever greatly depending on 
much more subjects' creative and incessant work, regular payments, unshaken trust in 
the  system  and  its  institutions.  If  even  only  a  minority  of  technicians,  officials, 
bureaucrats, security forces stop complying, the regime may face a risk of collapse. 
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In the late  age of integration,  electoral  majorities of  obedient  and conformist 
mobs  have  brought  in  power  the  worst  regimes  in  history.  After  total  social 
mobilization, tiny active minorities, who occupy key positions in bearing of the state 
machine, realize they may shrug it.
Disintegration of modern countries may be relatively bloodless, certainly because 
of civilization achievements, but also – and more materially - because the rebellion of a 
few may be enough to clog the violent machine of the modern state.
From the top of the modern totalitarian high pyramids, rebels and protesters once 
appeared little more than annoying cicadas, that the regime could easily pinch, thanks to 
the obedience of whole armies of ants. Industrialized obedience was the social base of 
oppression  in  totalitarian  states  and  totalitarian  modernity  within  every  state.  The 
Chinese power in 1989 enjoyed the obedience of troops, who had no possible empathy 
with the rebel students they were going to kill in Tienanmen Square – they did not even 
speak, literally, the same language.
In the increasing complexity and interconnection of our human society, none in 
charge may be really sure either that all of its forces and bodies, at the decisive moment 
when state crimes are ordered, they will obey, or that there will be conspiracy of silence 
and suppression of evidences, after that state crimes are accomplished.
A  wider  range  of  active  sabotage,  passive  resistance,  nonviolent  action, 
satyagraha – truth-force – initiatives, arise from the realization that social awareness 
and mobilization had eventually cracked industrialized obedience, as it broke the Soviet 
Union  and  it  paralyzed  the  American  imperialism.  And  not  only  this,  the  social 
construction  of  civil  disobedience  may  spread  as  a  contagion  through  world 
communications.
Through the  global  internet,  ideas  may spread faster  than  ever,  but  the  most 
interesting novelty is not the distant communication, that had always existed in human 
history,  even beyond generations  and continents.  Internet has done something much 
more dramatic,  drastically intensifying interaction between neighbors,  increasing the 
opportunities for generating individual and group activism in their own social milieu, 
and  fostering  local  territorial  cohesion  in  their  grass-roots.  Interconnected  local 
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communities are accumulating social capital at a pace not seen before in human history. 
In an interconnected global community, the most astonishing empowering is becoming 
that of a local, concentrated action.
The  1989  gentle  Velvet  Revolution  of  Prague  was  successful  thanks  to  the 
gathering of up to 800,000 nonviolent protesters, in a capital city of little more than 1 
million, out of total  population of about 15 million in the entire federal republic of 
Czechoslovakia.
In every place where this nonviolent regime change was imitated, there was no 
easy way out from serfdom, and the list of modern nonviolent revolutions would lead to 
discuss  a  long  list  of  contradictions:  neoliberal  economic  bias  and  the  triumph  of 
criminality  and  inequality;  political  neocolonialism  shaped  as  humanitarian 
interventionism; authoritarian restorations (Lawson, 2010). The 1989, however, a real 
nonviolent  global  movement  that  proved  to  be  exportable  everywhere  local 
technological and social networks infrastructures had been developed.
In the late  1989's  wave of 2011 Arab Spring,  there was certainly a universal 
momentum  for  freedom  and  inclusion  in  an  Islamic  world  before  flattened  under 
authoritarian  regimes,  but,  not  surprisingly,  the  most  successful  development  of  the 
Arab Spring was in the small, but socially and technologically advanced, republic of 
Tunisia. In that country, the Destour's regime had obtained decisive improvements in 
women's freedom, youth education, economic openness. From those achievements, the 
Jasmine Revolution had a wide, strong, social base to overcome the late corruption of 
the regime, its old authoritarianism, without ending up in a new one.
Peace, in this new world history phase, is seriously menaced only where states' 
central powerful elites are stubbornly committed to their own integration project, which 
corresponds to keeping power concentrated in their hands.
Claiming historical rights over a territory, re-awakening and often re-inventing a 
national identity, fighting to restore an ethnic or a religious pureness - all these are tools 
of  oppression  and  a  royal  road  to  destruction  and  death,  but  these  are  integration 
processes,  not  disintegration  ones.  We should  avoid  confusion  between  causes  and 
consequences. The Serbian chauvinism, not the Yugoslav disintegration, gave origin to 
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what  has  been  improperly  considered  a  disintegration  drama.  The  Yugoslav  crisis 
deserves the name of neocolonialist war, planned by an identerest Serbian coalition, 
with  complicity,  not  only  opposition,  from Croatian  and  Muslim elites.  It  was  not 
exactly an ethnic war – an expression that sounds as it was inevitable, while, on the 
contrary,  chauvinism could  be  stopped  early  by  a  fast  deployment  of  political  and 
military  help  to  the  oppressed  peoples,  in  Bosnia,  Kosovo,  and  also  to  the  often 
forgotten Vojvodina.
The  Serbian  neocolonialist  wars  were  not  the  return  of  something  from  a 
reactionary past and also labeling them as ethnic conflicts - in the sense of deriving 
from something primitive, innate, fatal - was fallacious if not openly deceptive. They 
were integration internecine wars, within territories where central elites had constructed 
scapegoats, in order to keep their followers united and, importantly, to keep themselves 
in power. The international blindness to this political reality was even worse than the 
lack  of  international  help.  The  latter  is  not  ever  possible,  despite  any  liberal 
megalomaniac  hubris.  The  first  was  possible,  with  a  seed  of  criticism  – and 
self-criticism - about the realities and the prejudices of the age of integration.
Darfurians and Tutsi did not have good neighbors to whom ask help. Bosnia and 
Kosovo did,  instead,  but  the Western fear  of  balkanization,  led to  very late  foreign 
interventions in help of local communities that were under  Serbian attack. In the end, 
Serbian violent irredentism was – fortunately we argue - stopped not mainly by NATO 
bombings from the near Italian bases, but from the decisive rebellion of Serbian public 
opinion. All along the 1990s, with the help of fax, mobiles, and the beginning of the 
internet, a peaceful, responsible movement of opposition, concentrated in the Serbian 
capital,  Belgrade,  defeated  president  Slobodan  Milosevic  and  his  clique.  When  big 
numbers of Serbian citizens invaded the streets of Belgrade, against the electoral fraud 
attempted by the regime, in 2000, any resistance from the state organs waned in a while. 
Only two lives were claimed and only a few were injured in the riots.
With the progress of social awareness and mobilization, there must be a visible, 
measurable,  lessening  of  obedience  and  conformation  to  the  current  regime.  The 
oppressive  central  power  must  decline  in  self-exhaustion  path,  meeting  increasing 
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difficulty in finding compliance in its subjects and complicity with state crimes and 
warfare.  Dissidence  must  become  a  mass  phenomenon  and  sabotage  to  internal 
oppression  and  objection  to  external  expansion  must  spread  throughout  the  social 
pyramid,  high  cadres  and  middle  range  ruling  elites'  members  included.  And,  very 
importantly, mass nonviolence must be the only answer to state violence – not because 
of  a  moral  preference,  but  because  the  nonviolent  character  of  the  answer  to  state 
violence,  is  a  coherent  consequence  of  social  awareness  and mobilization.  We will 
return on this, in the third part.
The validity of our development of Deutsch and Tilly's intuitions about social 
awareness and mobilization, would be put in hard test,  for instance, by the political 
evolution  of  China,  where,  since  Tienanmen,  social  and  economic  complexity, 
education and communication have continuously improved, and with them the social 
awareness and mobilization, with their related promises of change, too, in every corner 
of the Chinese continent.  We agree what the Chinese writer  Yu Hua told an Italian 
newspaper in March 2012. Censorship power was still strong as well as denial of truth 
and justice. The 4th of June 1989 was removed from the Han collective memory, but 
China was indeed ready for the 35th of May (Del Corona, Marco, 2012). The first step, 
as in former histories of thaw and regime gradual change, consists of letting freedom 
increasing for the future. Truth about past state crimes will follow, gradually, along with 
reforms. 
China is a Janus-headed reality: the strongest tradition of civilizational unity on 
this planet, increasingly coupled with a steadily increasing political decentralization and 
welcoming  of  internal  geopolitical  pluralism,  within  the  same  republic.  We  cannot 
certainly discuss here such a complexity, but we are considerably more optimistic than 
in  the  past  (Dru,  1995).  The  political  evolution  of  Chinese  provincialism  and 
regionalism is full of risks and contradictions, but Hong Kong and Macao are on their 
way of becoming emblematic sovereign princely citizenries; relations with Taiwan are 
complex  but  fruitful;  there  is  more  a  rhetorical  than  a  political  distance  among  a 
democratized Tibet  Autonomous Region and the Middle-Way Approach for the future 
self-governing Tibet, proposed by His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso; a 
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nationalities politics has been long in place for all 55 non-Han minorities and effective 
self-government exist in every province and municipality. The loosening of the kidneys 
in Beijing, keeping federal units in harmony, is more than possible, it has always being 
a Chinese distinctive.
Regarding the violence of the integration and the relief from violence in a time of 
disintegration, we must discuss a case as that of Somalia, the most stateless area of the 
Post-Cold War, the first of the failed states. Start by saying that the very phrase, failed 
state,  was also very misleading.  It  contained two  mistakes,  one  about  the past,  and 
another  about  the future.  First,  it  overestimates  the  qualities  of  the precedent  state. 
Second,  it  advocates  for  politically  and  morally  hazardous  investments,  milking 
international donors, in the reconstruction of a state that hardly ever existed or worked, 
except in the imagination of some local and international elites. All this narrative about 
failing states and state-building,  reveals  a  thinly-veiled neocolonialism, or even worse 
the return of an integrationist project. In the meantime, real local danger are not coming 
from an imagined return of past tribalism, but by very modern local warlords, fighting 
each other  to  grab  the  remains  of  the  post-colonial  central  power  and to  seize  the 
international aid. Aid that, it is sad but it must be said, arrive as massively as they are 
able at creating violence, fear, refugee camps (cf Besteman, 2003).
Somalia,  instead of a  failed  state,  should be  recognized as  a failed integration 
project, a region  deeply divided by the thirty years long Siad Barre's nationalist and 
socialist, modernizing and westernizing regime. Twenty years of international funding 
and interventions  in Somalia  resulted  only in further fueling of  violence  and robbery. 
They  were  wasted  in  trying  to  resume  and  continue  the  very  failed  pan-Somalian 
integration  project,  while  the  only  self-government  success  story  in  the  area, 
Somaliland,  was long  ignored  or  ousted,  because  of  Western,  Arab  League's,  and 
African Union's paranoia against  unilateral secession, and, more subtly, by a certain 
pan-Somalian reunification idea, a renewed integrationism, that is largely present in the 
Somalian diaspora's mind (Roble, 2007).
Learning from the Somalian lesson, by the way, the very concept of humanitarian 
intervention need to be focused. It should be considered a last resort option, limited in 
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scope and duration, in order to defend legitimate interests and human lives, in case of 
internal  crisis  within a  –  geopolitically  speaking – near  state.  The planet  is  getting 
smaller, thanks to improved transports and communications, but it would be pretentious 
and risky to imagine that everyone may help everyone else, in the international system, 
regardless  of  any  logic  of  proximity  and  principle  of  subsidiarity.  A  contingent 
intervention should be planned and enacted only by neighboring and directly interested 
powers, and with the collaboration of locals – possibly real ordinary locals, living the 
everyday life -  not under lobbying of westernized diaspora, inevitably narrow-minded 
political émigrés, foreign pundits.
The  theorization,  and  even  worse  the  advocacy,  of  a  general  principle  of 
international  humanitarian  intervention  –  apart  from  its  legality,  that  needs  to  be 
articulated and cannot be taken for granted - would end up to be intrinsically arbitrary 
and neocolonialist, generating more moral, legal and political problems than those it 
pretend to solve. 
Such  humanitarian interventionism, if really  generalized, would require exactly 
that kind of concentration of power and resources in national, regional and international 
bureaucracies,  that socially aware and mobilized people are instead seeking to put in 
discussion,  along with another strong  and entrenched integration prejudice: the total 
blindness to their lack of results and accountability.
Considering  the  results  of  international  humanitarian  intervention  in  Somalia, 
former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and many other  places, one may only imagine what 
may one day happen in other bigger and much more complicated regions of the world, 
for instance China. Challenges posed by a collapsing, incapacitated China would simply 
overwhelm any conceivable international ability – given we assume any willingness. 
The  international  community,  as  we  know  it,  does  not  simply  have,  among  its 
traditional organizations, instruments and approaches, any real capacity or prescription 
to treat state incapacitation (Pei, 2006, pp. 214-215).
One of two things, or you imagine the foundation of a real world state, which 
should, however, concentrate so much power as to become the incarnation of the worst 
totalitarian nightmare, or you let every corner of the human world to provide for itself,  
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to more with the help of its neighbors, within rules as possible shared.  Back to the 
totalitarian state, or towards disintegration. What is more likely, as well as desirable?
Where social awareness and mobilization have been successful, disintegration is 
a  geopolitical  opportunity,  not  a  danger;  and  secession,  separation,  devolution, 
redistribution of power from center to periphery, meet less and smoother resistance by 
their  respective centralized state. Long before 1989,  complex states,  focused on the 
public goods, and constructed as citizen-serving machine states, as it was discovered by 
Deutsch  in  the  1950s,  devolved,  decentralized,  or  split  peacefully,  as  Norway  and 
Sweden  did  in  1905,  simply  because  they  wanted to  become  smoother  and  smart 
structures, nearer and more useful to their citizens. The increase in the responsibilities 
of government in many matters as social welfare and the regulation of basic economic 
need, greatly increased the importance of such a govern near to the lives of its citizens. 
This, in Deutsch's reflection, was another important reason of more popularity and – in 
case  of  integrationist  resistance  –  of  more  intractability  of  national  identities  and 
struggles (cf Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 22-23).
After the 1989, the international integrationist strong prejudice against any kind 
of  secession, with the consequent and very questionable, and hypocrite,  intrusion and 
discussion of morality  and juridical issues, without or beside politics,  deserve to be 
archived. Secession may be as moral and as legal as any kind of gentle revolution is. It 
ought to let  a secession be,  if it  is a coherent consequence of social awareness and 
mobilization, and then it  nonviolent,  supported by majority,  offering compensation to 
minority  who may suffer from it (cf  Buchanan, 1991, pp. 151-153).  If active citizens 
have evolved in a princely citizenry, it is time to hope, not to fear.
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2.8 The Permissive State of Disintegration
In the Post-Cold War, the late waves of expansion of international unequal trade 
and universal mass consumes, from the inclusion of former socialist countries in the 
international  capitalist  system to the explosion  of  interconnected  smartphones,  have 
been classified under  the umbrella  term of globalization – a concept in  many ways 
improperly  reified  and,  in  our  opinion,  inappropriately  separated  from  the  more 
comprehensive and meaningful concept of westernization, which is hardly classifiable 
as a geopolitical or an economical novelty.
Even  international,  supranational  institutions,  multinational  and  transnational 
economic and social  actors,  have been multiplying  since  the  very  beginning of  the 
westernization, and they are not, in quantity and quality, something new, emerged in the 
Post-Cold War.
The most interesting thing in the entire process of westernization-globalization 
was that,, notwithstanding the incredible development of human beings' physical and 
virtual  mobility,  there  is  not  such  a  thing  as  an  “unequivocal  trend  toward  more 
internationalism and world community” (Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 22). An early caveat, 
from a forward looking scholar as Deutsch was, are still relevant for us:
“Nation-preserving, nation-building, and nationalism or the preference 
for the real or imagined interests of one's own nation and its members - 
these still  remain a major and even a still  growing force in politics,  
which  statesmen  of  good  will  would  ignore  at  their  own  peril.” 
(Deutsch, 1953-1966, p. 4).
The real “revolution of rising expectations around the world” (Agnew, 2012), we 
argue, requires a change of paradigm: from the reification of international life, to the 
comprehension of the multiplication of international actors (Cederman, 1997, p. 19). A 
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disintegration trend may be a conjecture that better explain the 1989 and its aftermaths, 
the dissolution of Soviet Union, the limits of United States' imperialism, the decline of 
states' warfare and crimes, the coming out of many new self-governing territories or 
even independent state in the international scene.
By conjecture we mean an idea - hopefully a good one - which leads us in the 
research, helping to put aside all the unnecessary details, toward the formulation of a 
theoretical construction (Gori,  1973, pp. 37-39). It may contain laws that,  following 
Popper's lesson, could never be proved, but that are useful till they are disproved. It may 
also depict a domain, its organization and connections among its parts, leading with 
consistency – and parsimony – to  understand things  of  interest  that  we could  have 
missed in absence of the conjecture itself (Waltz, 1979, p. 123).
We have,  till  now, discussed anthropological,  historical,  and social  conditions 
that  allow  our  conjecture,  contesting  that  humans  are  fatally  doomed  to  live  in 
increasing hierarchies or, in their absence, to self-annihilate in total wars. In Waltz's 
terms,  we  have  explored  the  conditions  of  human  geopolitical  integration  and 
disintegration under the first and the second images of international politics. The third 
image  awaits  our  comment  (Waltz,  1954).  We  argue  that  a  decisive  condition  of 
disintegration exists at systemic level.
Post-Cold War peoples are setting them free from the industrialized obedience 
which with they were forged. An incredible number of human beings have an unheard 
control on their life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and their pursuit of happiness is 
possible for those of them who, ever so many in known history, are landowners and are 
demanding a voice over the future of their properties. Enlarging, ever so numerous and 
so frequently renovating, elites are in search of their share of power in their homelands.
We  have  seen  electoral  democratization,  social  improvements,  ecological 
reforms, minorities' recognition, but these movements within every actual state, are just 
the beginning. We are assisting to further geopolitical consequences, because to realize 
the lasting and profound changes they are interested in, full self-government, in local 
and circumscribed territories, is required. Important redistribution of power and deep 
reformations  are  not  excluded  in  the  present  states,  of  course,  but  if  states  do  not 
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change, those who are interested in having more power, will have to free  themselves 
from the status quo of their centralized states. The hitherto submerged are questioning 
the power of the hitherto privileged political centers, foresaw Deutsch  (1953-1966, p. 
3).
The  eclipse  of  the  industrialized  obedience  is  ubiquitous.  The  consequent 
weakening of every world power makes room for centrifugal forces in the international 
system. A power vacuum is  formed by competitors'  withdrawal.  The very idea that 
world politics is driven by great powers and all other actors are only their pawns is 
increasingly questionable (Agnew, 2012).
At  systemic  level,  we  maintain,  a  permissive  state  of  disintegration  may  be 
theorized.  In  Waltz’s  words  echoing Rousseau (1954,  p.  232):  disintegration  occurs 
because  there  is  no  longer  anything  or  anyone  able  to  prevent  it.  A parsimonious 
theoretical statement, but more importantly, an always testable one: it will be useful till 
the moment a new hegemonic power rises, eventually falsifying it.
The  absence  of  any  likely  world  conqueror  frees  from  the  fear  of  being 
conquered.  Without  any  pretender  to  world  domination,  there  is  no  more  need  to 
accumulate  power  to  compete  with  or  to  balance  it.  One  of  the  strong  prejudices 
opposing any  geopolitical  disintegration,  the fear  to  be dwarfs  in  a world of giants 
wanes in this new reality.
We  have  already  discussed  the  Soviet  dissolution  and  the  United  States' 
overstretch. China and Russia, India and Indonesia, Nigeria and South Africa, Brazil 
and  Mexico,  Japan  and  the  European  powers,  all  the  most  populated,  richest  and 
consistently  armed  countries  of  the  world,  naturally  candidates  to  rise  for  world 
dominance,  they  are  all  increasingly  absorbed by their  internal  social  mobilization, 
along with the necessity of deep change in economy and ecology, justice and crime, 
welfare  and  debts  management.  The  European  almost-state,  the  European  Union's 
bureaucracy, does not represent an exception.
The  main  challenge,  in  all  of  these  giants,  is  downsizing  of  their  central 
bureaucracies,  devolution  of  power  in  favor  of  their  peripheries  and  minorities, 
redistribution  of  opportunities  from their  actual  elites  to  wider  strata  of  ever  more 
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demanding citizens – not only as individuals, but as collectives living in defined local 
polities, as citizenries. And as these potential identerest conflicts – material and spiritual 
traits fused, as proposed by Ferguson (2003i) - also have a geopolitical dimension, all of 
them may end up in geopolitical disintegration.
The  outcome  may  not  necessarily  be  their  fragmentation  in  a  bulk  of  new 
independent states, because empowerment of local governments, internal autonomies, 
federal states, may be an elastic, forward-looking answer. Federalism exists already in 
Russia, China, India, and in most of the other mentioned states, and it is there to stay 
(Kolstø, 2001).
During the Cold War time, a ponderous stream of international integration studies 
took shape, with David Mitrany, Joseph Nye, Amitai Etzioni, Johan Galtung, and many 
others. Functional - mainly economic - integration was considered capable to trigger the 
inevitable  political  unification  of  humans’ polities  in  large  countries,  if  not  entire 
continental  regions  (Haas,  1984).  Some of  these  studies  appeared  timeworn,  in  the 
Post-Cold War, because they were advocating that new powers might arise in order to 
balance  American  and  Soviet  hegemonies.  In  the  light  of  the  present  study,  their 
prospect that large continental states, such as Europe, Latin America and Africa, should 
be formed in order to join North America, China, Russia and India, in the so-called 
multipolar world, it seems really unlikely and, in many ways, a quite dire prediction.
Karl Deutsch, among scholars of integration, concentrated on a sober, essential, 
and still important idea: the construction of large communities of security and freedom. 
As  in  the  past  many  civilizations  and  their  loose  imperial  systems,  had  arrived  to 
provide security to their local political units, modern security communities could – and 
always will - be formed as an answer to the human need of living free and free from 
fear, surrounded by good neighbors. This need, yes, may be considered – si parva licet 
also from this our study - very near to something recurrent, universal, natural, in human 
condition and human history.
After having studied the first established modern security communities – Norway 
and Sweden, United States and Canada, United States and United Kingdom – and the 
emerging of a new larger one among the members of North Atlantic community, having 
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seen how security  and  freedom were  possible  among  units  remaining  independent, 
Deutsch casted doubts on any idea of unification of the world (cf Deutsch et al., 1957, 
p. 118-119). He maintained, also – perhaps shadowed by the following mainstream - a 
position of skepticism about any state «inevitable» augmentation prejudice: 
“The growth of a state, or the expansion of its territory, resembles a 
snowballing  process,  or  that  it  is  characterized  by  some  sort  of 
bandwagon  effect,  such  that  successful  growth  in  the  past  would 
accelerate the rate of growth or expansion of the amalgamated political 
community in the future. In this view, as villages in the past have joined 
to make provinces, and provinces to make kingdoms, so contemporary 
states are expected to join into ever-larger states or federations. If this 
were true, ever-larger political units would appear to be the necessary 
result of historical and technological development. Our findings do not 
support this view” (Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 24).
Deutsch also arrived to propose an inherent impossibility of unifying the planet, 
or even continents,  and more generally,  he put in  discussion the very possibility  of 
keeping united wide political systems:
“Even after extreme economic contrasts will have become mitigated by 
the eventual  world-wide diffusion of  technology,  the problem of the 
«signal-to-noise ratio» will continue to plague would-be architects of 
world  government  or  world  community.  How  can  we  assure  the 
necessary  priority  in  our  own  attention  for  messages  from  distant 
regions  and peoples  over  the  more  numerous  and urgent  competing 
messages  -  the  “noise”  originating  closer  to  our  own  environment? 
How can we do the same for the messages coming to us from some 
distant federal government, and, in turn, for its adequate reception of 
the messages we send to it? This is not primarily a problem of fidelity 
in  long-distance channels  and  it  is  not  entirely solved  by telegraph, 
telephone,  radio,  and  television.  Decisively,  it  is  a  switchboard 
problem;  and  all  improvements  in  transmitting  gadgets  may  merely 
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increase the «noise» or traffic jam of competing messages in the minds 
of the rulers and the ruled” (Deutsch, 1953-1966, p. 176).
He was writing at the very beginning of the post-totalitarian social mobilization, 
in a time when hope in world unification was probably at its historical maximum, as a 
famous one-worldist pamphlet, Has Man a Future? (Russell, 1961) may reveal, with its 
request for a unitarian world government in charge of control, among others matters, of 
atomic arsenals.
Wendt (2003), almost half a century later, after the dissolution of empires and 
blocs, in a much more complex and pluralist world, wrote an influential article that took 
up the theme of world  unification and its  inevitability.  He went beyond Cold War's 
nuclear one-worldism.  He argued that the first step was  the emergence of a universal 
security community, in this following Deutsch as developed by, among others, Adler 
and Barnett (1998) (Wendt, 2003, p. 505). Following steps, as the creation of a global 
common  power,  the  establishment  of  a  universal  supranational  authority,  the 
establishment  of  a  global  state  were  seen  as  a  consequence.  Any other  less  cogent 
architecture would be unable to prevent or punish unauthorized violence by rogue great 
powers (Wendt, 2003, p. 506).
A first point of weakness of this Wendt's discourse, we argue, was in his thinking 
that great powers may be really free to be rogue, to wage illegal war, once they have 
joined  a  security  community.  They  are  no  more,  we  sustain,  because  a  security 
community would be able to field faster and stronger reaction to a rogue state among its 
ranks.  In addition,  the security  community relies  not  only on the state'  top officials 
compliance, but also on a more general consensus within members countries; a consent 
to international security and peace  that  ruling elites cannot  ignore if not risking to be 
brutally removed from power by their  own people. This is an interesting point, in our 
opinion, that Wendt himself had contributed to clarify in his 1992 contribution about the 
changing nature of international anarchy – but  that he curiously leaves aside in this 
2003 article  - as we will see better in the third part of this study (Wendt, 1992, pp. 
414-415).
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States  are  defined by Wendt  as self-organizing interactions of their  members, 
structured  by boundary conditions,  which are  internally  their  enforceable  rules,  and 
externally their territorial closure. These distinct and self-organized systems states may 
have reached a local end-state, thanks to homeostatic logics, that are resistant to change. 
So, there may be local equilibrium, but, Wendt argues, territorial states are not stable in 
the long run, because they inhabit a system that is in disequilibrium (Wendt, 2003, p. 
507). Here there is another point of weakness, consisting in the fallacy of thinking that 
established  self-governing  systems,  the  states,  each  of  them  enclosed  within  their 
territorial consolidated borders, have to fatally collide, instead of living satisfied one 
along the other.
This  last  stable  and  peaceful  attitude,  on  the  contrary,  is  exactly  what  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  them  is  keeping,  in  the  entirely  colonized,  westernized, 
globalized,  post-totalitarian world.  Not  only,  nor  necessarily,  because of their  elites' 
wisdom or good will, but because of very material conditions of the post-westernization 
and post-totalitarian world.
In a world where every geographical space has been westernized and attributed, 
at  a  totalitarian price,  to  or  under  the paramountcy  of  a  state,  substantial  territorial 
disputes,  occupations,  incomplete  decolonizations  have  become  only  few  marginal 
exceptions.
Western Sahara is the only non self -governing territory – one out of a United 
Nations 2013 list of sixteen - where a democratic process to let the people decide their 
future is stuck. The only consistent population living under military occupation are the 
Arab Palestinians of the West Bank. A few disputes exist among China, Japan, South 
Korea,  Vietnam and Philippines,  apparently  regarding  little  uninhabited  islands  and 
more substantial economical questions of partition of continental shelves.
But  all  these  residual  contentions  are  more  crystallized,  than  really  alive. 
Declining bureaucracies, that have their roots in the darkest years of Cold War, are still 
obstructing the setting of these residual disputes, but they are losing their grasp, because 
people  living  in  the  middle  of  such  residual  geopolitical  contentions  -  the  often 
forgotten Saharawi people included - have their own social awareness and mobilization.
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The world is not geopolitically unifying and in addition serious problems are 
looming  within  each  state.  Practically  every  existing  state  has  internal  dispute  of 
distribution  of  power  among  its  center  and  its  peripheries,  minorities,  local 
administrations,  communities,  not  forgetting  to  mention  emigrated  or  immigrated, 
recently exiled or consolidated diaspora.
To  be  more  provocative,  consulting  a  2013  Wikipedia  list  of  countries  by 
populations,  out of 84 countries reported to have more than ten million inhabitants, 
those who – at  the best  of our  knowledge – could be considered relatively free of 
problems  of  disintegration  were  countable  with  less  of  the  finger  of  one  hand: 
Bangladesh, Czech Republic, South Korea, Tunisia. All these four may be considered, 
at  the time we were writing,  stable enough under a united central  government.  Not 
surprisingly, they had their actual stability at a very high price, as they were carved out 
of dramatic geopolitical struggles in their past.
The 2012 Malian  crisis  can hardly be seen as  a  geopolitical  novelty,  but  the 
international  situation  has  been totally  different  from  the  time  of  the  past  Tuareg 
rebellions.  There are no more local, regional or global actors, along with international 
resources, available to commit to the cause of the integrity of a failing nation, along 
with the stability of former colonial borders. Azawad's independence in Northern Mali 
may  be  still  meeting  an  uncertain  fate,  but  it  will  be  eventually  stopped  by  the 
insufficient interest and consent of the Tuareg people, not certainly from the minimal 
military aid Mali received from France and from other states – in the name, as we will 
soon see, of the so-called war on Islamic terror.
In front of this vacuum of world power, one could ask: might any ideology still 
be able to mobilize masses to sacrifice themselves in a world-unifying dystopia? Are we 
really sure that industrialized obedience has become history? How can we be certain 
that no power would be again capable of recruiting enough soldiers  to conquer the 
planet, and being obeyed?
From 1989 onwards, in this surprising and promising disintegration time, a new, 
global, dark enemy was exactly what those in power needed, in order to prevent other 
potential peaceful dissolutions and assure their power, curbing drastic elites’ turnover.
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The modern extreme streams of political Islamism, for instance, were already out 
there, with their own remarkable history of resentment and violence, anger and desire of 
redemption. Because of the vastness of the Islam world, the many and various Islamist 
factions and sects were much more diffused than other modern forms of nationalism, 
real-socialism, fundamentalism, authoritarianism, bigotry, organized social hatred and 
racism.
It was a two steps easy construction: first, from an immense variety of different 
ideologies and beliefs, Islamism became one, to suggest something similar to what was, 
for  instance,  the  Communist  International,  a  global  ghost;  second,  Islamism  was 
renamed Islamofascism to mean its  potential  as  the  cradle  for  a  new Hitler,  a  new 
geopolitical totalitarian universal menace.
This construction had certainly worked and many have been killed in the name 
either of Islamofascism or anti-Islamofascism. It is worth for us here briefly recall what 
there was of geopolitically significant, among so many errors and horrors, under so 
many good intentions and bad consciences.
First of all, it must be reminded that those who are spreading terror and spilling 
blood are a painful but familiar feature of the modernized world. The label they vest – 
Islamist, or white supremacist, or Hindu fundamentalist – is secondary, if not totally 
meaningless.  They are basically  individuals who have failed their  integration in the 
hardness  of  modernity:  self-destructive  kamikaze,  bloody  terrorists,  conspiracy 
believers,  radical  losers  (Enzensberger,  2006).  In  our  fragile  world  they  are  a  real 
danger, but they never were a geopolitical menace.
In second place, they are also people who were originally recruited and trained 
by a plethora of terrorist  organizations,  mostly intertwined with liberation struggles. 
Many were financed by the West against the Soviets, as in Afghanistan. Many others 
found  support  and  funds  in  the  East  and  the  South  of  the  world,  to  fight  cultural 
oppression,  capitalist  exploitation  and  pro-Western  regimes  in  Thailand,  Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Philippines. They have been declining, in the Post-Cold War, along with 
the rest of the political violence of the age of integration, but where they have instead 
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met the resistance of a strong integration power with a resolute integration project, they 
have survived and evolved.
In Russia, for instance, the decision of post-Soviet ruling elites, to resuscitate 
pan-Russian chauvinism to keep them in power and the Federation united, led to the 
First  and the Second Chechen Wars,  from 1994 till  1999, with violence protracting 
beyond. The invasions were presented as an anti-Islamist terror operation, while they 
were nothing different from cruel, neocolonialist wars. No doubt the Russian victory 
saved, at a high toll, the concentration of power in Moscow, eventually and mostly in 
the  hands  of  the  late  post-Soviet  strong man,  president  Putin,  but  it  also  delivered 
Chechen refugees to become terrorists all over the world. At a minor extent, also China 
repressed, since the end of 1990s, its mostly Islamic Uyghur Province of Xinjiang.
In third place,  they were people movements  that  turned violent  in  answer to 
repression by the old nationalist-socialist Arab establishment. This was, for instance, the 
case of the Islamic Salvation Army in Algeria. It might well have been infiltrated by 
extremists  and terrorists,  as the regime sustained,  but  we ignore how it  could have 
evolved if a civil war had not been unleashed in 1991, till beyond 2000. The hundreds 
thousands lost lives tell us of totalitarian violence, not of terrorism; of a modern state 
against its people, not of backward clerical revolt against secular institutions.
The only real, numerous and geopolitically powerful group of Islamofascists was 
formed in a single corner of the world: in Pakistan, with Pakistani consent and help, 
recruiting Afghan Pakhtun refugees and others veterans of the anti-Soviet resistance of 
the 1980s. They ended up establishing the awful Taliban regime in Afghanistan, from 
September 1996 till December 2001, always backed by Pakistani secret services, with 
American funds. Their regime was certainly a radical Islamist one, but they were also 
the last ring of a chain of geopolitical violence, that had been started by the British 
colonizers, and that, while we are writing, it is still pointlessly fed by American power 
and money – a very serious case of geopolitical short-circuit, that will deserve a final 
comment in the conclusion of this study.
The  Taliban  mingled  with  Pakistani  chauvinism  and  Arab  fundamentalism, 
making of their poor, war-thorn, desperate country the base - this is what the Arabic 
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Al-Qaeda means - from which to spread, along with hatred, fear and death, a dream of 
unification of Islam,  Ummah Wahida, and of conquest of the still infidel world,  Dar 
al-Harb. There is nothing less traditional, less spiritual, and less wise, than a modern 
ethnic-religious-political discourse, in the contemporary world (Roy, 2010).
Their  dream  of  ideological  purity  and  social  conformity  end  up  in  a  brutal 
regime, whose men turned against the women, the arts, the cultures, the traditions of 
their country. They made of Afghanistan a sanctuary for terrorists that, after September 
11th,  the  United  States'  War  on  Terror  invaded  and  destroyed,  with  international 
consensus, as a direct retaliation.
The international appeal of the Taliban and of Al-Qaeda echoed in many other 
tragic bombings all over the world, but, after the 2001 internationally blessed American 
invasion of Afghanistan, it was no more – if it has  ever been - a sound geopolitical 
menace.
The American Global War on Terror, on the contrary, not only, has not yet retired 
from Afghanistan  in  2013,  but  it  has  become a  label  for  bringing war  in  Iraq and 
everywhere on the planet, in that American hubris we have already commented.
Political Islamism, in the twilight of Cold War, seemed to many a viable way to 
mobilize mobs, under the deceptive guise of an alleged religious revival, in order to 
redistribute power in some post-colonial  Islamic states. But  Al-Qaeda was given its 
early  financing  and  its  global  visibility,  by  American  warmongers,  not  by  gullible 
Islamic masses, when it was pretended it had become an international terror network, 
echoing from the Seventies the links among Irish, Palestinian, German, Italian, Basque 
anti-capitalist terrorists. It was instead little more than a common label, to adopt by or 
to apply to, depending on the point of view, many independent terror groups.
A very  convenient  one,  we must  note,  and very  useful  to  marginalize  every 
specific  geopolitical  competence  and  let  the  military-industrial  complex,  and  its 
contractors and hired political consultants, free to do their job, under the necessities and 
the duress of the «inevitable» War on Terror.
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Those who dreamed about  a  new global  Caliphate,  by the way,  learned their 
hardest lessons not from the deployment of American power and money, but from the 
social awareness and mobilization of their Muslim fellows.
After the fall of many tyrants and considering the dramatic changes occurring in 
the Arabic and Islamic countries, their fundamentalist dream is shattered. There will not 
be  another  Iran-style  establishment  of  an  Islamic  regime,  either  in  a  great  Arabic, 
Persian country, or in Pakistan. The social base for this kind of political adventure does 
not exist anymore and the Muslim-friendly movements that are winning free elections 
resemble more European Christian Democrats than Nazi-Fascists (Roy, 1992; 2013).
Islamists did not falsify our conjecture. The corrupt, American money-devouring, 
Pakistani  security  service,  along  with  some  hardliners  within  the  Shia  Iranian 
mullahcracy,  the  Sunni  Talibans,  Hezbollah,  Hamas,  Somalian  Islamic  Courts,  and 
many  other  terrorist  entities  and  groups  -  all  of  them  revealed  to  be  rather  weak 
pretenders to world domination. And this mainly thanks to disobedience and resistance 
from their peoples: Arabs and Islamic peoples have been, moreover, it must always be 
reminded, the first victims of Islamists' terror, of their state' terror, of American and 
Western highly questionable War on Terror.
In 2008 a tension among opposites chauvinisms of Russia and Georgia, led to a 
few days long war, while the two little self-governing territories of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia  remained  de  facto  independent  states.  In  2010  a  kind  of  gentle  revolution 
arrived in Kyrgyzstan. Following the 2011 Arab springs, in Libya, Syria and Mali, local 
regimes and world powers have been trying to resist political change and geopolitical 
redistribution  of  power,  delivering  violence  and  begging  to  be  balanced  by  other 
violence, that may be labeled as terrorism, or resistance, or international humanitarian 
intervention, following the convenience and, in the meantime, remaining in charge the 
longest possible. But they have not certainly been consolidating. They have pointlessly 
kept waging war,  against  their  same people,  trying desperately to avoid the coming 
social revolt.
Instead of concert  of few - old or new – giant powers, or a violent world of 
competing  dogmas,  it  is  the  disappearance  from  the  foreseeable  horizon  of  any 
185 / 272
Mauro Vaiani - Disintegration as Hope - 2.8 The Permissive State of Disintegration
(PhD candidate in Geopolitics – University of Pisa)
believable  Leviathan  that  may  be  the  likely  –  and  positive  -  cipher  of  our  time. 
Calculating the chance of a unified Europe, or the growth of China, or the reawakening 
of Russia, or the messianic coming of other new powers, movements, actors, is due, in 
our opinion, to a systematic refusal of seeing the immense problems of sustainability 
and performance of modern states.  It  is  not  only political  and moral bias,  it  is  bad 
science.
No one wants to rule the world, in conclusion, because it is impossible even to 
imagine  to  conquest  or  to  govern  an  entirely  socially  aware  and  mobilized  world 
population.  Alexander  the  Great  won an empire in  Asia by defeating one rival,  the 
Achaemenid King of Kings. At the origin of Genghis Khan's fortune there is the consent 
of a small group of peer Mongol chiefs. The British managed to keep India after the 
Great Mutiny thanks to the faithfulness of a few hundred rulers of princely states which 
remained loyal. To conquer and rule the contemporary world would require to win the 
heart and the mind of billions human persons, both as individuals and as communities 
where their human personality is expressed, and presumably to kill the rest.
Against this fallacy, we have proposed a way to understand what has changed 
and an explanation of it. In the next and last part, we will shift from the theoretical 
insight to a normative discussion. The disintegration is here to stay, we argue, and it is 
worth proposing some ideas about how we might deal with it.
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3.1 Beyond the Cycle
Since  the  original  globalization,  anarchy  has  been  the  enduring,  distinctive 
character  of  human  geopolitics,  constituting  what  Waltz  once  called  the  striking 
sameness of international life through the millennia (Waltz, 1979, pp. 53-66). Anarchy, 
however, is not an ahistorical given, rather the conditions, the scope, the possibilities of 
self-governing  are  continuously  varying  in  history.  We  must  assume,  for  what  is 
possible  in  the  fog  of  the  social  construction,  a  correct  sequence  of  causality  and 
change.
The  foundation  of  human  polities  was  inescapable,  as  a  consequence  of  the 
intrinsic hierarchy – the original oppression - existing within each fundamental human 
community. Their dimensions may greatly vary, depending on their social complexity, 
stratification, and inequality, but also on their geographical position, along with other 
accidental chances or misfortunes.
Human polities have always related to each other, and have always belonged, as 
peers, clients, or dominants, to imperial systems. The evolution of such international 
loose  systems  had  led  our  historical  imagination  to  theorize  the  recurrent  rise  and 
demise of universal powers, and to the alternation of integration and disintegration, as a 
fatal destiny for local polities.
The late centuries-old  age of integration, by the way, culminated in the global 
westernization. Industrialization and its totalitarian outcome invested the entire planet. 
The resulting universal social awareness and mobilization made of each human creature 
a potential pretender to power, to be a sovereign of herself, her time and space.
It is not only a process of civilization, culminating in a declamation of universal 
individual rights. It is rather a universal deployment of individual power.
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It is not an absolute novelty in a historical or anthropological sense: we have 
records  of  historical  enlargement  or  ruling  elites,  as  in  the  long  history  of 
republicanism. The universality of this aspiration has been, also, at least theorized in the 
past. What deserves instead to be treated as unprecedented is the fixing of this pretense 
in images, songs, histories, not only myths or legends. And all these witnesses are made 
indelible because they are recorded and repeated in the cloud of the global internet, in a 
virtually  unlimited  number  of  copies.  Hence  they  are  made  accessible  and 
understandable to every human person, not only of this planet, not only of the present 
generation, but well beyond our space and time, our  Οικουμένη  (oikoumene). In the 
constructed sameness of historical power cycles, we have come to a break.
Given the human physical and psychic limits, the individual pretense of power 
concretely mean, as a starting point, a share in power over one's own local polity. Every 
human may legitimately aspire to be a peer member of the ruling elite who is leading 
her circumscribed territory, her polity.
This universal appropriation not only of one's own dignity, but also of one's own 
power  is  not  a  solitary  experience.  Rather  is  it  structured  in  collective  identerest 
complexes,  and  it  lead  to  overcome  social  and  geographical  unevenness  among 
communities, not only individuals. It is something quite different from the nationalistic 
bias, and it goes well beyond the integration failings.
The eventual admission to sovereignty of an increasing number of individuals 
has two direct consequences: it reduces hierarchy within the community, and it delivers 
also a strong demand of reducing hierarchy over the community.
In this strong demand of being free sovereign of one's own local polity, there is 
also the crucial recognition of other's freedom. Human polities, independence and the 
construction of  a  peaceful  neighborhood come altogether.  Freedom is  possible  only 
among  peers;  sovereignty  is  possible  only  among  mutually  respectful  and peaceful 
neighbors.
There could be a measure of freedom and peace, also under a loose hierarchy, as 
it was in the past imperial system, or in modern uneven geopolitical blocs, but Wendt 
was right: this is not an “end-state” (2003).  The direction of change, however, is the 
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opposite of what Wendt proposed: if an international security system is really working, 
it allows more freedom and led humans to more, not less, anarchy.
The socially aware, mobilized, interconnected, empowered human creature will 
be increasingly disobedient to what is larger and farer than one's own individual control 
capability. Redistribution of power within each community and reduction of power over 
communities is here to rest.
Has the contingent rise of a new world power become impossible? Yes, we argue, 
because it would require a totalitarian obedience from its subjects, in the making, and it 
would  produce  a  totalitarian  universal  slavery,  as  an  outcome.  Exactly  what  is 
incompatible  with  human  life  as  we  know it,  after  the  break  of  the  industrialized 
obedience?
We are  not  condemned  to  the  repetition  of  a  history  of  violence.  What  was 
perceived as problematic and risky, the international anarchy, may be seen as the only 
genuine  and  possible  kind  of  bottom-up  internationalism:  the  equality  of  corporate 
beings,  a  world  of  peer  states,  a  global  web  of  strong  local  democracies,  the  sole 
tolerable universal order (Nairn, 1997, p. 134). This is a comfort for those who feared 
world tyranny and global political folly (Gellner, 1964; Djilas, 1962). It may not leave 
completely  unsatisfied  even  those  who  believed  in  some  kind  of  top-down  world 
pacification (Deudney, 2007).
An  immense  literature  about  historical  alternation  of  integration  and 
disintegration, life-cycle models for civilizations and political systems, countries and 
states'  evolution portrayed as  they were living organism, passing through phases  of 
growth, maturity, and decline, is shaken from its founding. And even if we limit to what 
happened in the last integration cycle, we may see that decline of Spain, France, Britain, 
was “different from the current tendencies toward the breakdown of centralized power 
in the United States, the Soviet Union and, despite short-term reversals, the People's 
Republic of China”, as Dudley envisaged, before the Soviet Union dissolution (1991, 
pp. 286-287).
In one of his late work, Deutsch wrote that many positive and negative utopias 
have  proven  false,  but  there  was  another  kind  of  utopia  which  may  be  the  most 
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unrealistic, indeed the most utopian, of all, the one that suggests that the world will stay 
as it is...
“In the coming years, perhaps, the first need of a political system will  
be  to  preserve  a  sense  of  identity  and  continuity  for  its  people.  In 
growing up with we undergo a great many changes but we can cope 
with each of them because of a sense of self, a sense of personality. 
That is to say, we have a sense of something within us that continues 
through every change we experience from infancy through adolescence 
to adulthood. Identity means the applicability of memories, both our 
own and those of others around us. When these memories no longer 
apply  to  us,  our  identity  has  changed.  Something  similar  holds  for 
groups,  communities,  and  nations.  Their  members  need  a  sense  of 
identity,  a  sense of  continuous growth,  and a  sense of  belonging in 
order  to  face  the  dangers,  the  opportunities,  and  the  tasks  of 
reorientation which they will encounter.  In the future, the world will 
look very different from the way it used to. (…) But the only landmark 
we will need to preserve will be our sense of who we are - our sense of 
identity as a group, as a people, and as a country. For a long time the 
world will be inhabited by many stubbornly different people, each of 
them with its  own culture,  institutions,  and social  systems (Deutsch, 
1980, p. 644).
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3.2 The Princely Citizenry
Our  ambiguous  Western  modernity,  while  suspended  between  capitalistic 
fallacies and weak utopias, saw the bursting onto the world stage of growing networks 
of internet-connected, locally empowered, active citizenries, who are claiming, along 
with other human rights, a share of power.
By using the word of citizenry, we emphasis more on civic duties than human 
rights more on collective action than individual responsibility.  We define a  body of 
sovereigns who have a say over the destiny of their circumscribed territory.
The  development  of  their  identerest  complex  starts  from  very  crucial 
modernization issues: communication privacy and personal freedom, along with arms 
control; free and fair media in local languages, along with others in consistent lingua 
franca; political pluralism, along with freely elected political organs, and ruling elite 
frequent turnover; religious and cultural rights; law and order, along with a wide range 
of patrolling and stakeout;  protection of their  lands from pollution and exploitation; 
access to water and food, whose quality must be under local control; self-production of 
energy, in order to be the least dependent possible from unaccountable suppliers and 
uncontrollable sources; safeguard of their dwellings from urban degradation; protection 
of cultural heritage and public spaces; qualified and qualifying education, both in local 
and  in  international  languages;  free  enterprise  for  everybody,  but  with  positive 
discrimination and job opportunities for locals; moderate, progressive taxation, with the 
precise and limited scope of redemption of local poverty; health and welfare, in line 
with local traditions; community life and entertainment; respect of local death rites and 
other vernacular traditions; and everything else may be relevant to those who have born 
in, or those who have been welcome as immigrants.
The declination of such a list may vary profoundly, from the isolated mountain 
village to the five united boroughs of New York City. We want only to make clear that a 
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citizenry  has  huge  and  very  concrete  daily  and  nightly  responsibilities.  Citizenry 
membership  is  much  more  than  being  stakeholders  and  shareholders.  It  is  being 
politicians  who  decide  and,  contemporary,  being  servants  who  execute.  It  is  being 
leaders  who  have  a  strategy  and,  at  the  same time,  being  soldiers  who  die  in  the 
everyday tactic. 
Equal  participation  in  self-government  means  obligation  to  participate  in 
concrete  implementation  of  deliberated  policies.  Being  a  member  of  a  sovereign 
citizenry bring with it the obligation to act, as well as to will. The decision to build a 
new road, for example, entails building it, as in the traditional communal liberty. Those 
who want,  they have to work and to pay, for what they want, and their  sacrifice is  
regarded  as  an  expression  of  commonality  and  sovereignty,  for  which  no  further 
compensation is required (Barber, 1974, p. 176).
Both right and left political movements have the responsibility in finding a local 
and  localized  response  to  modern  bureaucratization  and  alienation,  overcoming  the 
wide concern that such local energies may  not exist anymore.  Citizens, together as a 
citizenry,  may  restore  their  communitarian  efficacy,  building  original  solutions, 
reducing the weight of distant, insensitive power, and “making the link between public 
function and citizen input more palpable, as it can be in smaller or more tightly knit 
political communities” (Taylor, 1985).
Such  a  collective  body  would  be  able  to  go  beyond  the  mere  protection  of 
individual  liberty,  and  beyond  a  mere  politically-driven  economic  redistribution.  A 
princely citizenry may practice vigorous civic virtues and, through strong participative 
institutions, require each citizen to take part in a conviviality, a mutuality, a cooperative 
and positive effort. In such an environment, each decision would be the assumption of a 
positive, personal part in the process, bringing a new wine of brotherhood, which is 
necessary to go forward the incoherence and the limits of the modernity (Ferrara, 2004). 
In the decisional arena, at stake are always everybody's life and liberty, property 
and pursuit of happiness, as in the tradition of ancient citizens' general assemblies, like 
the  Arengo of  the  Republic  of  San  Marino,  and  the  Swiss  Canton  of  Glarus' 
Landsgemeinde.
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An economic lobby, an opinion movement, an ideological faction, an organized 
political or electoral committee, they may be present within, or trying to influence from 
without,  policies  and  politics  of  a  citizenry,  but  it  is  this  last  that,  as  a  sovereign 
corporate body, carry entirely the burden and the infinite risks of power.
Citizenry's sovereignty may exist in various de facto and de iure gradations, as 
sovereignty is  always relative,  in the reality,  even for every polity,  the oldest,  most 
democratic and most successful independent states included. It is trivial to repeat here 
that Swiss federal units, cantons and half-cantons, have much more sovereignty than 
many members of the United Nations. 
We want to stress that a citizenry, when it comes out having a real power over its  
own  material  and  spiritual  life,  in  its  circumscribed  territory,  it  also  acquires  a 
meaningful geopolitical identity and role – either as an independent state, or a federal 
unit.  The  social  awareness  and  mobilization  will  bring  in  the  international  life  an 
exponential surge of such new actors.
As citizenries are becoming effective sovereign, they will also be protagonists of 
disintegration. We advocate that they will deal as a «princely citizenry» in the process.
The term deliberately - and not only provocatively - recalls the Indian princely 
states.  Those states were depicted as strongholds of backwardness,  and a dangerous 
possible cause of balkanization. They were therefore wiped out, at the moment of the 
Partition  of  India.  In  each  of  the  two  resulting  dominions,  Pakistan  and  India,  the 
integration process provided to erase them, in order to achieve the formation of two 
modern unified states. Backwardness was not, however, the whole story. There were 
also original  and local  institutions  of good governance,  social  welfare,  environment 
protection, that were destroyed and, in many cases and places, have not yet been validly 
replaced.
The names of Kalat and Swat in Pakistan, and those of Bophal and Mysore in 
India  (Ikegame,  2013),  among  many  others,  remind  us  typical  histories  of  modern 
political  violence,  industrialized  exploitation,  environmental  destruction.  Even  more 
emblematic it  was the fate of Kashmir,  which was invaded, partitioned in turn,  and 
transformed in a well  of political  extremism and chauvinism in the interest  of their 
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respective military-industrial complexes by both the occupying countries, Pakistan and 
India.
Princely states'  aristocrats,  with the cooperation of their  technocrats  and civil 
servants, with a variable measure of support from the wealthier, middle and even from 
poorer  strata,  they  sometimes  ruled  with  those  qualities  of  selflessness  and 
farsightedness, which are exactly what one expects to find in a responsible aristocracy. 
The likely universal rise of people to power in their local community, we wish, should 
echo  Barber's  seminal  writings  about  thick  democracy,  citizen's  participation  and 
generosity, creation of an aristocracy enlarged to everyone who has learned to be free 
with responsibility (Barber, 1992). We would recommend that all citizens may become 
aristocrats, peer members of their sovereign princely citizenry.
The adjective princely is  also evocative of Gramsci's  concept  of  the political 
party as a modern prince, whose raison d'etre and responsibility was the establishment 
and  maintenance  of  the  state.  Hence  embodying  the  role  of  the  state  founder  and 
organizer, as outlined - and fostered - in Niccolò Machiavelli's The Prince, appeared in 
manuscript in 1513 and published in 1532 five years after his author's death. The prince, 
and later the princely party, was seen as the pivotal political organizer of a fair and 
effective state for their people. In the thought of Gramsci – and of Machiavelli – that  
meant to incarnate a rational, responsible ruling force, whose morality was confirmed 
by its results, in terms of peace and prosperity for its subjects.
The princely party, in the modern social and territorial struggles, had to be rooted 
in  its  territory,  and inclusive,  involving the entire  local  realities and diversities,  the 
largest possible part of the population. The Gramscian prince had to be reliable and 
believable, in the eyes of all its people, social enemies and political opponents included. 
Thanks to its territorial and social roots and its political credibility, the princely party 
could really bring forward a bottom-up process of social transformation and political 
liberation.
Contemporary history witnessed many princely parties' success stories. In many 
one party regimes, the leading party evolved as a responsible aristocracy. In Western 
democracies, some long lasting hegemonic parties, apart their privileges and arrogance 
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left also a mark of responsibility and effectiveness: the New York Democratic machine, 
the Swedish Social Democrats, the Tuscan Communist party-state, the Bavarian Social 
Christians, among many others. All of the decolonization and liberation national fronts, 
also became the princely party of their new established states, not only remaining in 
power for decades, but also identifying with the state they founded so entirely, that their 
demise and their state's collapse coincided.
In a time of social awareness and mobilization, following different institutional 
paths, modern political parties' power is everywhere questioned, by citizens and their 
activism networks.  There  is  a  quest  for  participative  democracy,  well  beyond mere 
electoral democracies, in many places of the world (Barber, 1984-2003; Floridia, 2012). 
This has an evident connection with the rise of social awareness and mobilization, even 
if  we  will  limit  here  to  discuss  only  a  few  geopolitically  relevant  aspects  of  this 
increasing role of citizens.
Within  a  diaspora,  a  refugee’s  camp,  a  social  movement,  a  religious  sect,  a 
political faction, an oppressed minority, a marginalized periphery, an exploited territory, 
it is likely the formation of an enlarged elite of citizens struggling for change. They 
soon  elaborate  their  identerest  complex,  form political  bodies,  choose  their  leaders 
pursuit  the  social  construction  of  their  citizenry.  Every  forming  or  acting  citizenry 
should pose as a responsible aristocracy, and then meet the Gramscian conditions for 
hegemony, thus transforming itself into a princely citizenry, a lasting reality, a liberating 
force, a bringer of hope.
First,  aware  of  the  potentiality  of  social  awareness  and  mobilization  and  of 
industrialized and totalitarian state violence, a princely citizenry should follow Gandhi 
and  Bacha  Khan,  Dubcek  and  Havel,  Mandela  and  Aung  San  Suu  Kyi.  It  is  not 
inappropriate to remind that any violent revolution may easily end up in establishing a 
regime as violent as the precedent was. A violent reaction to oppression may of course 
happen,  and angry oppressed  people may often  have fought  bravely,  paying a  high 
price, with poor results, triggering even more brutal repression, or, even worse, ending 
up  in  depending  from  a  foreign  military  help  – another  peacekeeping  mission,  or 
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humanitarian intervention, which would be, as we have repeatedly noted, at the origin 
of much more problems than those it pretend to solve.
“By  placing  confidence  in  violent  means,  one  has  chosen  the  very  type  of 
struggle with which the oppressors nearly always have superiority” (Sharp, 1993-2010, 
p.  4).  In  every  modern  revolution,  violence  must  be  avoided  as  much  as  possible, 
because violence is the specialty of the modern state. A nonviolent action, instead, may 
gain many more followers, because it is stronger than the state, since its conception. It 
has a strong inclusion power, because it prevents since the beginning the spreading of 
hatred. Nonviolence is a sign of patience, pragmatism, moderation, moral superiority, 
social  influence,  political  moderation,  all  of  them  Gramscian  requirements  for  the 
leadership of a liberation process.
The nonviolent revolution and the international public «power of attention» may 
nourish  and  strengthen  each  other  in  a  virtuous  circle,  in  the  global  media  scene, 
inducing a turning point, as Julia Bacha concisely and efficaciously explained  in her 
speech Pay Attention to Nonviolence (TED, 2011). Social aware and mobilized people 
are escaping from a past of totalitarian violence, and those who manage in organizing a 
gentle revolution, may meet an unheard international support.
Every nonviolent revolution has, in fact, the advantage of being part of a global, 
cumulative,  powerful,  emotional satyagraha – a truth-force experience,  probably the 
first,  tough  embryonic,  form  of  global  civil  religion.  Since  1989,  the  new  global 
indelible  collective memory is  forming,  and this  memory is  finally  a  really  shared, 
post-ideological, post-totalitarian one. Tienanmen's victims, Tibetans' self-immolations, 
monks and nuns violently crushed in Burma, Iranian Green Revolution martyrs, along 
with the faces and the names of all those who have lost their lives in gentle revolutions,  
all of them are entering the same heroes and heroines' global Pantheon. No ideological 
or political divide, allow anymore anyone to see some of these martyrs as rightly killed 
enemies, or collateral damages of anyway justifiable repression. While the old political 
centers, military-industrial complexes, meet ever less obedience, truth-force initiatives 
are becoming a geopolitical pivotal player.
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Second,  a  princely  citizenry  has  to  define  its  realistic  territorial  borders,  no 
matter  what  were the historical,  or legal,  or righteous,  or else  way imaged,  desired 
borders. A princely citizenry exists inasmuch it is formed by locals, who want to take 
care of  their  own limited territory,  getting rid  of  any external  intrusion,  along with 
unaccountable, distant powers. The self-government of a carved part must be welcome, 
while a war for the liberation of the whole would be either uncertain or impossible. 
There  must  be  a  princely  sense  of  geopolitical  limits,  staving  off  any  extremist 
irredentism. And of course, at cost of immense sacrifices, a princely citizenry never 
seek either to grab, or to show any desire of grabbing, other people’s land.
The sufferings of deported peoples and refugees, during the integration process, 
in the making of modern states, have been unimaginable, and they will never find a 
compensation.  Hundreds  of  millions  of  people  have  been  obliged  to  resettle  by 
totalitarian policies, and the survivals and even less their descendants, will never be 
granted any right of return.
A few hundred thousand Saharawi refugees will  be given new dwellings and 
opportunities, not far from their original native places, in the decolonization process of 
Western Sahara, but they are an exception. They left in the 1970s, when a certain level 
of indelible global memory had already been reached. Second, they want to return in a 
country where there is still room for them.
A  concentrated  of  hypocrisy,  hatred,  corruption,  along  with  misuse  of 
international aid, is still keeping alive in 2013, the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), founded in December 1949. 
A little  welfare  and  modest  salaries  are  distributed  to  some  of  the  five  million 
descendants  of  the  652,000  Arabic  Palestinians  who  have  fled  from  Israel  in  the 
occasion  of  1948  and  1967  wars.  Apart  from  the  inevitable  inequalities,  wastes, 
humiliations and degradations, deriving from such assistance-addiction, the worst thing 
is the institutionalized lie about a return, which it would be possible only at the price of 
a war that would end up destroying the place where to return.
There  is  no  viable  right  to  return,  and  no  possible  redemption  for  past 
deportations and population transfers, from India-Pakistan to Germany-Poland-Russia, 
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from Italy-Yugoslavia to Turkey-Greece, and so on. The future, instead, is our space of 
hope.
A great achievement of our time consists in that future deportations will meet the 
tireless resistance of princely citizenries, or, at worst, they will forever recorded and 
made indelible in the internet. A simple novelty that many state and war criminals will 
ignore, from now on at their own risk.
A world of princely citizenries, devoted to defense of their members' personal 
properties and of communitarian sovereignty over their own land, may eradicate one of 
the greatest  of the modern fears,  one felt  even more near  and real  than the atomic 
menace, the one consisting in the totalitarian uprooting, mass deportation, destruction of 
dwellings, confiscation of lands.
In our interconnected world, the digitalization and the instantaneous universal 
spread on the internet of every geopolitical injustice, may not ever prevent the injustice, 
but the concept of fait accompli has been passed to history.
Open source maps and mashup, along with digitalized estates archives, are the 
nonviolent  means  that  will  make  unforgettable  and  unforgivable  any  further  brutal 
settlement of the strong in the property of the weak.
The princely citizenry may endorse a role of prevention of any further territorial 
brutality.  It  becomes  the  exactly  opposite  of  its  integrationist  counterpart,  the 
Herrenvolk, and their bloody relentless quest of Lebensraum.
Third,  a  princely  citizenry  builds  reliable  and  accountable  civic  and  secular 
institutions - not necessarily Western-style ones. It must become an affordable solver of 
problems, which were neglected by the predecessor powers. On this pathway, a princely 
citizenry gains consent and respect, support and financing. It is soon ready to establish 
peaceful peer relationships with neighbors, former foes included. It becomes a source of 
security, against internal crime, political violence, and external enemy.
A princely citizenry differs from an integrationist power exactly in this renounce 
to demarcate the population along ethnic or religious or political lines. It assumes the 
responsibility of its entire territory and of all those who are living on it.  A princely 
citizenry must be protagonist of amelioration for all those living on its territory, not just 
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for those who fit within a narrow sectarian appeal. It establishes a guarantee for all the 
residents, leading to reforms of social inclusion, as an antidote to every ethnic, religious 
and political rhetoric a vaccine against any kind of racism.
Important and increasing social and political movements, advocate for the return 
to  a  local,  concrete,  pragmatic  self-government.  Self-government,  special  autonomy 
status,  devolution  referendums  multiplies,  from  Hong  Kong  to  Bougainville,  from 
Åland  Islands  to  Sint  Maarten.  Return,  here,  as  with  all  the  form  of  political 
territorialism after the modernization, must be read, following Nairn, as a reinvention of 
something that was present in the history or in the nature of the country, but, more 
often, as the discovery of novelties re-clothed in a vernacular vestment.
In  the  post-1989  world,  many  delayed,  or  newly  imagined,  statehoods  have 
become possible. They have the chance – wrote Nairn since 1997 - to meet a better 
environment for smaller polities, which want the benefits of self-rule without an armed 
chauvinism,  and  without  hatred,  or  less  hating  at  least,  their  former  metropolitan 
oppressive power. The Scots, Wales and the population of Northern Ireland may have 
the opportunity of being among the firsts to develop their nationhood through civic, 
constitutional modes, under new circumstances of global restraint from violence and 
fear, rather than the former, wretched ones of warfare in defense of state integrity and - 
as it happened because of Serbian neocolonialist project – brutality and racial dementia 
(cf Nairn, 1997, p. 180).
Self-governing polities are not doomed to be selfish or war-addict, but they may 
enjoy spiritual unity,  functional cooperation,  lawfulness,  while continuing to  behave 
independently, as peers in an anarchical community (Fischer, 1992). When we propose 
to local privileged elites, local ruling parties, local citizens' movements, local leaders, to 
become aware of their  duties as coming princely citizenries, we certainly develop a 
normative stance, but we also remind what has really changed in the Post-Cold War. We 
ask to realize that our global word is narrowing also in the sense that exit opportunities 
are reducing, and consequently voice options are getting more and more demanding.
“It's a revolution in the state of civilization [...] An army of principles 
will penetrate where an army of soldiers cannot - It will succeed where 
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diplomatic  management  would  fail  -  It  is  neither  the  Rhine,  the 
Channel, nor the Ocean that can arrest its progress - It will march on the 
horizon  of  the  world,  and  it  will  conquer.”  (Paine,  1796,  Agrarian 
Justice, in Paine, 1995).
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3.3 Anarchy Resized
In the modern industrialized and militarized world, where the political power was 
so concentrated to end up in a totalitarian outcome, it takes a constant critical effort, to 
which  we  hope  this  study  has  contributed,  to  keep  in  mind  that  war  is  not  an 
inescapable human fate. Rather than an inevitable consequence of human sentiment, 
political  greedy,  international  menace,  war  has  been,  since  its  invention,  a  social 
construction,  brought forward as a certain guarantee of power for those who are in 
charge. Denying that those in power continuously created the very “problem of order” 
they are supposed to solve, ends up in an improper reification of an Hobbesian world of  
boundless and endless war, as if it was not only real, but also the natural, in the sense of 
the most likely, if not the only possible. On the contrary, far from being exogenously 
given, this world is constructed every day by a process of “will formation” (Wendt, 
1992, p. 410).
The modern states' “will” has come to generate another world, a Lockean system, 
where they recognize each other as sovereign. Each state is entitled of exclusive power 
within  its  political  borders,  these  lasts  being,  with  minor  and  marginal  exceptions, 
precisely defined and internationally unquestioned (Wendt, 1992, p. 412). Such a world 
of  respect  and  recognition  came  to  be  relatively  less  undemanding,  in  terms  of 
international security. Wendt suggested three patterns of increased security: first, states 
would  be  more  secure  limiting  themselves  to  their  historical  geopolitical  core, 
relinquishing  problematic  and  marginal  territories;  second,  international  mutual 
recognition was progressively internalized in the national law, hence a ruling elite was 
no more free to wage war against foreign countries, in absence of a just cause, because 
of its  internal  public opinion resistance to  illegal  warfare;  third,  mutual sovereignty 
recognition was leading states to rely more on international security institutions (Wendt, 
1992, pp. 414-415).
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Wendt does not refer explicitly to it, but he implicitly acknowledges something 
very  close  to  Deutsch's  intuitions  about  social  awareness  and  mobilization:  in  the 
Post-Cold War,  it  has become clearer  that  most  security  problems are coming from 
within  each  state,  and  risks  of  internal  mass  disobedience  give  origin  to  more 
international  restraint.  And  internal  disobedience  from a  socially  aware,  mobilized, 
interconnected population would be also, we add, the main obstacle on the possible rise 
of new predator states, of new Hitler or Stalin, Mao or Videla.
Because of the inherent social awareness and mobilization, in the westernized 
and globalized world, either an often invoked world state, or even continental unions, or 
every other large state were and will ever be impossible to maintain, as was early made 
clear by the greatest of the integration scholars, Karl Deutsch.
In  spite  of  any  possible  social  learning  and  technological  development,  he 
suggested that  it  was impossible  to unify mankind,  so long as spatial  and temporal 
limitations  looms  large  in  the  life  of  every  individual.  Centralized  government  on 
continents  and beyond was and is  impossible,  because of  inherent  organization and 
communication limitations (Deutsch, 1953-1966, p. 176). On the contrary:
“The transition from local and agricultural modes of life, to commercial 
and  industrial,  and  service  economy,  can  mobilize  and uproot  large 
portions  of  populations.  But  in  every economic  transformation,  new 
differences  will  be  produced,  new unevenness  will  represent.  In  the 
long  period,  distinction  among  social  strata,  territories,  centers  and 
peripheries are unavoidable” (Deutsch, 1953-1966, pp. 175-176).
Every kind of integration intrinsically generates new inequalities. A main urban 
center ends up ruling its rural surrounding. Political and economic capitals thrive while 
peripheries  remained  neglected.  Integration  always  means  militarization  and 
bureaucratization of a center, at expense of peripheries. 
Behind beliefs in indefinite economies of scale, there is mere obsolete Fordism, 
Taylorism,  and  reckless  exploitation.  Presumed  greater  efficiency  of  centralized 
decision making hides unaccountable and super endowed top bureaucracies.
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The bigger is the integrated geopolitical space, the greater are the gap among 
ruling elites and lower classes. Inequalities become gulfs, classes crystallize, diversities 
stereotype. Cultural conformism, religious bigotry, politically organized and electorally 
exploited  hatred  overshadow  any  possible  resistance  to  submission  and 
commodification,  of  individuals  and  communities,  by  the  state,  state-owned 
organizations, state-protected corporations.
In  a  time,  as  the  2010s  are,  of  deindustrialization,  financial  misadventures, 
obsolete infrastructures, debts explosion, with a continuous shrinking of blue collars 
qualified jobs, bigger are the republics, the less large-scale social  cleavages become 
treatable,  if not irredeemable. The middle classes and their – mythical or realistic that 
they were – aspiration of social ascent are put in discussion. Internal immigrates are 
economical  hostages,  used to  keep salaries and work conditions  at  the lowest  level 
possible. Foreign immigrates are stuck in their ethnic niches, if they at least have one, 
filling ghettos in degrading urban areas. In addition, in every big state, public debts 
crisis is menacing the welfare for the increasing aging population, and public services 
for everybody.
Electoral democracy, as mere confirming the status quo in periodical plebiscite, 
or  periodical  choosing  of  new conductors  of  the  same machine,  is  not  a  sufficient 
answer  to  this  demand  of  change.  If  and  when  expressed  in  local,  circumscribed, 
competitive  constituencies,  electoral  competition  may  still  produce  a  certain  elite 
turnover, but to pretend that people may challenge the status quo by periodical voting, it 
would  be  like  pretending  that  a  single  shareholder  may  control  the  economic  and 
financial result of a large corporation.
Why have we been so long blind to the impotence, the faults, the excesses of 
every great republic? A strong prejudice has been constructed to defend concentration 
of power, if it was a democratic one. We may see this conviction crystallizing during the 
French Revolutionary Repression in the Vendée (1793-1796), and then petrifying during 
the  American  Secession  War  (1861-1865).  The  prejudice  affects  conservatives  and 
liberals, socialists and individualists. It paralyzes both left socialist anarchists and right 
anti-bureaucracy libertarians, preventing any collaborative, cross-cutting policy.
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The  prejudice  consists  in  this:  small,  low-level,  peripheral  authorities  are 
fundamentally  reactionary  and  only  great,  high,  central  enlightened  authorities  can 
bring progress. And this credence is so strong that it completely overshadows the reality 
that  -  literally  -  every  important  civilization  achievement  has  emerged  in  time  of 
multiplicity, diversity, competition, where short hierarchies allows wide horizons.
The same total distrust in the periphery and total submission to the will of the 
center,  was shared both  by moderate  American  Federalists  and by hardliner  French 
Jacobins.  It  became the  official  ideological  mask to  legitimize  the  concentration  of 
power in the age of integration. It ended up being useful to justify the creation of big 
industrial  concentration,  big  slums  for  proletarianized  people,  big  fanatical  brutal 
masses,  big  armies,  big  corporations,  big  continental  states,  big  weapons  of  mass 
destruction and, in the end, a big global government to take control of them.
In every big and deeply centralized republic – the United States of America,  in  
primis -  inequalities  are  structural  and  the  status  quo  is  unchallengeable.  We  have 
already commented the sense of impotence of those who acted in  social movements 
within the  Western political centers, major countries, while on the contrary in many 
peripheral  corners,  marginal  countries,  strong local  social,  participative  democracies 
were less narcissistic and more effective.
Nancy Fraser (1995) started a serious reflection about new form of dominations 
in large, integrated post-industrial societies. Demands for «recognition of difference» 
have  been  mobilizing  people  under  «interclassist»  banners  of  ethnicity  and gender, 
while material interests, urban marginalization, socio-economical cleavages, and every 
fundamental discussion about redistribution were somehow hidden under the carpet. In 
the continental republic, the potential trap is that the elite who are aware of material 
problems, are at  the same time very far from them; while masses living in poverty 
remain prisoner of their «identities» in their ghettos. And the gap was destined to be 
perpetuated, given the fact that where the future is prepared, in education, universities 
and media, emphasis on identity ended up in isolating women in women studies, blacks 
in  black  studies,  queer  people  in  queer  studies,  letting  a  few  of  them  becoming 
employed in  a  privileged academic  job  – perhaps  underutilized  -  while  the  masses 
205 / 272
Mauro Vaiani - Disintegration as Hope - 3.3 Anarchy Resized
(PhD candidate in Geopolitics – University of Pisa)
remained  dropouts  from  real  social  innovation,  economical  improvement,  political 
change (Michaels, 2006).
The  liberal  myth  of  protecting  minorities  and  diffusing  progress,  from  a 
centralized power, ends up in crystallizing inequalities. It is even more fallacious than 
the socialist pretension of planning redistribution and infrastructuring of far peripheries, 
by the hands of high, far, unaccountable bureaucrats, concentrated in a capital, which 
ends up to be irredeemably distant from the rest of the country. Bigger the country, 
more distant they are.
There is a fundamental fallacy in waiting a solution to the problems created by 
integration processes, seeking further integration. Continental states, world governance, 
international agencies, all these seem to be more part of the problem than a possible 
solution.
In a dynamic and interconnected globalized world, where immense virtual spaces 
are  being created and are continuously enlarging,  well  beyond physical  geopolitical 
borders and limits, states have certainly lost control of the mobility of virtual capitals. 
States, however, have not been “hollowed out”, as some hastily claim. States are more 
interventionist than ever, trying to control, for instance, the internet, smartphones, and 
every new technology;  opposing the free circulation of  unconventional  ideas,  along 
with sustainable and fair trade; selling their wars on terror and on drugs; mismanaging 
their immense military debts, without touching structural inequalities (cf Harvey, 2000, 
p. 65).
The  expectation of  the  waning  of  states,  we  argue, risks  to  be  another 
internationalist  fallacy,  another  integration  prejudice:  less  (local)  in  favor  of  more 
(continental, global) powers, that would eventually result not less oppressive, only less 
accountable. Rather a more effective, more local, more participative, independent and 
sovereign republic - a princely citizenry we would say - “means to defend ethnic and 
cultural identities and environmental qualities in the face of time-space compression 
and global commodification” (Harvey, 2000, p. 65).
States,  and  their  internal  authorities  and  autonomous  territories,  are  the  first 
“locus”  of  resistance  against  raw international  oppression,  avid  global  exploitation. 
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Their existence makes harder for any core power to exercise discipline over own and 
others' peripheries. Small independent and monetarily sovereign states, for instance, are 
certainly affected by the crisis of solvency, provoked by mismanaged large international 
public  and private debts, left  floating in the virtual global finance. Their  potential of 
social  cohesion,  however,  their lighter and leaner structures, the control they retained 
over their local currencies, assured to them, as in the case of crisis in Iceland, a faster, 
fairer and more inclusive recovery (Seminerio, 2013).
New local-global relationships are in course of redefinition (Harvey, 2000, p. 65). 
Looking at  big powers'  and their  violence's  decline,  meditating Raymond Williams' 
Resources of Hope (1989) one may find “an optimism of the intellect in order to open 
up ways of thinking that have for too long remained foreclosed” (Harvey, 2000, p. 17).
In  the  Post-Cold  War,  trends  of  integration  –  and  submission,  exploitation, 
destruction - that seemed inescapable, have become questionable. Various institutional 
solutions  assuring  individual  freedom and  communitarian  liberty,  varying  from full 
independence, to many forms of partial self-government, as units within federation, are 
multiplying. And everywhere the available international security system make people 
feeling  more  secure,  more  they  divide,  in  search  of  their  own solution  to  political 
injustice and social-economical inequalities.
It  is  increasing,  not  shrinking,  the  measure  of  diversity  in  which  humans 
self-govern in local, delimited polities, whose characteristics are decided by geography, 
history,  military and industrial  technology,  but also by unpredictable human factors. 
Size,  along  with  diversity,  appears  to  matter,  in  order  to  have  viable  and  livable 
communities. There is no such a thing as a right size for a state, or for a somehow 
self-governing community, but certainly there is not, either, any evidence of advantage 
in big dimensions (Dahl and Tufte, 1973, pp. 122-131). Certainly states increased their 
average  extension  and population,  during  the  industrial  colonialism,  but  in  the  XX 
century, it was already clear that democratic states tended again to be smaller (Lake and 
O'Mahony, 2004). To ensure collective subjectivity and dignity, mutual responsibility 
and  solidarity,  democracy  and  freedom,  an  original,  local,  cohesive  self-governing 
community is still crucial (Calhoun, 2007).
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Social  movements,  grass-roots  activism,  active  citizenship  networks,  may  be 
only a socialist, democratic, liberal myth, if they can't evolve in a collective experience 
of power - what we have called a princely citizenry - an institutional reality, able to 
become  the  political  hegemon  on  their  circumscribed  territory,  with  the  concrete 
possibility to lead their community to “escape from a fate” of injustice and inequality 
(cf Baier, 2011).
This change, the possibility for a princely citizenry to arrive to power, upon a 
process of  social  awareness and mobilization,  and from a position of power lead a 
bottom-up process of geopolitical emancipation, is becoming a possibility, everywhere. 
Notwithstanding still  huge inequalities,  traditional  distinctions  among First,  Second, 
Third, or Fourth World have become irrelevant, by this regard. As we have repeatedly 
noted commented in this study, as we have seen in the 2010s in Iran and Egypt, Brazil  
and Burma, and many others, the sense of a possibility of peaceful change through 
protest, strike, vote, may spread  as  fast as the use of internet-connected smartphones, 
even in poor, backward, problematic, violent places.
Embryonic citizenries may exist also in the most lawless and desperate corners of 
the world, where they provide a simulacrum of what central states never could or would 
provide to their remote peripheries. The Azawad National Liberation Movement,  the 
Karen National Liberation Army, the de facto state of Somaliland, represent meaningful 
examples. When, still mired in some integrationist project, state-building or defense of 
an unlikely artificial state, international or former colonial powers decide to deal with 
them as  they were criminals,  instead of insurgents,  both the parts  -  and the people 
within - pay a high price. It was, by the way, an old caveat of international law, well 
before the emerging of  “Kalashnikov democracy” (Carr, 2008), that those who are in 
control of a territory with the support of some population, like it or not, would be better 
dealt as sovereigns, to make peace possible, instead of greater destruction.
The so-called failing states are populated by entities as Congolese rebels, Somali 
pirates,  Afghan warlords,  Mexican narco-mafias.  Theirs  have  also  their  geopolitical 
shelters,  which  are  a  reign  of  machismo  and  squadrismo,  terror  and  death.  Their 
original states are dead, but they are surviving as monstrous geopolitical zombies, still 
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continuing to inflict violence and extortion over territories and population in their ray of 
influence. Only strong local citizenries, able to enlist local security forces, establishing 
a  new political  order  and the  rule  of  a  vernacular  law,  may overcome geopolitical 
zombies. Local citizenries should be given full control of every international help, in 
order  to  break  any  international  and  foreign  complicity  with  local  corruption  and 
violence. 
Power  is  diffusing  in  our  world,  letting  room  for  an  entire  multitude  of 
micropowers  most  of  them  very  narrow-minded,  selfish,  dangerous  if  not  openly 
criminal, as we are timely reminded by  The End of Power (Naím, 2013). We would 
mantain, by the way, our positive insight on such a disintegration and we would suggest 
that  a wiser answer to power dispersion, by international and Western interventionist 
hubris, might be to start helping local embryonic citizenries, and to stop messing with 
dying states and zombie oppressors.
We  have  already  seen  as  nationalities'  self-determination  and  eventual 
independence has been one of most successful outcome of the real-socialist geopolitical 
experience. We have reminded that federalism is present practically in every relevant 
geopolitical power, an institutional wisdom allowing an elastic, gradual redistribution of 
power  among  old  political-economic  capitals  and  increasingly  socially  aware  and 
mobilized peripheral citizenries.  Some cases of small potential countries, which also 
represent  social-economical  success  cases,  are  the  well-known Quebec,  Catalonia, 
Flanders, Quebec and Scotland.
The most interesting resizing and redistribution, however, that we may discuss, 
are  those  still  at  the  center  of  the  Wallerstein's  world-system  and  of  Bauman's 
postmodernity.  The  American  society,  within  a  formally  federal  but  substantially 
unitarian frame, is composed by self-governing states, tribes, territories. Socially aware 
and mobilized peoples have been historically constituted in robust, resilient citizenries, 
free  and  able  to  vote  and  to  bear  the  responsibility  and  the  consequence  of  their 
deliberation, with elected and accountable bodies, which speak and act “in the Name, 
and  by  Authority  of  the  good  People”  as  it  is  proclaimed  in  the  Declaration  of 
Independence of the United States of America, July 4, 1776.
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The  evolution  of  state  rights  in  America  will  be  crucial  in  a  time  of 
disintegration. The present concentration of power in Washington is a heavy heritage to 
deal with. In Washington we meet the highest world concentration of those who are 
menaced by the setting of states too big to fragment, organizations too fat to moderate, 
corporations to big to fail, because they make a living of it, and a good one.
Because of their numbers and dimensions, dismantling big, central bureaucracies, 
on which many powerful, influential civil servants and military officials depend, it will 
be tougher in America, than it was in the former Soviet Union. Habits of dependence on 
the state have been lasting in America, too. Since the origin of American industrialized 
imperialism, bureaucrats have been passing pass from federal administrations, to major 
corporations,  to positions in the so-called international institutions,  seamless,  in fact 
being  the  main  beneficiaries  of  American  conservative  containment,  liberal 
engagement, neoconservative revisionism, full fledged global power.
A similar process will take place in other world capitals,  but with less dramatic 
consequences, because of the lower concentration of power, compared to the American 
one.  Hundred  thousands  of  officials,  executives,  consultants,  cadres,  may  face 
dismissal,  in  the  moment  that  Chinese  provinces,  Indian  states,  European  Union 
members realize that their common affairs may be dealt by lean, periodical meeting of 
undersecretaries,  while  much  more  effective  and  sensible  policies  may  be  realized 
locally, in each federal unit. This shift may be shocking and will command moderation 
and gradualism in the transition.
Might America finally reconcile its apparently self-assured but also weak, fragile 
realist Bruce Banner, with its dark, primordial, cruel, but also quietness searching and 
sanctuary giving, idealist Hulk?  May  America,  because of its geopolitical supremacy 
and despite its extractive economical position of strength, lead the world on this way of 
redefinition  and redistribution  of  excessive  concentration  of  power?  A lasting  karst 
Jeffersonian  tradition  is  available  and  may  be  rediscovered  in  order  to  shrug  the 
imperialist rigidity (Deutsch and Kochen, 1980).
American public opinion and some elected representatives are getting aware that 
the United  States  are  safer  than  ever  (Zenko and Cohen,  2012) and that  prolonged 
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imperial  overstretch  in  the  2010s  is  anachronistic,  costly,  pretentious  as  well  as 
unnecessarily cruel. The Washington status quo, however, is strong enough to resist, 
thanks to vertical, crystallized, misleading polarization. National movements, cultural 
mainstreams, social organizations, economical lobbies, Blue and Red constituencies are 
fighting each other over many national, ever more radical and divisive issues, but never 
being able to put in discussion the Washington military-industrial complex.
As  we  have  already  noted in  this  study,  there  is  a  profound  tension  among 
personal success and structural inequality, in American society. The continental society 
is vertically split between rich whites, marginal whites, blacks, latinos, and many other 
minorities of old or recent immigrations, or formation. Single individuals may succeed, 
and merge in companies and universities, the army and the politics. In the same time, 
their originating communities rest substantially apart, socially, economically, spiritually, 
culturally divided. They are also, mostly, spatially separated, living in different suburbs 
and ghettos. They are united by a language that is the most universal lingua franca, but 
they are also  dramatically divided by their  accents, which mark indelibly the social 
background and, sometimes, when people from different social backgrounds meet, their 
accents also prevent them from understanding each other.
These cleavages are played in every state, in every county, in every metropolitan 
area. Individuals may have a personal economic success, but they cannot do anything, 
alone, in order to make their neighborhood, borough, county, state, a decent place in 
which to enjoy their wealth, without being forced to live within high walls, to protect 
them from the surrounding mass of the poor, the desperate, the criminal. Successful 
national  leaders  may enjoy a brilliant political career  and gain a strong international 
stance,  but  they  cannot,  from the  top,  even  scratch  this  structural  status  quo,  as  it 
happened, for instance, to both Ronald Reagan and Barak Obama, who were personally 
and politically real mavericks, with serious intentions, given of a certain tenacity and 
charisma, and were presidents in the middle of epochal upheavals.
Structural changes should be tried through strong local political action, by local 
authorities  which  reclaim  power  and  resources  from  the  too  distant,  indifferent, 
ineffective federal level, in order to redeem the decline of «layered-cake» federalism 
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and the paralysis of «marble-cake» federalism in American society. If vertical cleavages 
have proved insurmountable, local American citizenries should try horizontal rebellion, 
to regain their sovereignty, to cut the imperial octopus, “to dissolve the political bands” 
(American Declaration of Independence, 1776).  As Vermont independence advocates, 
Frank  Bryan  and  Ian  Baldwin,  wrote  on  Washington  Post  on  April  1st 2007,  their 
country did not join the Union to become part of an empire, and the country, therefore, 
must seek permission to leave. American citizenries will obtain from the center what the 
status  quo  has  always  denied  to  American  individuals,  no  matter  how  gifted  and 
successful.
Washington power, «the machine of the machines» will be scrapped, as any other 
and even before, by universal social  awareness and mobilization. The likability of the 
process is connected with the increasing demand of equality and participation, and then 
power and sovereignty.  A large,  big society,  where peripheries are  too far from the 
political  center,  where those in charge do not know their  too many and too distant 
subjects,  where  every  crucial  public  service  is  at  the  mercy  of  unaccountable 
bureaucracies, where active citizens end up being resentful against too many things they 
cannot  either  control,  understand,  or  even believe,  it  cannot  simply  work,  as  wrote 
Zwerin in 1976, echoing both Tocqueville and Gramsci, in his in many ways prophetic 
A Case for the Balkanization of Practically Everyone.
In one of the many studies about the economical and social successes of smaller 
states,  we  read  that,  by  the  early  1980s,  Norway,  Denmark,  Netherlands,  Belgium, 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  and Austria,  seven small  democracies,  achieved  an  economic 
success that rivaled with the American one, thanks to what the author called a kind of 
democratic  corporatism (Katzenstein,  1985).  In  our  geopolitical  discourse,  it  is 
important to understand that these peripheral countries, lacking big natural resources to 
exploit,  too  small  and  dependent  on  world  trade  to  indulge  in  protectionism,  they 
decided to invest in themselves, achieving equality and dignity, education and security, 
cleanness  and  decency,  enough  to  allow  their  people  to  be  flexible  and  creative 
entrepreneurs, able to produce  with  quality  and originality,  for their own community 
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and  being competitively in the external ones.  Small states have well  scored, because 
they preserved their political institutions, their social inclusion, their cultural diversity.
Smaller,  circumscribed,  self-governing  societies,  where  the  local  citizenry  is 
sovereign  and have a voice and a weight,  are much  freer, then stable, then wealthier, 
then more beautiful, then boring... Like in Switzerland: “Switzerland is not paradise, 
but a society with a minimum of strife” (Zwerin, 1976, p. 146).
As  scholars of federalism – let us here remember among so many Gianfranco 
Miglio and  Daniel Judah Elazar -  have been  always maintaining since the  precocious 
awareness of the centrality of covenants in human history, a fair cantonization, as a road 
to liberty and responsibility, justice and peace, is an institution that would deserve to be 
adopted well beyond the Swiss mountains.
If  such  a  concentrate  of  diverse  citizenries  can  get  along  so  well  while 
surrounded  by  hostile  European  history,  it  will  be  possible  for  anybody  else,  he 
suggested. There is no Swiss secret but great liberty and tremendous responsibility of 
self-governing. Many fear an era of flat-out balkanization, but Zwerin argued, on the 
contrary,  that  balkanization  has  not  yet  gone  far  enough,  till  the  lowest  possible 
common denominator, the Swiss half-canton. “Let's half cantonize the world” (Zwerin, 
1976, p. 148).
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3.4 The Coming Caretakers
“History is not a single stream whose currents run all in one direction. 
The world may be tending toward unification, but it is also straining 
with  all  its  will-power  toward  ensuring  the  autonomy  even  of  the 
smallest  communities,  and  the  two  tendencies  are  not  necessarily 
contradictory” (Lüthy, 1962, p. 34).
At  the  height  of  the  age  of  integration,  with  its  totalitarian  outcome,  when 
military-industrial  complexes  brought  mankind on the  verge  of  self-destruction,  the 
world came to be divided in two only major blocs. The Swiss historian and journalist 
Herbert  Lüthy early noted – since 1962! - that while many believed it was only until 
such  time  as  one  bloc  would  prevail,  this  trend  has  been  instead  already  reversed 
(Lüthy, 1962, p. 34).
A few years later, in 1966, still in the middle of the darkest Cold War years, a 
priest  from Tuscany,  Don Lorenzo  Milani,  a  prophet,  a  visionary  educator,  and  an 
international  public  intellectual,  talking  to  one  unquiet  Christian  young  man  and 
socialist activist,  Alessandro Mazzerelli, echoing his friend Ivan Illich - and perhaps 
Leopold  Kohr  -  made  a  wish  for  a  world  divided  in  twenty  thousand San Marino 
republics. This multitude would have radically changed the world for the better, in his 
vision. People would control directly those in charge. Governments would be pressed to 
take  care  of  concrete  achievement,  in  fields  as  environment,  culture,  and  justice. 
Eventually  peace  would  also  be  assured,  or,  at  worst,  “wars  would  become 
guerricciole” - a Tuscan word that means skirmishes (Mazzerelli, 2007, p. 31).
Should we liquidate this prophecy of Don Milani, as something naive, in a world 
endangered  by  climate  change,  scarcity  of  vital  resources,  space  confrontation, 
cybercrime,  terrorism,  possible  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  rogue 
regimes, failing states and zombie oppressors?
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Lüthy would have answered that,  if these tiny, rebellious, vassal states cheekily 
and successfully defy the monolithic giants, many would have a smaller population, and 
a  more  limited  economic  and  military  potential  than  Switzerland.  Why should  this 
development be looked upon only as a form of “balkanization”, as “a proliferation of 
flimsy and illusory sovereignties”? It should be seen, more realistically, for what it is: 
“many countries have won independence and are now learning with difficulty how to 
live up to it” (Lüthy 1962, p. 34). A positive insight on a coming time of disintegration 
was early foreshadowed, in the mountains of Switzerland and in those of Tuscany, not 
far away from San Marino.
Peoples'  awareness  and  mobilization  may  reveal  to  be  considerably  less 
reactionary,  and  chauvinist,  than  many  imagined.  The  industrialized  obedience  of 
subjects to their state went really in crisis and this fact had led to recent but steady 
reduction of international and domestic political violence, state crimes, and wars. At the 
break  of  this  new  international  day,  the  possibility  needs  to  be  considered,  and 
constructed,  and,  we  argue,  fostered,  that  the  disintegration  new actors  may  really 
evolve in that kind of local responsible, moderate, pragmatic local corporate beings that 
we have named princely citizenries.
Will  a  disintegrating  world  be  more  insecure?  Insecure  in  respect  to  what? 
Should we be nostalgic of bipolar stability? Should we restore the colonial empires? 
Should we forget that nation-building, rather than the breakup of states, primarily meant 
expropriation, deportation, ethnic cleansing, ecocide? This work argues that a world of 
military insignificant statelets will be – at least, at its worst - less cruel  than the one 
shaped  by  the  centuries-old,  Western-led  integration  process.  The  decline  of  giant 
military-industrial complexes and of authoritarian centralism, is a real process, and a 
positive one. 
In every borough, every burgher understands sharing a social dignity and asks for 
political power. Every citizen wants to become part of the local patriciate, gathered in 
the  Arengo, to discuss, to vote, to bear the responsibility of the decision. Crowds of 
aristocrats  want to be in  charge of their  estates,  as a senate of peers,  as a  princely 
citizenry. The universal plethora of these princely citizenries, sovereign of their princely 
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states, should encounter permission rather than resistance. They are the best thing that 
could  happen  to  the  human  world,  in  the  Post-Cold  War. A planet  populated  by 
committed, satisfied, caring princely citizenries, in charge of their small, circumscribed, 
cared states, may change the world in a much better place.
A universal tide of nonviolent new «matriotism» is now possible, a sentiment 
which may be conjugated with an old, good, self-denying, freedom-loving patriotism. 
Big fatherlands are leaving room in the world to little motherlands, many more, and 
smaller, and weaker countries, less oppressive to their inhabitants, and less dangerous to 
their neighbors.
An international system populated by thousands of tiny cantons would not be, by 
the way, anything new. The centuries-old Swiss experience, and others similar, would 
be only generalized. As Lüthy noted:
“The whole of Swiss history bears witness to the fact that after long 
centuries of anarchy and violent conflict it has been possible, in one 
small area, to reconcile unity and diversity, general cohesion and local  
autonomy of the component parts. It was the successful achievement of 
this synthesis which caused the French historian, Elie Halévy, to say in 
1913,  just  before  the  beginning of  the  catastrophe,  that  Europe  was 
faced  with  the  choice  between  "a  universal  Swiss  Republic  and 
bellicose Cæsarism." […] was the forecast fundamentally wrong, and 
have we ceased to believe in our own lessons?” (Lüthy, 1962, p. 34).
The chain of causality, as we reconstruct it, is important: Western states lost their 
absolute freedom of action in the world, after the totalitarian wars and the atomic bomb; 
they  lost  the  blind  obedience  of  their  subjects,  after  the  self-exhaustion  of  the 
integration process. They gathered under the umbrella of the two superpowers and, after 
the 1989,  the  two blocs,  the regional  alliances,  the international  system evolved as 
overlapping  security  communities.  A  princely  citizenry  may  come  out  in  the 
international system, demanding the sovereignty of its territory, thanks to the existence 
of these already functioning security systems, in a world a declining political violence.
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Scotland's independence, to cite just this world-known example, will be possible, 
after the 2014 referendum, because it is ruled by a mature, pragmatic, self-restraining 
princely citizenry, and because of institutional flexibility that the British always allowed 
in their relations with their former colonies. Decisive, however, is the fact that such 
independence  will  occur  within  the  security  frame  of  the  Atlantic  Alliance,  the 
Commonwealth,  and,  despite  the  severe  crisis  of  the  European  Union,  thanks  to 
European rights the Scottish people are inalienably entitled,  and that could never be 
suppressed  during  the  coming  negotiations  to  include  independent  Scotland  in  the 
European Union organs and bodies.
Being part of a security community is a constitutional feature of every princely 
citizenry. Their territory is circumscribed, by definition, and they exist only as they are 
satisfied rulers of their own estates. This stability is a guarantee of security for every 
neighbors  well  beyond  any  concept  of  democratic  peace.  Territories  are  respected 
because they are a collective property and a condition of existence of each princely 
citizenry.  The  very  absurd  case  of  a  princely  citizenry  which  would  attempt  a 
guerricciola, a skirmish bringing death and destruction in its neighbors' estate, could be 
only  exceptional.  It  would  be  treated,  by  other  neighbors,  as  a  case  of  collective 
self-destructive hysteria, and it would also be in any case severely punished. Certainly, 
even with the craziness of a statelet, a world of small states may be envisaged as less 
dangerous than ever.
It is questionable and increasingly questioned, thanks to the decline of integration 
prejudices, that  other  international problems,  beyond war and peace,  may really be in 
need of  the so-called  global  governance.  On the contrary,  without  strong,  effective, 
accountable, local governments, any global initiative would end up to be, as it was in 
the  age  of  integration,  in  the  ineffective  multiplication  of  impotent  and  costly 
international  bureaucracies,  a  fallacious,  lip-service  one-worldism (Zwerin,  1976,  p. 
144).
A main  example  is  given  in  the  most  delicate  field  of  international  law.  Its 
hypertrophy, the multiplication of treaties and courts, and the increasingly confusion 
among what is right, what is moral, what is possible, are causing its steady decline.
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International aids should only decrease, if they work. And they should even more 
fast  decrease,  if  they  are  Dead  Aid (Moyo,  2009),  improper  investments  in  late 
state-building  integrationist  projects,  sinister  welfarism  or  other  forms  of  political 
corruption.
Functional organizations of the United Nations, along with many other expensive 
and  ineffective  international  headquarters,  who  pay  more  wages  than  they  realize 
projects, deserve to be dismantled. Collection of international information and statistics 
may  be  managed directly by  networks of affordable local authorities,  compliant with 
open  data  standards,  not  with  any  higher  hierarchy.  The  success  of  the  mostly 
horizontal,  self-governing  Internet  infrastructure,  could  be  the  model  for  the  future 
international world web of civil servants, in a time of disintegration.
Global epidemics also require free and fair cooperation among local authorities. 
One should remember what happened with  the  Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS),  between November  2002 and July 2003. 8.000 persons were affected, more 
than 700 died. Chinese central authorities' censorship provoked a fatal delay in effort to 
control the pandemic. What was really decisive to save human lives, was the internet, 
that helped grassroots health operators to share news and views about the disease, much 
faster  and  more  effectively  than  international  and  national  bureaucracies  did. 
Furthermore,  zealous  local  democratic  authorities,  expression  of  emerging  princely 
citizenries, like Hong Kong and Taiwan, played a key role, telling the truth, elevating 
control level, closing frontiers and imposing quarantines.
As regard the so-called climate change, it is trivial to remind that big polluters 
may exist only in the shadow of great states and they will not survive the crisis of their 
political protectors. A smaller and more free state, ruled by its own princely citizenry, 
will  perform much better in environment protection,  because the  socially aware and 
mobilized citizen love their estates, know their environment, and have a sincere, lasting 
interest in protecting their homeland.
There is no theoretical or practical reason, we argue, to think that small states and 
princely citizenries,  not alone but united in their  international  security communities, 
may be less able to cope with international collective action problems than the powers 
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of the past were.  They will take care of Arctic and Antarctic,  oceans and outer space, 
patents and nuclear, perhaps, thank to their public opinion pressure, with more moral 
clarity than the old greater and unaccountable powers did.
It may be true that many states would prefer to have somebody else to meet many 
crucial  international  cooperation  issues  (Craig,  2008),  but  small  states  and princely 
citizenries may make a difference, instead, acting as tumor suppressing caretaker genes, 
a strong antidote to big states' experience  of  oppression and destruction, the  modern 
gears that need to be clogged, in order to have a better world.
We may only try to imagine, in conclusion, how free would be small states and 
princely  citizenries,  in  a  world  where  a technology  revolution  would  end  energy 
scarcity and the international scramble for resources, where the lean thinking would win 
more minds and hearts, where John Naisbitt 's 1982 Megatrends would keep inspiring a 
sustainable and socially responsible economy.
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Conclusion
During a  centuries-old age of  integration,  a  tiny group of powers conquered, 
colonized,  industrialized,  militarized,  westernized,  globalized the  entire  planet. 
Thousands of local polities, no more only included in loose imperial systems as it has 
been in most of human history, but submitted to a direct, brutal, homogenizing rule, 
eventually lost identity and spirituality, language and culture, diversity and originality.
We have strictly kept separated, in this study, the reality and ideologies of the 
integration, from the local, individual and communitarian, resistance to integration. We 
have proposed that nationalism may be the word and the concept that should be used to 
name the modern state-building and integration projects: Anglicization in the British 
Isles, French homogenization of the continental hexagon, and so on, arriving up to the 
Serbian  neocolonialist  project  in  the  former  Yugoslav  at  the  end  of  XX  century. 
Nationalism is a feature of modernity and a main fig leaf of its integrationist projects, 
ecocide and genocides included.
This  same  integration  process  included  an  increasing  number  of  people  in 
universal  bureaucratization,  industrialization,  militarization.  In  this  way,  we  argue, 
following the intuitions of Tilly and Deutsch, it generated both the biggest and most 
ambitious world powers, and its self-exhaustion. We have named this transformation a 
process of social awareness and mobilization. Practically every submitted person, at the 
beginning of the modern state, has been fed, educated, employed, recruited, religiously 
conditioned,  politically  brainwashed,  electorally  maneuvered.  They  were  made  an 
anonymous and substitutable pawn of the industrial obedience. In the late technological 
and  organizational  development,  however,  mainly  after  the  World  Wars,  with  the 
coming of mass consumerism, in the global communication system, and eventually with 
the  post-industrial  evolution of modern societies,  their increasing complexity required 
more white-collars and technicians than ever in human history. As a result of this social 
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advancement, there was also greater economic and political inclusion. Never ever so 
many people have been made aware of the social complexity where they are living and 
of the power they are serving.
In  the  same  time,  powers  and  superpowers,  as  social  and  communication 
systems,  arrived  at  their  assimilation  and  expansion  limits,  in  conjunction  with 
geographical, economic, technological, cultural limitation of the population's ability or 
willingness to move, or to extend communication, contacts, and conquests. That helps 
to  understand  why  the  building  up  of  continental  unity,  or  even  more  of  a  world 
unification, would result fallacious (cf Deutsch, 1953-1966, pp. 174-175).
In the Cold War time, the integration came to its  apex,  with its  final  bipolar 
geopolitical stability. There was nothing left that was worth to conquer on this planet 
and beyond. There was nothing else that ruling elites could achieve through war, so 
making eventually definitely evident to their masses of subjects, that war was a tool of 
internal  domination  rather  than an inevitable,  supposedly  natural,  human destiny of 
expansionism. A long history of misleading obedient subjects, began to come to an end.
In the peripheries and in the marginal areas, up to the most remote corners of the 
industrialized and militarized world, cleavages, distances, and dependencies, generated 
not only Parsons' social differentiation, but dramatic, structural inequalities. In addition, 
under  the  influence  of  the  colonial  positivist  and  classificatory  hubris,  social 
inequalities,  when  connected  with  visible  physical  or  cultural  differences,  were 
transformed in ethnic separation.
If and when social inequalities were connected with racial differences, however, 
they became irredeemable by definition. The superiority of the colonial white race and 
its  local  lackeys,  along  with  the  permanent  submission  and  exploitation  of  inferior 
races, was thus justified on scientist bases and with arguments of modernized «natural 
law», of the same kind used to spread  worldwide bigotry against the women and the 
queer people. Then, not any ethnic primordialism, or cultural irreducibility, or irrational 
regurgitation - which existed mainly in the Western self-indulgent mind - but rather the 
Western  colonialist administration gave an ethnic character to the Protestant-Catholic 
strife  in  Ulster,  the  White  Arab-Black  African  cleavage,  the  Hutu-Tutsi  hatred,  the 
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Muslim-Hindi partition, the South African Apartheid. Western and westernized powers 
forged  the  universal diffusion of politically constructed  ethnic  hatred against old and 
new  diasporas  -  Jews,  Romani  Gypsies,  Armenians,  Kurds,  Parsi,  Palestinians, 
Chechens, etc. - transformed in easy and always useful regime crisis scapegoats.
Peripheral, colonized peoples, after having understood the inequalities they were 
victims  of,  used  their  Western  acquired  culture  to  produce  their  own  modern, 
westernized  answer  to  Western  oppression.  All  over  the  world,  a  plethora  of  local 
communities started to create or renew, invent or elaborate,  discover or image their 
creole  nationalism,  a  geopolitical  answer  to  the  Western  nationalist,  colonialist, 
imperialist oppression. In many cases, however, this led many post-colonial states to a 
contradictory  process  of  self-colonization.  Many  decolonization  revolutions  became 
totalitarian in their turn, as their original Western models had been, leading to farther 
ecocide and further genocides.
Decolonization under the paramountcy of the two superpowers, furthermore, was 
a  very  limited  geopolitical  process,  stopping  at  the  old  colonial  borders.  It  was 
necessary  to  wait  the  consequence  of  social  awareness  and mobilization  within  the 
hearts of world superpowers, to see further and farther geopolitical consequences.
Only after the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union and the beginning of an 
internally-generated self-restraint in the United States, we witness a major geopolitical 
turn, the Post-Cold War as a time of disintegration, where, among many contradictions, 
setbacks, and regression, we have come to measure, empirically, not only theoretically, 
the change in power internal and international relationships, brought of universal social 
awareness and mobilization.
After the end of the bipolar system, instead of the rise of new powers, we are 
having the disintegration of every power. All major states are obliged, by social and 
local revolts, to reduce their internal oppression, their external violence. Redistribution 
of power and resources among their federal units, may be the only antidote to decline 
and disintegration.
This  disintegration,  in  addition,  does  not  mean  chaos,  or  violence.  On  the 
contrary,  state crimes and wars have been continuously decreasing, because no more 
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fueled by bipolar rivalry or integrationist hubris. The world is now safer than ever, and 
wrapped  by  a  network  of  overlapping  security  communities,  which  have  a  strong 
support directly from the social aware and mobilized people.
The international system has come to a permissive state of disintegration, where 
geopolitical  disintegration  happens,  because  there  is  nobody  or  nothing  that  may 
prevent it. In this less violent environment, aware and mobilized people, within their 
circumscribed  territory,  may  develop  their  own  identerest  complex,  their  local 
institution, their political project of self-government.  They  may  form their own local 
corporate  geopolitical  body  that  we  have  called  in  this  study  a  princely  citizenry, 
echoing  three  things:  the  time  of  destruction  of  local  princely  states  is  over;  the 
Gramscian discourse about the «aristocratic» responsibility required to those in charge 
of a political process of liberation; a discourse that, in turn, echoed the well-known 
Prince, who Machiavelli portrayed in 1513 as a responsible founder and maintainer of 
the state.
The multiplication  of  independent  states  and stronger  local  authorities  within 
federal states encounter permission rather than resistance.  It represents a  promise of 
lasting peace, in the sense of the 1966 prophecy of Don Lorenzo Milani - about a world  
of thousands of San Marino republics, where wars would be  guerricciole – and also 
because many more places of the world may choice to join together as Swiss cantons 
and half-cantons,  or  to  ban fratricidal  war  as  the  European Union and the  Atlantic 
Community did.
The Swiss cantons experience, along with those of many other neighborhoods of 
small  states  and  statelets,  is  also  a  concrete  promise  of  regional  and  international 
cooperation, of capacity of sustaining a virtuous cycle of good neighborly relations, of 
healthy competition and imitation of good practices, of accumulation of regional and 
international social capital.
An important literature have inspired our research, but it would well lead to open 
as many other deeper insights: the importance and the contagious potential of local, free 
and  responsible  self-government  (Putnam  D.  et  al.,  1993);  the  positive  correlation 
among political  scaling  down and economical  liberalization  (Alesina,  Spolaore,  and 
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Wacziarg, 1997); the resonance that nationalist demonstrations and secession practices 
have  within  stateless  people,  in  conjunction  with  their magnification  in  the  global 
interactive  and  interconnected  communication  system  (Cox,  2008);  the  rising 
importance of territorial politics, along with the increasing demand for local democracy, 
decentralization  and  self-government  (Keating,  1988);  the  understanding  that  small 
nations are viable and able to assure their prosperity, out of old dangerous blocs,  but 
within  post-1989  supranational  organizations  (Albrow,  1997;  Colomer,  2007);  the 
necessity  that  concepts  and  demands  of  secession  may  be  extricated  from  narrow 
agendas of national security and keeping of the status quo (Chandhoke, 2008). 
In  the  integrated westernized  and globalized  capitalistic  economy,  the middle 
classes  represent  the  core  part  of  the  socially  aware  and  mobilized  population 
(Kagarlitsky, 2006). The decline of their sense of equality and opportunity, and the drop 
of  good,  creative,  well-paid  managerial  jobs  at  their  disposal,  are  dramatic  (Parsi, 
2012). We do not share, however, a certain sense of impotence in front of the decline of 
representative  big  mass  democracies,  as  those  we  have  found,  among  many,  in 
Kurlantzick (2013).  If  democracy has temporarily  deteriorated in many giant  states as 
Russia or Nigeria, it is because they are simply still too big, expensive, ineffective. In a 
word: too centralized. We keep suggesting a distinct scaling down.
Within the strengthening of local inclusive and participative democracies, we see 
possible their full inclusion in a change. As active networks of such citizens mature and 
form  a  princely  citizenry,  their  new  collective  body  may  commit  to  make  of  its 
circumscribed territory a princely state of equals, a place worthy of a community of 
peers, founded on a general sense of reciprocal obligation; where everybody has duties, 
not only rights; has got a dignity, not only an opportunity; and democracy of the most 
prevail over the elitist and fallacious meritocracy of the fews (Lasch, 1995).
To those who justly remind us the risk that a world of dwarf states would be a 
paradise for the giant corporations (Ramonet, 1998), we that the weakening of states 
they  feared,  has  already  happened  in  past  international  political  and  economic 
integration processes, that brought with themselves the passive acceptance of the global 
unequal  dynamic  of  enrichment  and  impoverishment,  along  with  speculations  and 
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privatization of public assets, weakening of public welfare, decline of public services 
and infrastructures. We need stubborn and proud strong local democracies, sovereign 
and free peoples.
Scaled  down polities  may escalate  and overcome inequalities  that  have  been 
created in the age of integration. None more and better than a local princely citizenry 
may  do something  pragmatic,  tangible,  effective,  against  pollution,  black  economy, 
exploitation  of  children  and  women,  circulation  of  junk  food,  urban  degradation, 
education  gaps,  youth  emigration  and  abandonment  of  the  elderly.  Long  standing 
movements  for  equality,  redistribution,  liberation  of  entrepreneurship  and creativity, 
which  failed  to  change  to  status  quo  in  big  republics,  because  of  their  vertical, 
crystallized  cleavages,  may  succeed  in  smaller,  circumscribed,  more  horizontal 
societies, where the community of the princely governors and the crowd of the princely 
subjects, not only know well each other, but they practically coincide.
A world populated by increasing socially aware and mobilized peoples, may be 
more profoundly understood, we argue, through our proposed disintegration paradigm, 
a plausible, global, grand trend of geopolitical disintegration, in the Post-Cold War. To 
this theoretical insight, we have bluntly added what we considered positive and relevant 
for  the  global  political  debate,  in  terms  of  practice,  prospective,  normative  inquiry 
(Reus-Smit, 2012). And our reader is made fully aware of our sympathy for an evolved 
world anarchy.
We openly admire decolonization leaders and small-motherlands patriots, local 
liberties  fighters  and promoters  of  local  democracy,  theorists  of  bioregionalism and 
ecologists, to the extent that they mingled with and became contaminated by anarchists 
and libertarians.  We believe that  in  small  countries,  individual  freedom,  respect  for 
human  diversity,  economical  sustainable  recovery,  social  justice  and  international 
peace, may be possible as they were not in big integrationist states. We welcome, of 
course, every healthy skepticism from those not convinced that smallness is always the 
answer to the big problems.
Facing a time of geopolitical change, it would be important to rely on expertise, 
but  also  on  compassion,  and  on  a  real  interest  in  the  historical  and  geographical, 
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spiritual and material pathways that each local, defined, concrete human community is 
pursuing. When faced with a choice between action or prudence, interventionism or 
non-interference, war or peace, it is impossible to avoid severe mistakes, but one should 
at  least  be humble enough to rapidly  correct  errors,  in  order  to  spare  human lives, 
natural and cultural resources, economic riches.
There must be a ground, where social theory may have practical purposes and 
may  help  to  debunk  prejudices  and  illuminate  a  geopolitical  crisis.  Science  is 
knowledge,  knowledge  is  responsibility,  and  holding  that  to  know  is  to  bear  a 
responsibility, we join a venerable tradition, inherited from such diverse and ancient 
sources.  “The political  scientist as a professional is the knower par excellence.  It  is 
therefore immoral for him not to act on his knowledge” (Easton, 1969). Let us, then, 
discuss shortly two examples, respectively coming from one of the most war-torn and 
poor corner of the world, and the other from one of the most peaceful and rich one: 
Afghanistan-Pakistan and Quebec.
Along the Durand Line,  that  we have  long studied as  a  dangerous «Pakistan 
Fault», the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Afpak) area, instead of the Switzerland of South Asia 
it  could be,  has become an emblematic  «Disintegrationstan».  When in 1973 Daoud 
Khan  established a  modern  centralized  Pashtun nationalist  and Islamic  Republic  in 
Afghanistan, against all odds and all the lessons of Afghan history, he was prisoner of 
the bias of the age of integration. In the moment we are closing this study, forty years of 
uninterrupted wars have passed since then, all of them bloodily fought to subject the 
country  to  a  unitary  regime,  whether  pro-Soviet  or  non-aligned,  pro-Western  or 
Islamist.  Ultimately,  since 2001, a wide US-led coalition,  with UN blessing,  is  still 
fighting and financing a re-edition of a 1973-style, thus quite fragile, Islamic Republic. 
Foreign  intervention  in  Afghanistan  in  the  2010s,  insisting  on  centralized 
nation-building,  have been incessantly fueling the cycle  of violence and fanaticism, 
corruption and crime – a very questionable way of fighting post-2001 War on Terror. 
The Western and westernized mainstream  has persisted in its aggressive treatment of 
Afghanistan crisis, insisting in keeping unite and centralized a  country that, after the 
repeated collapse of successive integrationist projects, needed decentralization in large 
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doses, instead. The  crucial question remained long ignored: is a centralized state an 
appropriate  model  for  a  huge  mountainous  country,  with  strong  traditions  of  local 
self-government  and  autonomy,  and  with  significant  ethnic  differences?  (Stewart, 
2009).
On  an  another  hemisphere,  in  the  Commonwealth  of  Canada,  the  Quebec 
national  liberation  movement  has  increased  and  matured,  in  the  decades,  enforcing 
self-government  institutions,  culture,  inclusion,  pluralism,  pragmatism.  The  people 
living in the province and voting in its elections and referendum are certainly one of the 
most  interesting  early  cases  of  princely  citizenry.  The  1980  first  referendum  on 
sovereignty  was  probably  premature,  in  a  world  that  still  blindly  believed  in 
concentration of political and economic power. The  proposal to pursue secession was 
defeated by about 60 to 40 percent margin.  In the 1995, in a second referendum, in a 
time of already ongoing disintegration, the independence proposal achieved half of the 
voters, less a few thousand. It was a defeat and also a notable result, considering the 
strength  of  those  elites  that  were  defending,  along  with  Canadian  integrity  and 
economic submission to the United States, their own social status. Looking at results in 
the  constituencies,  one  may  notes  that,  having  left  an  opting-out  choice  to  a  few 
English-speaking Eastern territories and Northern native communities, the referendum 
would have been won. Quebec is a very big, and partially heterogeneous, province. The 
historical construction of its borders is an issue we cannot of  course discuss here, but 
what is evident to us, is that a princely citizenry which really want self-determination, 
must concentrate on a circumscribed and limited territory, where everybody feels fully 
included.
Independence  is  likely  and  possible  for  more  narrow  but  more  cohesive 
constituencies,  as  we are  witnessing  in  the  coming referendum in  Scotland  (2014), 
Catalonia, Flanders. In a positive process of universal redistribution of power, socially 
aware and mobilized people demand the emancipation of their periphery, but they also 
pretend the emancipation of every other.  In 1957, in his  seminal  The Breakdown of  
Nations, Leopold Kohr was deeply convinced that the bulk of the world inhabitants did 
not want to live
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“in vast meaningless realms. They want to live in their provinces, in 
their mountains, in their valleys . They want to live at home. This is 
why  they  have  clung  so  tenaciously  to  their  local  colour  and 
provincialism even when they were submerged in great empires. In the 
end,  however,  it  was  always  the  small  state,  not  the  empire,  that 
survived. That is why small states do not have to be created artificially. 
They need only to be freed” (Kohr, 1957, p 196).
In the following, and famous, Chapter Eleven, Kohr asked: “But will it be done?” 
(1957,  p.  197).  About  sixty  years  later,  he would  probably  change his  question  in: 
“Have we alternatives?”.
* * *
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I cannot believe that the Creator made man
 to leave him in an endless struggle
with the intellectual wretchedness that surrounds us...
I am ignorant of his designs,
but I shall not cease to believe in them
because I cannot fathom them,
and I had rather mistrust my own capacity
 than his justice.
(Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835-1840)
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